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
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## *The Oasis of al-Hasa*

(See page 417.)

# The Middle East Journal

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## ZIYA GÖKALP: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO TURKISH NATIONALISM

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*Niyazi Berkes*

**T**HIRTY YEARS after his death, Ziya Gökalp still stands out as the most original and influential among the Turkish writers of the 20th century.<sup>1</sup> He died on October 25, 1924, at the age of forty-nine. He produced his basic writings between 1911 and 1918, and between 1922 and 1924. In the first period he initiated a new approach to the discussion of the fundamental problems of cultural change which had become acute in Turkey following the restoration of the constitutional regime in 1908. In the second period he continued along the same lines, although many of his ideas had already materialized with the establishment of a nationalist regime in Anatolia under Atatürk.

The recurrent theme in Gökalp's writings was the question of how the Turks should adopt Western civilization, and how it should be harmonized with their two historic traditions, i.e., their Turkish and Islamic backgrounds; or, in other words, what the Turks as a nation and Islam as their

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<sup>1</sup> The best account of Gökalp's life and work to date is Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism* (London, 1950). The reader will find there a selected list of books and articles on Gökalp, p. 174.

◆ NIYAZI BERKES, docent in sociology, the University of Ankara, is visiting associate professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal. He has finished an English translation of Ziya Gökalp's prose writings which is expected to be published soon. Professor Berkes is at present engaged in a study of the development of secularism in Turkey.

religion would look like under the conditions of contemporary civilization. Raising this question was not on Gökalp's initiative. There had been others in Turkey who had anticipated or influenced him, as we shall note below; but his uniqueness lay in the fact that he was able to discuss this question in terms of a coherent, although too schematic, intellectual framework, analyze all of its ramifications, and draw certain conclusions, setting them up as formulae for a cultural policy.

This he did first amidst the throes of the declining Ottoman Empire, and then at the rather nebulous stage of the rise of a new nationalist regime, both of which, of course, conditioned his work to a great extent in form and content, in its merits as well as in its shortcomings. However, the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, following its defeat in World War I, prepared a more favorable ground for the materialization of his ideas. Although he died in the early phase of Atatürk's drastic reforms, one will find the ideas behind the main trends of these reforms in Gökalp's writings. His ideas with regard to the particulars of the Islamic reform suffered most during the ensuing period of drastic secularism. However, I believe that if he had lived longer, he would have been able to reconcile himself to the Atatürk policy because his ideas on the caliphacy were already at variance with the logical consequences of his Westernist nationalism, being rather fanciful utopias designed to find a basis of internationality to Turkish nationalism. Furthermore, we know that the constitutional clauses on secularism and the freedom of conscience and thinking were from his pen as he was a member of the committee which prepared the new constitution in 1924. Probably it would have been more difficult for him to reconcile himself with the radical purist language reform policy followed by Atatürk. Nevertheless, he remains as the best intellectual formulator of the main trends of the Turkish Republic: Westernism, democracy, political and economic national independence, and secularism. Although, in actual practice, there have been deviations from some of his contentions, it is still his style of thinking with regard to the basic issues which has intellectually dominated the modern reforms in Turkey.

The practical orientation of Gökalp's ideas and their close association with political action during the years preceding and following World War I have led many critics to blame him for Turkey's political misfortunes. But in spite of this ideological association, he always remained outside of politics and lived as a teacher and writer. He never assumed any responsible public office and never aimed at any political or personal gain. He lived almost in privation. He had none of the aptitudes of the man of action. He was extremely shy and introversive. At the same time, he had an exceptional charismatic power over the youth of Turkey and even over the politicians of the Party of Union and Progress. He was the type of intellectual not infrequently found in the East: a spiritual guide, an inspirer, a *mürşid*, as



he was called in Turkey. He had marked Sufi inclinations, and the influence of *tasawwuf* always remained conspicuous in his thinking. This helps to explain a paradoxical situation with regard to his position today. In spite of his enormous influence during his lifetime and the prestige he still holds, his writings, with the exception of some scattered publications, are to a large extent unknown and unread. Certain slogans and catchwords which he popularized have remained in the memories and on the lips of the people. Some of his ideas are completely forgotten or have become distorted; a few which he clearly rejected are still ascribed to him. Socialistically inclined étatists, extremist racists, Westernists, and liberals saw him in different ways. His solidarism, or syndicalism, and his caliphate utopia are completely forgotten. Only a fraction of his writings have been repeatedly printed in the Latin script, but until now no edition of his complete writings has appeared<sup>2</sup> and not even a complete and reliable bibliography of his writings exists.<sup>3</sup>

One of the reasons for this situation is, of course, the change in the Turkish alphabet. There are, however, other reasons to account for it. One of these, perhaps, is the fact that he published most of his prose writings in periodical reviews, or even in daily newspapers, in the form of short essays. Even the few books published in his lifetime, with the exception of one or two, were collections of his essays. Some of the reviews or newspapers to which he contributed are not easily available today — they were short-lived, and few copies still exist.

Another factor was that Gökalp's most active period of writing corresponded to the most unstable and critical periods of Turkish history, unfavorable to continuous, careful, and detailed book writing. For this reason, as he confessed himself, he never had time to write comprehensive studies to elaborate his historical, sociological, or philosophical ideas. And, finally, there is a social-psychological fact to be remembered in this connection. In periods of upheaval, transformation, and confusion, ideas which win mass appeal tend to become myths. Under such circumstances, people miss the fine distinctions a thinker makes in his concepts, the precise and subtle definitions he gives of his terms, and tend instead to stereotype them. Thus, for example, even today many people fail to understand Gökalp's insistence on a distinction between culture and civilization, or between race and nationality; and one wonders how an anti-Western jingoism or a doctrine of racism has come to be derived from his writings.

<sup>2</sup> The Turkish Historical Society recently announced the publication of his complete writings. So far, however, only the first volume has appeared, containing his poems and tales: *Ziya Gökalp Külliyyatı*, vol. 1, *Şiirler ve Halk Masalları*, edited by Fevziye A. Tansel (Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınlarından, Seri II, No. 18 (Ankara, 1952)).

<sup>3</sup> The best bibliography so far published is Cavit Orhan Tütengil, *Ziya Gökalp Hakkında bir Bibliyografya Denemesi* (İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Yayınlarından, No. 13 (İstanbul, 1949)).

Gökalp himself, however, was very systematic in the use of his terminology. On this matter he was perhaps too mechanistic and arbitrary. He used to pigeonhole his facts and put labels on them, and then proceed with his discussion by manipulating these symbols. In doing this, he had little regard for existing terms or even for the facts themselves. He either used his symbol-terms in the meanings he ascribed for them, or else invented new ones which were unknown until then. This, too, has been one of the reasons for the confusion in the exact meanings of his symbol-terms. He felt he had to do this because, in order to find his solutions, he had to revolutionize the sociological and political language of the Turkey of his time. Those who fail to see his ultimate aims usually tend to miss the exact meanings of his terms as well, and to turn them into mystified fetishes.

Bearing in mind these points about Gökalp's personality, influence, language, and symbols, we shall discuss first the general intellectual situation before him and the problems he faced, then how he approached them, how he treated them anew in terms of his early philosophical outlook, and finally the general conclusions which he proposed as a program of action with regard to the economic, political, religious, legal, and cultural problems of Turkey.

## II

The beginnings of the major problems which Gökalp treated are to be found in the first half of the 19th century, in the Tanzimat period of Turkish history. They came about mainly as a result of attempts to reorganize the political, legal, and administrative structure of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, it is true, had already been touched by the impact of the West. There had been signs in the 18th century that, in spite of resistance, the idea of Turkey having to adapt itself to the requirements of European civilization continuously gained ascendancy.<sup>4</sup> But neither in political organization, nor in social life or cultural and intellectual spheres, can we find any substantial change in the older Ottoman system, which was then in a state of corruption and disorganization. In the political field sultanism still reigned as a political-military-fiscal system of the Ottomans. Its two pillars, the benefice system of the Sipahis and the Janissary organization, still remained, although only in an entirely degenerate form. Why the vast and efficient military, agrarian, and administrative organization of the Ottomans was disrupted before the effective modern European economic and political impact started in the 19th century is a question still almost untouched today but beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say here, however, that these factors were not much different in nature from those which had given rise to modern European economic and political institutions. Our present con-

<sup>4</sup> See Bernard Lewis, "The Impact of the French Revolution in Turkey," *Journal of World History*, vol. 1 (July 1953), pp. 105-125.



cern is to note that in the 18th century — in spite of such novelties as the introduction of the printing press — intellectual life in Turkey was still under the domination of the *medrese* and was thoroughly scholastic. Likewise, literature and art were in a state of a rigid formalism and conventionalism.

It was only at the beginning of the 19th century that the feeling of dissatisfaction which had run through the 18th century turned into a decision to introduce Western methods. The first radical step was the destruction of the Janissary system, together with a fight against feudalization, which was taking the place of the previous benefice system. For the first time in Ottoman history it had become necessary to destroy an important institution in order to introduce new ones, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of Peter the Great's reforms in Russia a century earlier. The Tanzimat edicts of 1839 and 1856 were but official confirmation of this movement; henceforth it became an established policy to abolish old institutions which were found to be incompatible with corresponding modern institutions and to found new ones on the European models.

Two factors, however, led to the unsatisfactory application of this idea. To follow this principle would necessitate ultimately a radical change in the ruling institution itself, which was the only force to put the policy into practice. In other words, a despotic monarchy had to democratize itself — a situation observed also in Russian history. The second factor was the inevitable economic and political consequences of the contact of a medieval society with the full-grown European expansionist economy and politics. Under the pressure of the difficulties arising mainly from these two factors, the leaders of the Tanzimat reforms failed to pursue their program of modernization wholeheartedly as well as to understand the full scope and nature of the social transformation in which they were involved. This hesitancy inevitably led to imitation, opportunism, and inconsistencies. One of the consequences was the creation of a series of dichotomies in almost every field of life. In politics, in administration, in the legal and juridical system, in education, in intellectual life, two sets of institutions, two sets of ideas, two loyalties — one to the old and the other to the new — were standing side by side.

The man who diagnosed the morbid nature of this situation and recognized it as a major obstacle to progress toward the establishment of a modern state was Namık Kemal (1840–1888). He attempted to show the original, or rather idealized, forms of the religious, moral, and legal institutions which were associated with Islam, and the original, or idealized, forms of the political institutions of the old Ottoman tradition at the time of its prime; and, at the same time, those aspects of civilization of the West which had given progress, prosperity, and superiority to the European nations. By his discussion of these three elements, he arrived at the con-

clusion that there were no basic contradictions between them. Islam, according to him, would provide the moral and legal bases of society; the Ottoman tradition of statecraft, together with its multinational and multi-religious cosmopolitan policy of toleration, would be the political framework of the Ottoman (not Turkish) state; and Western civilization would furnish the material and practical methods and techniques to enable this system to survive in the contemporary world of power and economic progress.

In this way Namık Kemal distinguished the areas of the three elements in the life of the 19th century Turks. For him, the most important factor in the failure of the Tanzimat was the confusion which reigned in their minds with regard to these three elements. Thus, for example, the *shariat* was dropped in order to take codes from France, while European methods in techniques of education, government, science, economy, and agriculture were not introduced. By their naive wishes to modernize the state, the men of the Tanzimat reforms unnecessarily undertook economic and political obligations toward European powers which robbed the Ottoman state of all independence and integrity. In their administration, they did not apply any of the principles of modern democratic regimes. But neither the old Ottoman political institutions nor Muslim law were in reality incompatible with democracy and progress or with modern science. The main reasons why they were thought to be so were, first, the fact that all of these traditions had lost their original functions, and secondly, that the imposing penetration of European imperialism prevented their smooth adaptation.

The course of events at first ran counter to Namık Kemal's ideas and led to their repudiation. Following the constitutional revolution of 1908, however, they were almost completely revived, but in a different atmosphere. Under the previous suppressive regime the attempt at reconciliation between the elements which Namık Kemal had discussed gave rise to three ideological movements, each of which capitalized one of the three elements at the expense of the others. Thus reactionary Islamic groups, zealous to defend Islam against the increasing criticisms of the missionaries and the new group of European orientalist and thinkers, like Renan, provided the support for Sultan Abdul Hamid's pan-Islamic policy. Over against them, the secular intelligentsia — now increased in number because of the new secular educational institutions and enlightened through increasing contacts with European literature and thought — stood up as protagonists of the idea of Westernism. In addition to these, there arose a small, weak group becoming interested in an entirely new concept: Turkishness. Stimulated by the political, economic, and literary awakening of the Turkish-speaking peoples under Russian rule in the 19th century, by the new interest of certain romantically inspired European writers (such as Léon Cahun), by the increasing effect of the movement "toward the people" initiated by Namık Kemal's teacher Shinasi and of its interest in the basic Turkish language

and past, and, finally, by the nationalist movements of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities of the Ottoman Empire, together with those of certain European pan-movements, such as pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, a group of writers shifted the attention which the Islamists paid to the Islamic past of the Muslim-Turkish Ottomans to the ethnic past of the Turks themselves.<sup>5</sup>

However, the Islamists and Westernists, as well as those interested in the Turkish masses and culture, were all Ottomanists at heart so far as political problems were concerned. Even the Young Turks, who were active in foreign countries beyond reach of the suppressive regime, were not clear on these issues. Only gradually and through discussion in party conventions, or through communications and publishing did they come to ask the question: For what are we fighting? For a new sultan? For a new constitutional Ottoman state which would guarantee the rights and privileges of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities of the empire? All of the Westernist Ottomanists were highly shocked when they were confronted with the nationalist demands of the representatives of these communities. For obvious reasons, none of them could admit nationalism either for their non-Muslim and non-Turkish colleagues or for themselves.

During these prerevolutionary years of discussion and intellectual confusion, only one voice reflected the views of the new nationalist group on a political level. That was Yusuf Akçora (1876-1933), who, in turn, was inspired by Hüseyinzade Ali, a doctor from the Caucasus.<sup>6</sup> He discussed Turkism as a pan-Turanian movement in comparison with the pan-Islamist and pan-Ottomanist policies. Akçora pointed out that the concern of the Islamists and the Ottomanists was primarily to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to create an international block against European aggression. He proposed another pan-idea which was equally grandiose, but perhaps more effective and more modern as well as more useful to the Turks.

### III

Ziya Gökalp was a young small-town student. He was idealistic and had an intense patriotic zeal. But he had none of the opportunities of the Turkist scholars of Istanbul or the pan-Turanist ambitions of the sophisticated and experienced exiles in Europe. When he came to Istanbul in 1896, from Diyarbakır, his home town in southeastern Anatolia, the concepts of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism were under discussion among the intellectuals. The fact that he wrote poetry which reflected the influence of Namık Kemal, the utopian Islamist, and of Tevfik Fikret, the Westernist humanist, plus Sufism, shows that he was struggling and wavering between

<sup>5</sup> For a recent account of the rise and development of nationalist historiography in Turkey, see the admirable article by Bernard Lewis, "History-writing and National Revival in Turkey," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, vol. 4 (June-July, 1953), pp. 218ff.

<sup>6</sup> See Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

the three trends. He was fighting within himself the battle which intellectuals and politicians were waging on other levels. His temperament, his environment in his home town, and his education brought these three forces together to struggle against each other: mysticism, theology, and natural sciences. Later these took a more intellectualized garb in the terminology of his writings as Turkish culture, Islam, and contemporary civilization.

In spite of his obscurity before 1908, Gökalp quickly became known, at least within a small circle, in the years following the constitutional revolution. He is then found in Salonika associated with the Party of Union and Progress, around which was a group of young intellectuals who longed for a new life without knowing, however, what it was they wanted or how it would be realized. It was a time when Turkey had to exert enormous effort to recover not only from the effects of corruption, tyranny, and economic bankruptcy, but also from moral and intellectual confusion; indeed, a complete reconstruction of Turkey was considered by most intellectuals to be of the utmost urgency. An intense patriotism, in reaction against the nationalist movements among the non-Muslim and non-Turkish peoples of the decadent empire, provided the emotional background.

Gökalp readily came to the conclusion that a mere political change meant nothing unless it was followed by a social and cultural revolution. But the intellectuals, as well as the politicians, were still hopelessly divided in their opinions as to the proper basis for social reconstruction. After the revolution the conservatives among them boldly urged a reversion to the *shariat* of the Islamic *ümmet*. On the other hand the liberals — those who more staunchly supported the idea of Westernization — could say nothing but that everything existing was “irrational” and everything coming from Europe was “rational.” Only vaguely did they hope for a secular basis of reintegration. And, finally, there were the Turkists, who longed for the romantic ideal of racial or ethnic unity of the Turks and preached a return to the pre-Islamic past.

Gökalp found some truth in each but fully agreed with none. He rather followed Namık Kemal's middle road: that only the material civilization of Europe should be taken and not its nonmaterial aspects. Namık Kemal had been forced to pay a high price for this conviction as he failed to see the incompatibility between the demands of modern civilization and those of Turkey's traditional institutions. However, in developing this conviction, Gökalp did not follow Namık Kemal's track, but proceeded with an approach which signified the shift from Tanzimat rationalism, inspired by the 18th-century thinkers of the European Enlightenment, to the romantic thinking of the 19th century. He believed that both Islamists and Westernists based their ideas on individual reason, and that the individual and his reason cannot be criteria for social reconstruction as they lead either to conservatism or to utopianism, both of which are blind to realities. The new reconstruction would proceed not from the reason of individuals, but from



the reason of society. No one can restore or revive a dead institution at will, or import new ones, on order, from Europe. In terms of an idealistic philosophy, he accepted the transcendental reality of society, identifying it with the nation in a way reminiscent of the German Romanticists or the Russian Slavophiles and populists. He believed that it is the people, or the nation, which is the final and unerring criterion of what is desirable or undesirable, what is to be taken and what rejected. Whatever the "collective conscience" of the people accepts is "normal"; whatever it rejects is "pathological." As the ultimate reality of contemporary society is the nation, and as national ideals are ultimate forces orienting the behavior of the individuals, so for the Turks their most urgent task consisted in awakening as a nation in order to adapt themselves to the conditions of contemporary civilization. He transformed the Turkism of the purist pan-Turkists from a mere political concept into a cultural one.

Having an unlimited faith in sociology as the supreme positive science,<sup>7</sup> Gökalp felt that it was the primary task of this science to determine what the Turkish people already possessed or lacked to be a modern nation.

#### IV

To investigate this question, Gökalp began by describing what he believed to be the basic malady of the then existing cultural situation in Turkey. This consisted of his diagnosis of the dichotomies in every field of Turkey's social life. On the one hand was the people with its intimate, informal institutions, its religion, its art, and its thinking; on the other was the official organization, with its formal, artificial institutions, all borrowed from the civilizations of the East and the West: its *fıkḥ*, its *divan* literature, its hodgepodge of unintelligible language, and all its imitations of the superficialities of French civilization. None of these took root among the

<sup>7</sup> Gökalp knew the ideas of the major schools of European sociology of the late 19th century. He found most congenial to his own thinking Emile Durkheim's conception of sociology, its methods, divisions, etc., as well as its philosophical basis. His belief in Durkheim's sociology as the science of society led some critics to the conviction that Gökalp merely imitated Durkheim. It is true that he did not deviate from a Durkheimian understanding of sociology. This was not fortuitous, because, like Durkheim, Gökalp too was a student of philosophy trying to develop a philosophy of values and of action from a reconciliation between positivism and idealism, which he attempted before he became acquainted with Durkheim's writings. In developing his sociological analyses of the cultural problems of Turkey, he proceeded with this philosophy, which he later called sociological idealism, and utilized data, sources, concepts, and methods not alike to those found with Durkheim. His discussion of culture and civilization and his views on nation and nationalism — which, I believe, constitute the core of his social philosophy — are entirely lacking in Durkheim (see Heyd, *op. cit.*, p. 66). On these points he is nearer to some of the German sociologists, such as Tönnies (*ibid.*, pp. 67ff.) and Alfred Weber, and even reminds us of some ideas expressed in W. G. Sumner's *Folkways*. No direct influence of these sociologists, however, has been established so far. It seems to this writer that Gökalp developed his ideas on the above mentioned points quite independently, although they were one possible logical consequence of Namık Kemal's distinction of the two aspects of Western civilization. For a brief account of the various sociological ideas current in Turkey before and after Gökalp, see the writer's article, "Sociology in Turkey," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 2 (September, 1936), pp. 238-246.

people, remaining not only alien but mutually incompatible. To Gökalp, the reason for this anomalous situation was a lack of adjustment between the two essential but distinct aspects of social life, *civilization* and *culture*.

The concepts of culture and civilization thus occupied a major position in his thinking, yet they puzzled many of his critics who tried to see wherein lay the importance of making a sharp distinction between the two. If his analyses are taken as a whole, however, these two concepts do not represent antithetical and mutually exclusive entities, but rather two closely related and complementary traits of social reality. Briefly stated, civilization refers to modes of action composed of the "traditions" which are created by different ethnic groups and transmitted from one to another. Culture, on the other hand, is composed of the "mores" of a particular nation and, consequently, is unique and *sui generis*. The "traditions" are rational forms of behavior imposed upon individuals by their common civilization, while "mores" represent the specific value judgments, or ethos, of a particular nation. Culture constitutes a system whose elements have an integral connection with one another on the basis of a peculiar logic which constitutes the ethos; civilization, on the other hand, is a product of detachment from that logic. Civilizational elements assume meaning and function in the life of men only when they enter into the service of culture. Without a cultural basis, civilization becomes merely a matter of mechanical imitation; it never penetrates into the inner life of a people and never gives fruit of any kind.

That was exactly what had happened in Turkey and perhaps in other Muslim nations, where civilization had come to be a mere skeleton corroding and annihilating all cultural flesh and blood of the social body. When a new civilization presented itself from the West, this lifeless skeleton lost all meaning and creativity. With this addition of the impact of Western civilization, the situation presented a three-fold difficulty to thinking minds, but the question was basically the same dichotomy between civilization and culture.

The remedy, according to Gökalp, lay in discovering the basic social unit which is the source of cultural values. To him, that source was the form of society which he called "nation." The nation, he furthermore believed, is that independent social unit which is at the basis of modern (Western) civilization. In other words, modern Western civilization is the international product of several peoples who have reached the stage of nationhood in the course of social evolution. Turkey was in turmoil because it was in the process of transformation from a theocratic (*ümmet*) civilization to a civilization based on modern nationality, the full nature of which was still unknown. In order to prove these points, it was necessary for him to establish the sociological reality of the "nation" in terms of social evolution, trace its historical formation, analyze its elements, and, finally, develop a method of cultural criticism with a view to discovering the roots of maladjustments and the means of their amelioration.



Gökalp's ideas all revolved around his understanding of "nation," and undoubtedly this constitutes his major contribution to Turkish thought. The word *millet*, which now stands for "nation," at that time simply meant a religious community. Even Namık Kemal, who for the first time awakened a national consciousness among his people, failed in his Islamic utopianism to see the unreality of such a concept of nation within the framework of contemporary civilization. Gökalp set about giving the Turks a new definition, and in this he surpassed in success his predecessors as well as his contemporaries. He mobilized all his energies to demolish the theocratic conception of nationality. It was his mission to demonstrate that the average Turk, who at that time used to identify himself as a Muslim member of the Ottoman "nation," was confusing nation with two other sociological entities. One was *ümme*, an international religious community, and the other was a political organization comprising in itself several nationalities as well as religious communities. In addition, Gökalp pointed out, with the rise of Westernism and pan-Turkism, "nation" came to be confused with two other concepts: with race or ethnic family, and with contemporary international civilization. The true nation could be identified with neither of these.

To Gökalp the social process is visible only in the historical development of nations from primitive societies to the societies of contemporary Western civilization. In the course of this evolution every society develops a specific culture. There is no continuous process of evolution of the totality of human society. Societies may, however, be grouped by species. Interdependence, factual relations, and similarities between societies of the same species lead to the formation of intersociety groupings or "civilization circles," but, according to Gökalp, these are "communities" rather than "societies." From a sociological point of view, they remain weak and loose formations because they lack common binding cultural values. Only civilizational links tie them together, whereas societies, or nations, follow characteristic life attitudes and an immanent development.

However, throughout the social evolution from the primitive segmental type of society to present-day organic society, the confines of the nation have widened, chiefly through a civilizational process. Thus, the modern nation is a new type. The primary factor in its formation is neither race or ethnic unity nor a symbiotic coexistence with other nations within a political, religious internationality or a civilization circle. The modern nation is a community in a unique complex of cultural values, on the one hand, and a society based on organic solidarity, division of labor, and functional differentiation, on the other. The ethnic societies which have emerged as modern nations went through a sort of period of captivity within international politico-religious civilizations, and as a result of the disintegration of these civilizations, have come out as entirely new formations with the development of the processes of secularization and democratization. Nations never come into existence out of nothing, as we see in all the vain attempts at creating

artificial nationalities. They must have an ethnic basis, must undergo a process of transformation within supranational formations, and must experience the revival of national consciousness under great events. Although nations turn to their ethnic past during their revival and think that they are continuations of it, they are no longer the same ethnic units and cannot return to archaic conditions. Neither can a modern nation carry on the hang-overs of its imperial or theocratic civilization. It is a homogenized product of various racial, ethnic, and religious elements welded to one another by historical catastrophes and is no longer reducible to its elements. In this new form of nation, all hang-overs from the tribal or theocratic civilizational elements now become "pathological." Only cultural remains are normal, because it is only these that are alive and capable of giving cohesion and orientation to the life of the nation.

The modern nation is an independent cultural unit within the confines of contemporary civilization. However, the two stand in rather precarious relation to each other. As in the past ethnic societies were swallowed by larger civilizational groups, so modern nations have to remain in the orbit of contemporary civilization. Will this lead to merging in a larger international society? Gökalp is skeptical of the expectations to that effect and dismisses them as utopias. Only civilizational organizations may arise in the future, and of their effectiveness he is not fully convinced. Like many of his contemporaries, he does not attach much value to the high-sounding international ideals of contemporary civilization. Only nations have social reality as cultural units.

However, Gökalp's main concern is not the future problems of modern nations within the contemporary civilizational internationality, but rather the immediate problems of Turkey vis-à-vis Western civilization. His purpose in dealing with the relations between culture and civilization was to explore the difficulty of producing adjustment and harmony between the two, especially when a culture is trying to extricate itself from one circle of civilization in order to enter another. That was the tragic situation in the case of Turkey, which was different from those of the modern nations arising out of the folds of European Christianity. The Turks inherited from their past their ethnic culture, which withstood the enormous impact of a highly developed Eastern civilization and today has proved its power of survival. Only the unity engendered by this culture remained as a refuge for the Turks from the dangers of extinction in the past as well as at present. They also inherited a political system and a religion from the internationality of the East; both, however, were now confronted with a civilization before which they were in a process of collapse. The Turks obviously could not cease to be Turks, nor would they desire to do so; neither could they extricate themselves from their religion by the power of reason or enlightenment, since it had taken deep roots in the culture of the people even though its *fiqh* and its *medrese* never succeeded in doing that. But as a

nation they had to adapt themselves to contemporary secular Western civilization, since the civilization to which they belonged in the past was neither secular nor adaptable to modern nationality. This was the problem of cultural criticism which Gökalp finally aimed at solving.

## V

Gökalp's distinctions and definitions so far had been aimed at a clearer discussion of this problem. He believed that he had formulated the outlines of a branch of sociology which we might call a sociology of culture, a normative discipline based on the general positive science of sociology. By applying the principles of his sociology of culture, he came to the conclusion that the three factors represented by the three ideologies (Islamism, Westernism, and Turkism) were not, in reality, incompatible with one another, provided that the areas of the national social life to which they referred were viewed from correct angles. Then would it be seen that they are even complementary to each other *within the framework of the modern nation*.

The Islamists were wrong because they did not see the reality of the nation as distinct from the theocratic *ümmet*. They insisted on the restoration of, or return to, the *shariat*, which was, in fact, nothing but a civilizational crystallization of law fitted to an *ümmet*. They failed to distinguish the universally valid truths in Islam from those aspects which were only socially and temporally relevant, and therefore identified the first with the second. They identified religion with law and ritual, as would be normal within the framework of a theocratic *ümmet*. Thus, they failed to see Islam as having a universal message for the pious, good man, and a moral, ethical character. That is why one finds religious fanaticism and moral laxity side by side. They made Islam something concerned with only the technicalities and intricacies of the observance of ritual and legal rules, and inevitably stood against everything new because they identified life with rules. They wanted to maintain the same rigidity, nay, even to tighten it, in the face of the increasing pace of progress under contemporary conditions, and as a result came to clash more violently with the needs of the nation. Here lay the source of the idea that Islam and contemporary civilization are incompatible — the basic conviction of the Westernists.

But the latter were wrong in their convictions too. Gökalp contemptuously called them the zealots of Europeanism, as he called the former the zealots of *fikh'ism*. In spite of the undeniably great service performed by the Europeanist leaders of the Tanzimat reforms, they were wrong because they did not take care to proceed in terms of a cultural framework. They were like automatons in what they did, devoid of meaningful objectives. They were under the illusion of certain civilizational fictions, for example as they desperately tried to convince the people that the Ottoman community was a nation. Their political system had nothing to do with the political structure

of modern democratic nations. They thought that an autocratic and theocratic system would be modernized when partially modified by a half-hearted Europeanization which allowed all meaningless superficialities and formalities to enter full sway.

Viewed from the right angle, however, Westernization was not only compatible with Turkey's national culture, but was even indispensable to its flourishing. A full-fledged national culture can come into existence only when its raw material, still on an ethnic and folk level, is worked with the fresh techniques of a civilization to which many nations have contributed. Neither was there an incompatibility between Western civilization and Islam. In order to defend this latter thesis, Gökalp had to refute two contentions of the Islamists shared by many Europeans, and a constant sore point and dilemma to the Westernists: he rejected the idea that Islam was a civilization, and that Western civilization was synonymous with Christianity. It is true that religions have developed civilizational forms, but it is equally true that they have given cultural content to the ethos of nations. Civilization is basically free from value judgments; it is a matter of factual reality. And, furthermore, contemporary civilization, arising out of the victory of the rational mind and positive science over civilizational Christianity, is destined to become more secular as it encompasses Muslims, like the Turks, and neither Muslims nor Christians, like the Japanese. Therefore, the acceptance of contemporary Western civilization has nothing to do with either nationality or faith. The confusion on this point is due to a confusing of culture with civilization.

At this point, in connection with the problem of the relation between culture and civilization, there emerges an interesting question which we would expect our author to discuss. To what extent were the cultural and the religious backgrounds of the Turkish nationality receptive and stimulating to contemporary Western civilization? Many Europeanists of his time thought that they were not. Gökalp, on the other hand, wanted to demonstrate the contrary. In order to prove that Turkish culture was not only favorable but even conducive to the requirements of modern civilization, he preferred to resort to dubious history rather than examine the present existing institutions of the people. Apparently he felt it necessary to discover the original ethnic basis of Turkish culture. But the infancy of the Turkological studies of his time, his questionable competence in the field compared to the authority of such present-day scholars as Fuad Köprülü, the insufficient character of the materials he used, and his too evident bias in using these materials cast shadows on the credibility of his findings, or at least on his methods. However that may be, Gökalp's conclusions were entirely new and fascinating to his contemporaries. With bold generalizations he proclaimed that the basic Turkish cultural traits were not those salient features of the so-called Oriental institutions which were regarded as contrary to modern civilization and had long been associated with the Turks, such as



polygamy, the seclusion of women and their low status, fatalism, and asceticism. Neither was that sickly Oriental music or that fearful conception of a transcendental God Turkish at all. These were imposed upon the Islamized Turks, chiefly through the infiltration of the civilizational traditions of the Near East into the *fikh* books, into the *medrese* teaching, and into the *enderun* (palace) etiquette and the *divan* art. They never got a hold over the Turkish ethos. They had a place only among the de-Turkified and "civilized" Ottoman intelligentsia.

The same features were also traditionally attributed to Islam. But to Gökalp they were not inherent in Islam, as he found their origins elsewhere. Certain elements of Arab and, secondarily, Persian culture had crept into the *shariat*. When cultural elements of a certain social species of a particular time became common civilizational elements, they try to impose themselves as value judgments on the national ethos by book, law, court, or state. But in spite of the sanctioning of these institutions, certain tribal customs, such as *lex talionis*, or polygamy, remained only in the *fikh* books and never became universal institutions of Turkish culture.

The only customs or habits or ideas existing among the Turkish people which were not compatible with modern civilization, Gökalp believed, were those which remained as survivals or fossils of such dead institutions and were, therefore, easy to eradicate. He always urged the men of reform not to be frightened by them since they were functionless appendices on the social body, to be cut out with one stroke without damaging the life of the nation — provided it is nourished by fresh cultural and civilizational nutrients. (Atatürk, in his iconoclastic decisions, later proved him to be right.)

Gökalp tried to find yardsticks to judge the genuinely basic culture traits and thus to distinguish, in terms of his understanding of good and bad, the normal from the pathological, i.e., those elements which are incompatible with modern conditions. As mentioned earlier, he found one in going back to pre-Islamic origins. As a second means, he accepted the various manifestations of the ethos of the nation as real criteria. One of them, according to him, was carried through the Great Man, the genius, the hero, and the sage. These men, with their exceptional power of insight and intuition and utmost sincerity, were the real representatives of the national ethos as well as the mainsprings of progress. It is absurd, he believed, to take the opinion or behavior of the average man as a criterion of action. And, finally, there are the works of the anonymous collectivity. The people learned humanity, goodness, and meaning in life not from the dead books of the doctors of law or the artificial, unnatural literature of the courts. Their hearts and imaginations for centuries had been nurtured not by these, but by their own humble religious experiences in their mystic fraternities and by their aesthetic experiences in their rich folklore. These institutions of the people, which constitute a virgin and fertile soil for the creation of a modern cul-

ture, should be studied, learned, and cultivated by the elite of the nation, who are the bearers of modern civilization and the builders of the future modern national culture. Their cravings to create will be satisfied, not by blind imitation or parrotlike repetition of the cultural products of the nations of Western civilization, but by refining this store of raw material through the knowledge, techniques, and skills which they acquire from modern civilization.

## VI

This was, in short, the message which Gökalp brought from his cultural analyses to the leaders of Turkish national reconstruction. His program shows that his original three-fold treatment, in the final analysis, amounted to a two-fold directive: toward the culture of the people and toward contemporary civilization. Uncover culture in order to reach civilization. Base on a secure foundation in order to achieve progress.

What were the tangible effects of his teachings? By taking the nation and the people as the ultimate cultural, political, and economic unit, he paved the way to a view of Turkey as a nation, as a national state, and ultimately as a democracy. By differentiating Turkey from a theocratic conception of the *ümmet*, he prepared the Turks for a secular view of religion, culture, and civilization. Stressing the possibility of incorporating Western civilization on a Turkish cultural foundation, he prepared the way for a dynamic policy. He also initiated a new historical and sociological interest in the pre-Islamic past of the Turks and in the history of the actual institutions of Islam in contrast to Islam as conceived within the theoretical framework of the *shariat*. He stimulated a vigorous and passionate interest in folk culture. If his own researches on history, folklore, and sociology have little value compared to the works of Turkish and foreign scholars of our time, this does not at all minimize his significance as a pathfinder and explorer. If some of his ideas are almost forgotten in present-day Turkey, and if some of them, quite new in his time, seem merely commonplace today, it is because they have become facts. All this shows the depth of his influence and the scope of his vision.

We see, therefore, that Gökalp was not a philosopher, although he did have a philosophy which always remained in the background. He was neither a sociologist in any real sense, nor a historian. Equally influential as a talker, lecturer, professor, and man of public affairs, Gökalp consecrated his writings as well as his teachings to giving a new orientation to the thinking of a people which was, as he believed, in a stage of transition from one civilization to another; and to showing up new goals to be pursued in order to achieve this transformation. Whatever his shortcomings as a philosopher or sociologist, he will remain in Turkish history as a genuine thinker who had an exceptional insight into existing problems and a vision of a brighter future.



# ISRAEL'S DISTORTED ECONOMY

Jenny Nasmyth

IT IS NO PROBLEM to learn of Israel's great achievements. In government publications, in Zionist pamphlets, in documents relating to the Bond Drive<sup>1</sup> one can read how industrial production has risen 143 percent since the founding of the state; how agricultural production has risen 97 percent; how land under cultivation has increased 122 percent; and how over 700,000 Jews have been gathered into the Promised Land, doubling the population in five years. It is impossible not to be moved by this statistical evidence of a living zeal, just as it is impossible not to be impressed by the way in which devotion is conquering the desert of the Negev while the Arab desert still stretches to the east and south, and by the way immigrants from Yemen, Budapest, or New York leave behind their old lives for the sake of building anew.

It is no problem, as well, to learn of the abnormal disadvantages from which these people have suffered. All underdeveloped countries have their difficulties, but Israel has some exclusively its own. Its Arab neighbors still insist that a state of war exists between them and Israel. This insistence inhibits the development of Israel's economy in a number of obvious ways. The first is the Arab boycott (including the closure of the Suez Canal), which deprives it of a cheap source of foodstuffs and of an easy outlet for its manufactured goods. The second is the consequent obligation to maintain a standing army and universal conscription at a cost of half the ordinary budget. The third is the severance, by Iraq, of the oil pipeline to Haifa, which not only restricts the British-owned refinery to 20 percent of capacity, but obliges Israel to pay foreign currency for oil (the equivalent of \$45 million in 1953) which it could normally expect to get for local currency. Furthermore, this boycott has been superimposed on other disadvantages which are beyond the control of the state. The most obvious of these are a dry climate, a clay soil, and the absence of any natural surpluses of raw materials; the failure of the Mandate to industrialize or in other ways to diversify the unbalanced economy of Palestine; the effect of the World War on citrus production (which has always been Israel's largest single source of exports), followed by the devastation of more than half

<sup>1</sup> E.g., Ministry of Finance, *Data and Plans Submitted to the Jerusalem Conference, October 1953* (Jerusalem, 1953).

♦ JENNY NASMYTH, Foreign Editor of the London *Spectator*, contributed the chapter on Economics and Finance to *The New State of Israel* (London, 1954), edited by Gerald de Gaury. The present article is based in part on material collected during a recent visit to Israel.

the groves in the Palestine war; and above all, the need to absorb a vast immigrant population that was unused to manual labor, that was often sick and dispossessed.

It is common knowledge, then, that in the face of great and irremovable obstacles, Israel has struggled bravely and to some extent successfully with its economic problems. But just because Israel's success in the face of external difficulties is so comparatively well known, the main purpose of this article is to examine the other side of the picture: the degree of failure, and the internal difficulties that are contributing to it.

## II

The central failure is that the cost of Israel's imports in 1953 was still, in spite of a progressive decrease since 1951, nearly five times the value of Israel's exports. This ratio is not only much higher than had been anticipated in successive economic plans, but very much higher than most economists — inside or outside Israel — think is safe or healthy.<sup>2</sup>

In the normal course of events, the Israelis must expect to have substantially less foreign aid available to them in five years' time. It is possible that before five years are up, some dramatic development will come about: a new crisis which will swell the contributions of world Jewry, or a new patron, or the discovery of oil. It is arguable that the right course for Israel is to assume that such a miracle will happen and to take little heed for the morrow; it is arguable, and some Zionist idealists are prone to argue it. But there are others in Israel, many of them in responsible places, who now realize that some of the ideals of Zion have proved excessively expensive; that their cost may be the ruin of Israel; and that at the moment it may be more important to cut costs than it is to preserve the ideals.

For purposes of simplification the representatives of these two trends of thought will be called the "idealists" and the "economists." The "idealists" believe that Israel's greatest economic asset is its faith. They believe that the hostility, both of its climate and of its neighbors, has only been overcome in the past by the passionate faith of its people in Zionism. They say, and they may well be right, that the early colonists would never have drained the malarial swamps, cultivated rocky and barren ground, or defended their cattle from thieves in the night had they not been convinced that they were founding a new way of life, not merely for themselves but for the entire Jewish people. The "idealists" also say that to dilute this idea, to compromise with reality now, would be to abandon when it is most needed the factor in Zionist history that has been responsible for the series of miracles on which the state was founded and on which, for the time

<sup>2</sup> See Balance of Payments 1953, annexed to *State of Israel, Prospectus Development Issue*, March 10, 1954: Imports of goods & services, \$335 million; exports of goods & services, \$86 million.

being, it must continue to live. One of the manifestations of this train of thought is the belief (often heard, but not among the "economists") that Israel needs a still stronger population. The "idealists" talk in terms of a total of 4 million, who by their massive enthusiasm would guarantee the ultimate strength and survival of Israel.

The "economists" have a different creed. They argue that whatever was true of the founding of the state is largely irrelevant to its continuance. Crusaders are one thing; citizens must be another. They go on to argue that some part of Israel's economic predicament is due not to external, irreducible causes, such as the Arabs or the weather or the soil, but to revocable ones, or at least to causes that it lies within the power of Israel to alleviate. They believe that the enemy to some extent lies within. And they believe that the right way to meet the crisis in Israel's balance of payments is by reducing the fanaticism and increasing the rationalism in the way that Israel's internal affairs are run.

What follows is an attempt to analyze only that part of Israel's economic predicament that stems from revocable causes: from those artificial distortions which it would be possible to remove or at any rate to reduce, if those who recognize them are given a chance to influence policy. The first such distorting factor in Israel, which overlays all the others, is the prevailing atmosphere of half war, which during the past year has been more pronounced than at any time since the armistice. But whereas the Arabs will not make peace with Israel, they are equally unlikely to launch an unprovoked attack. The Israelis find this difficult to believe, and they find it quite impossible to act on such an assumption. The result is that in part consciously and in part subconsciously, to some extent as a wise precaution and to some extent obsessively, they have developed what is more or less a war economy. All war economies are distorted and to that extent inefficient for peaceful purposes. The effects, on Israel, are many, various, and far-reaching.

In general, this war fear has helped to perpetuate the idea, which was necessarily the basis of early Jewish colonization in Palestine, that money is less important than survival. In an economically rational world, settlements should be made first in places where the least money can produce the most results. In Israel, far more often the criterion has been strategic. Settlements have tended to multiply on the frontier or in the desert, because the frontier needed fortifying and the desert had to be occupied. There is, for instance, the *kibbutz* of Sdeh Boker, thirty miles south of Beersheba, where three years ago about a hundred youths went straight from their military training to settle down in shacks. Around them is stone and sand; nothing grows there except a few pale, papery crocuses during the spring. The only water has to be brought from a catchment for winter rains which has been built about seven miles away. The nearest supply center is two

hours away. Cultivation, which can only begin when water is laid on in large quantities, is bound to be many times more expensive than the cultivation of still unoccupied spaces in Galilee. Yet this is the *kibbutz* which so impressed Prime Minister Ben Gurion with the value of what its founders were doing that when he resigned from public office he went to live with them. Economically, it is a project that should have no priority whatever. Yet strategically, it is something that Israel feels it must support.

Further north, a number of modern pumping stations are being erected as part of the irrigation network which takes the water down to the desert. They are extremely efficient and they practically never break down, yet they all operate at about 50 percent of capacity. One station that I visited boasted a magnificent generating plant, though the current in use came from the main transmission line; its own plant had been used for precisely 200 hours in the course of two years. But the Arabs may one day cut the main supply, and the pumping stations must be prepared — so, at least, runs the argument.

A large number of immigrants have been taken to live in Jewish Jerusalem because Jerusalem is half in Arab hands and is a declared objective of Arab leaders. The immigrants live in condemned houses around the Damascus Gate, or in tin huts in the *maabaro*, or in new concrete houses which they have built themselves. Yet Jerusalem is short of electricity, short of water, and short of raw materials. It is, in economic terms, grossly overpopulated. But the Israelis have decided for political and strategic reasons to make Jerusalem the capital of their country and cost has become largely irrelevant. In these ways, the half-war mentality obtrudes wastefully into an economy which cannot, at the best of times, afford waste. To some extent, it is inevitable; but to some extent, what began as strategic necessity has become a social virtue. There is a sort of snob appeal in starting a new settlement, though to join an old one would be more productive. By the same token, the minimum defense of the desert has become a glorious crusade to make it blossom like a rose. Parts of the desert can, and indeed are being made to blossom comparatively cheaply by the intelligent application of water and skill. But they are not where the ex-Prime Minister has gone to inspire his countrymen by his example. And in this kind of way, the economy, and the economic atmosphere, has been obscured by the shadow of war — over and beyond such direct effects of Arab hostility as the blockade, the cost of the army, and the loss of the oil from Iraq.

### III

So much for the enemy without, who features, as I have tried to suggest, somewhat larger than life size in Israeli economic planning. The other sources of distortion are a variety of the enemy within. They are the factors which combine with the war factor to restrict unnecessarily the productivity of Israel's economy.



Most of them begin a long way back, in the history of the Jewish colonization of Palestine. From about 1932 until 1948, Zionist activity in Palestine was regarded by the indigenous Arab population as an act of aggression, and by the Jews as a semi-military operation. Competition within the Jewish community was a luxury it could not afford. One result was to lay the foundations of the great cartels which now rule the economy of the state. The first and greatest cartel is the Histadruth, the organization of the trade unions, which in the early days, by force of circumstance as well as by conviction, organized not merely labor but the means of production as well. The conditions of the Mandate required it. Cooperative buying and selling and cooperative bargaining were a source of strength.

But in a democratic state, such a system may be a source of weakness. A Histadruth selling organization — the Tnuvah — now markets 75 per cent of the agricultural production of Israel. The Tnuvah in fact conducts a collective bargain with each individual Israeli consumer, to his detriment. Each settlement conducts its own collective bargain with the Tnuvah, and so on throughout the economy, with some astonishing results. There is a glut of vegetables, but vegetable growing is still a highly profitable and privileged occupation; buses have become a luxury, but bus drivers (who have their own private cartel) are still making more than cabinet ministers. In other sectors of the economy there are other cartels: some private, some public, some mixed. In so far as they achieve lower import prices and higher export prices by their bulk operations, they are good; in so far as they combine to keep internal costs high and production rigid, they are unconditionally bad. But the cure will not be easy. "The Histadruth," said a member of the Government, "is against all cartels except its own." And the Histadruth is the loudest voice in the present Government coalition.

Another aspect of Israel's historical evolution that makes for difficulties now is the pattern of agricultural settlement. The supply situation inside Israel has radically changed during the last two years. For the first time, local surpluses are beginning to appear in some products — in those products, such as soft fruit and vegetables, that are traditional to the Jewish Palestine economy. Though there has got to be expansion in agriculture, it can no longer be in the same direction. Intensive, small-scale, high-cost farming, the essence of Jewish colonization under the Mandate and the pampered pet of all Jewish planning since the founding of the state, cannot usefully be expanded much further at this stage in Israel's development.

This leads to the heart of some fundamental questions. Agriculture for the Jews is not merely a matter of growing things. It is a matter, first, of "getting back to the land," a question of ideology and historical redress that has produced, in Palestine, unique forms of social organization. The *kibbutzim* (collective farms) and *moshavim* (cooperative settlements) represent the established aristocracy of the Jewish state. But they are mainly

organized for the production, on a small and intensive scale, of fruit, vegetables, milk, and eggs, in principle by people who do not work for hire. Secondly, agriculture in Israel involves a vast investment of money and machinery, for it is a question of growing things despite nature, of piping water and clearing rocks, and of highly mechanized cultivation. It is obvious that under these circumstances, in a poor country, there is no economic justification for producing anything that is not immediately needed to save imports or expand exports. A new type of farm organization must therefore be evolved, and a new attitude to investment on the land, which make it possible to grow the crops that will contribute most to the balance of payments — industrial crops such as cotton and beets, feeding stuffs for cattle, and wheat. All these crops can only be grown efficiently under extensive cultivation, and this in turn requires the use of hired labor on a much larger scale than at present, and a cheaper system of irrigation. Here, therefore, is a challenge to many of the convictions on which Jewish society in Palestine has so far been based. Until the challenge has been met — some experiments in meeting it are being made already — agricultural production will be distorted by the social conventions of the country.

The difficulty of absorbing immigrants into the economy is another factor limiting production in which history has played its part. About 150,000 immigrants are still living in *maabaro*th — that is, in tin shacks with no permanent means of earning a living except at government expense. Yet it is reckoned that about 25,000 could be absorbed into existing settlements without cost to the state. One reason why more of them have not been settled is the purist attitude of some of the *kibbutzim*, who refuse to compromise their communistic principles by employing hired labor. Another reason is that the government has so far been reluctant to put pressure on immigrants to leave the *maabaro*th; many of the latest arrivals come from North Africa and Asia, where from time immemorial they have worked only enough to provide a minimum subsistence. In the *maabaro*th, their minimum subsistence is assured. Their roof and their food is free. Many of them prefer not to exchange this security for the hurly-burly of work in the outside world. Only now, when it is clear that nothing else is going to shift the hard core, has the government brought itself to compromise with its principles (every Jew is assumed to have a claim on the state for a minimum standard of living) to the point of charging a small sum for food supplied in the *maabaro*th.

There is also a third reason why it has taken so long, and been so expensive, to absorb the immigrants productively into the economy. In the old days of the Mandate, the brave thing and the useful thing was to found a new settlement, to make a new conquest for the Zionist movement in Palestine. This tradition is now strengthened, as we have seen, by the war mentality. But in these days of statehood, the need is to consolidate what al-



ready exists at the lowest possible cost. The government may now decide not to finance any more new settlements, "except for security reasons"; but it has taken them over five years to make this break with traditional principles.

Another curious legacy of Israel's past is the subconscious assumption that money is no object. This, too, has been kept alive by the prevailing war mentality. In the old days, with high subscriptions from Zionists in the Diaspora and a small band of brothers in the field, money was not the main object or the main limitation. What mattered most was the conquest of the land. It was axiomatic that everything had to be subsidized and that nothing could be made to pay its way. It would be ridiculous to say that most people in Israel are not now acutely conscious of the need to save money — in principle. But it somehow never seems to apply to any one of them in particular. In government offices, in settlements, and even in factories, there is still an extravagant conviction that everything must be of the best and that if it costs a bit more than the second best, government funds or higher prices will provide. There are, for instance, people who for twenty years have been planning the irrigation system that is to make Israel's deserts fertile. Only now is it beginning to dawn on some of them (the "economists," though not the "idealists") that they are providing water so expensively that some villages are preferring to dry farm than pay the water rates. But many of these veteran planners have invested years of devoted dreaming in their scheme, and no mere economic considerations are going to make much impact on them. So also, in the settlements, one finds an exceptionally high ratio of machinery to labor. In one *kibbutz* visited of 150 people, farming just over 1,000 acres of which 300 were irrigated, there appeared to be about \$250,000 worth of machinery financed by public loans and charity dollars. It did not seem to have occurred to anyone at the settlement that this was an extravagant way to farm.

Why has it taken Israelis so long to realize that the problems of the state and the problems of the pre-state are entirely different? A minority in a hostile country tries to sell everything as expensively as it can; a majority governing its own country is merely flaying its own people if it does not keep costs low. One reason is the war atmosphere, referred to above, which has obscured the issue of economic survival with an exaggerated view of the threats to Israel's political survival. The quieter the frontier, the better chance the "economists" have of rationalizing Israel's economy. Another reason is the carry-over into the state of a multi-tiered, quasi-governmental, bureaucratic structure. When Israel became a state, the multiple sources of finance that were responsible for this system went on. There were, in Israel, many who had dedicated their lives to furthering the particular project that was their contribution to the State of Israel. They do not now find it easy to lose that individual sacrifice in the common effort. The results are

best illustrated by the following extract from a recent United Nations report on Israeli agriculture:<sup>3</sup>

A partial list of the organizations . . . which are wholly or partially responsible for certain segments of the agricultural economy suggests the extraordinary difficulty of getting a unified approach to the agricultural program and, what is even more difficult, of consistent and coordinated executive or programs. Consider the institutions and organizations that have to do with agriculture in Israel: the Ministry of Agriculture, the Jewish Agency, the Jewish National Fund, the Water Planning Board, the Mekoroth water company, Histadruth, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the Agricultural Bank, numerous private banks, the Citrus Marketing Board, the numerous commodity associations, the overhead organizations of the agricultural settlements. . . . A number of these organizations have powers that seem to transcend those of the State. There are interlocking directorates, often with government officials taking part in a responsible way in forming lines of action for one or another commodity group or special interest group which may or may not run counter to the interests of the nation as a whole.

Thus, when it comes to the execution of policy, there is a bureaucratic free-for-all that frustrates every plan that is made. In matters of incentives, credits, subsidies, price policies, each organization follows its own bent, administering large sums of public money with incorruptible honesty and an indestructible egocentricity. Meanwhile, the plans themselves come and go, achieving something but failing in any grand design. A recent example is the development program devised by the department dealing with German reparations. It is no more a master plan than its predecessors, based as it is on a series of arbitrary assumptions about policy in other sectors of the economy that may, and almost certainly will, be revised at any minute.

All these factors are restrictive and they imply the extension of a good deal of protection to the various sectors of the economy by the different interests that are vested in them. This characteristic, which springs from Israel's recent history, has been exaggerated by the total absence of competition from outside. The Arab blockade has killed competition from neighboring markets, and the shortage of foreign exchange has killed competition from anywhere else. The result is that the new industries, as well as agriculture, are growing up behind an impenetrable wall of protection. It is true that industrial exports have doubled during the last year. But they depend for their sales not so much on their competitive price as on the fact that Europe has been short of dollars and has in the past been prepared to buy from Israel a few of the things that it would not buy from America. Furthermore, exports are mainly conducted on a barter basis (sulphuric acid to Turkey in exchange for raw sulphur, jeeps to France in exchange for buses), so that proper cost accounting is virtually impossible. Add to this the fact that most manufacturers are new to the job, and most workers even newer — that in fact there is an acute shortage of managerial and technical skills — and it is easy to see why costs tend to stay far higher, and production far lower, than they might.

<sup>3</sup> Report to the Government of Israel on National Agricultural Plans and Programs. A.T. 287/s/17.

## IV

The crux of the matter, then, is this: Owing to a variety of reasons, historical, psychological, and social, the Israeli economy is being distorted. The restrictive tendencies of nature have been supplemented by the restrictive practices of a highly bureaucratic and protective state. Production and productivity in Israel have been inhibited by a number of factors other than, and in addition to, the inevitable ones. And this is important because the increase of productivity in Israel is the only obvious escape from its economic dilemma — how to narrow the gap in its overseas trade without cutting consumption to the point where the economy can no longer expand and there is neither incentive nor resources for new investment.

The foreign exchange problem is now writ large upon the wall. In the first few years of the state, until 1951, 85 percent of Israel's receipts came from capital account, or, in other words, were not covered by Israel's earnings from exports and services. Of these sources of foreign exchange, some have run out already, such as releases from sterling balances (\$100 million) and the loan from the U. S. Export-Import Bank (\$135 million); others seem likely to run down during the next few years. Grant-in-aid from the U. S. Government, accounting for about \$145 million through December 1953, is not intended to be a permanent source of income. American officials in Israel are talking in terms of another five years of aid program — or even less, depending on the political climate in Washington, where an anxiety to see the bottom of the pit that Mr. Truman started to dig is growing with every month of the Republican administration. During the next few years, Israel has to brace itself not merely to make good that part of its trade gap that is filled by U. S. public funds, but also to start servicing its foreign debt (at a rate of \$100 million in 1954 alone), and to attempt to reduce its dependence on the charity of world Jewry (well over \$100 million in 1953). It must face the possibility that it will not in the future, as it has in the past, be able to continue to tap fresh sources of foreign aid. The last great windfall in that respect was the granting by Dr. Adenauer's Government in Bonn of reparations to Israel for the wrongs done by Hitler to the Jews of Germany. These reparations are at present supplying Israel with most of its imports of capital goods as well as some imports of consumer goods, and will continue to do so for 14 years. But unless the Israelis use this respite to build the main supports of their industrial and agricultural development, rather than to finance their current requirements of consumer goods, it is difficult to see how Israel will ever become solvent on anything like its present standard of living. In the past, the Israelis have been comparatively profligate with their resources, and those who financed them have been comparatively prolific. Barring miracles, external circumstances will never again be so favorable.

The trade gap could, in theory, be forcibly closed by cutting the standard of living to the point at which payments and receipts could be made to balance with less foreign aid. But here one runs against the second horn of Israel's economic dilemma. While the average Israeli lives much better than his Arab neighbor and some Israelis live quite well, there is not, by Western standards, much that can be cut from national consumption as a whole. And Israel is, or is trying to become, a developed state in the Western sense.

To illustrate their dilemma, Israeli economists have recently been drawing the following comparisons with Great Britain. They divide the national income of Israel and Great Britain into that part of it that is absorbed by minimum subsistence, that part that is absorbed by contributions to the state, and that part that is disposable income in excess of these two. The result is as follows:

	Percentage of National Income	
	Israel	Great Britain
(1) Minimum subsistence	55	25
(2) Compulsory contributions to the state	31	40
(3) Disposable income in excess of (1) & (2)	14	35

This would be a depressing comparison, even if one assumed that Israeli needs and British needs were roughly similar. But in fact, Israel is an under-developed country; its first need is to expand its productive capacity and it should therefore spend proportionately larger sums than Britain on building up its capital assets, which can only come from item (3) and a portion of item (2) above. To depress the average standard of living in Israel much below the present level would mean eliminating the small margin that at present exists for private productive investment. And that, quite apart from the hardship and the political resistances to it, would mean mortgaging the future for the present to an unbearable extent. The individual's standard of living will have to go down — the recent increase in taxes is a sign that the politicians are trying to accept this — but the extent to which savings on this account can relieve the net pressure on the balance of payments is limited, for imports for investment must go up. There is only one other way to solvency: to increase productivity, that is, output per man hour and per unit of capital. And, as I have tried to indicate above, productivity in Israel is at the moment limited by natural circumstances, by the international situation, and by self-created distortions in the economy.

It would be unfair as well as misleading to suggest that the Israelis, in general, are not aware that there is something wrong and are trying to set it right. In the last three years there has been a constant, ingenious, and partially successful effort by the Government to reduce the distortions and to increase productivity. The consequences of its early policies began to be plainly disastrous by the end of 1950. On the one hand were the immigrants



flooding into a country where, at the best of times, it would be slow and hard to expand production. On the other hand was the official policy of fair shares for all: controlled prices, rationing, and an expansionary credit policy. The Promised Land was determined to honor its promises, to all the Jews from everywhere who chose to enter it. The result was an inflation which threatened to paralyze the whole economy. All goods became short; rations were not honored; millions of pounds of foreign currency and millions of tons of imported produce disappeared into the voracious maw of the black market, only to reappear in the smart houses and speculative enterprises of the black marketeers. Toward the end of 1951 a major break with tradition was courageously made. At the cost of letting prices rise, of largely abolishing rationing, and of curtailing some of the more extravagant methods of financing development (all of which involved some sacrifice of ideological principle), a policy of disinflation was introduced. The Government stopped short-term borrowing, private credit was restricted, and the rates of exchange were manipulated in such a way that the cost of less essential imports rose steeply. In its immediate effect this was comparatively successful. The inflationary riot has certainly been subdued: money is scarcer (in some places), goods are very much easier to find, merchandise imports have fallen from \$343 million in 1951 to \$286 million in 1953, the producers' incentive to seek export markets has increased, and the black market has gone out of business. And all this has been done, so far, without a general rise in wages.

But the ultimate purpose of a disinflation is to cure the cause as well as the symptoms of an inflation. It must not only make money scarce; it must do so in such a way that people will work harder and thus produce more per man hour. It is at this point that Israel's attempt to disinflate has not yet begun to bite on the economy. The reason is the powerful forces at work in the country which prevent what is an honest attempt at disinflation on a financial plane from having the proper results on the level of production. Some of these forces are uncontrollable; they arise from the obvious difficulties of expanding production in any underdeveloped country that is short of natural resources for internal consumption and export. They also arise from the unavoidable absorption of so much of the national income in unproductive activities, such as the armed forces, and in the minimum long-term investments in water, roads, and housing, that have to be made in a country whose population has doubled in five years, but that do not immediately increase the number of goods available for consumption. And there are also those other forces which come, as I have suggested above, from the economic distortions that are dictated not by necessity but by history, emotion, and ideology — the price Israel is paying for its Zionist conscience.

The success of the disinflationary policy is still in the balance. The main question is whether success can be assured before a general rise in wages



cancels out the attempt to restrict purchasing power. A proportion of Israeli wages (the first £180 a month) is automatically linked to the cost of living, so that as prices have risen there has been some increase in the money available to workers. But all wages above the first £180 a month have been frozen by agreement between the Histadruth and the employers, so that there has in fact been a net fall in real wages. How long the Histadruth is prepared to maintain this agreement, and how long the Government is prepared to ask the Histadruth to do so, are by no means certain. It is part of the much larger question of how much hardship the people of Israel are prepared to take, and how much hardship the Government feels strong enough to impose on them.

The answer, which is central to any assessment of Israel's economic prospects, is being debated in and out of the offices of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The need to find an answer has produced a spiritual crisis of the first order, not merely in the bureaucracy but on every street corner. It is argued over midnight coffee in the *kibbutzim*, in the schools and universities (where students last year struck at being asked to pay more for their education), in the two-roomed flats of the professional classes, in the newspapers of every political complexion. In Israel, every planner has his own plan, every doctor his own panacea, every individual his own, highly differentiated point of view. The year 1954, in Israel, has been one in which everybody finds himself obliged by the economic situation to ask some searching questions about the assumptions on which the state has so far been built: Can we afford a Western standard of living? Can we afford to conquer the desert? Can we afford not to? Can we afford our ideological convictions, our peculiar social structure, our type of farming, and our attitude to labor? Can we, morally, afford to modify them?

Whatever the individual answers, it must be clear that a great deal of waste resulting from the extravagant ideology of Zionism is complicating the task of proving that it is possible to maintain a socially progressive state on an essentially barren piece of land in the Middle East. The first objective must surely be to eliminate this waste, to stop making the best the enemy of the good. Whether this will actually be done depends on the outcome of the conflict between the "idealists" and the "economists." And that in turn depends not so much on the economic situation as on the international situation. If circumstances permit the war mentality to recede, the "economists" may win the day. If not, the economic future of Israel will continue to depend on miracles.

# PROBLEMS OF ARAB REFUGEE COMPENSATION

*Don Peretz*

WHEN THE United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) failed to break the deadlock between Israel and the Arab states at the Paris Conference in 1951, it abandoned its political efforts and adopted a functional approach toward solving the Palestine problem. Since that time CCP attention has been focused almost exclusively on problems of compensation for abandoned Arab refugee property and the release of Arab bank accounts frozen by the Israeli authorities. It has been the Commission's hope that progress on these two issues would substantially diminish friction between the antagonists and contribute toward a future peaceful settlement of the Palestine conflict.

Since initiating its work on the compensation issue, the CCP has to its credit three accomplishments. It has completed a global estimate of the value of Arab abandoned property. It has persuaded the Government of Israel to abandon its refusal to consider payment of compensation outside of and before a final peace settlement. And it has obtained the release of a quarter of the £4 million in Arab refugee accounts frozen in Israeli banks. Despite this progress, possibilities of actual compensation payment seem remote indeed at the present time because the issue is so interwoven with technical complications and political qualifications. But before examining these obstacles a description of the abandoned property is in order.

## *EXTENT OF ABSENTEE PROPERTY*

The CCP Refugee Office has estimated that more than 80 percent of Israel's total area of 20,850 square kilometers is land abandoned by the Arab refugees,<sup>1</sup> although only a little more than a quarter of it was considered cultivable. This property has contributed greatly toward making Israel a viable state. Its mere bulk, and the fact that it constitutes most of the area along Israel's borders, give it great strategic significance. Of the 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and 1953, 350 were set up on absentee property.<sup>2</sup> More than a third of Israel's Jewish popula-

<sup>1</sup> UN Doc. A/1985, p. 11, para. 7, 8; p. 5, para. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Custodian of Absentee Property, press release, Jan. 16, 1953; *Haaretz, Jerusalem Post*, Jan. 18, 1953.

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tion lives on former Arab land, and an additional 250,000 people, including a third of the new immigrants, today live on abandoned Arab urban property.<sup>3</sup> The Arabs abandoned whole cities like Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramleh, Beit Shan, and Migdal-Gad, plus 388 towns and villages and large parts of 94 others containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel.<sup>4</sup> Some 10,000 shops, businesses, and stores were left in Jewish hands. Most of the 120,000 dunams of Arab orange groves, comprising about half the citrus land in Palestine at the end of the Mandate, were taken over by the Israeli Government, although of that area only about 40,000 dunams have been cultivated.<sup>5</sup> During the 1951-1952 season these groves produced 1,250,000 boxes of fruit, equal to nearly half the total citrus exported from Israel in 1951,<sup>6</sup> and in foreign currency value to nearly 29 percent of the country's earnings from exports.<sup>7</sup> In addition to large citrus areas, 40 thousand dunams of vineyards, at least 10,000 dunams of other orchards, and nearly 95 percent of all Israel's olive groves were abandoned by the refugees.<sup>8</sup> In 1949 the olive produce from abandoned Arab groves was Israel's third largest export, ranking after citrus and diamonds.<sup>9</sup>

The CCP has further estimated that the amount of Israel's cultivable abandoned Arab land is nearly two and a half times the total area of Jewish-owned property at the end of the Mandate.<sup>10</sup> The Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property, however, has claimed that of the 4 million dunams of Arab land held by him, only 2.5 million were cultivated.<sup>11</sup> No account was given for the discrepancy between the amount of cultivable area established by the CCP (4,574,000 dunams) and the cultivated area held by the Custodian. Neither has the difference between the total of 4 million dunams of absentee property held by the Custodian and the CCP's total estimate of 16,324,000 dunams of abandoned Arab land been explained.

The CCP's estimate of abandoned Arab land was based upon *Village Statistics*, published by the Mandatory Government. This publication contained a list of all the villages and towns of Palestine, giving the populations subdivided according to religion, and the area in dunams belonging to each village and town, divided into categories according to the nature and use of the land. It showed the number of dunams in each category held

<sup>3</sup> Custodian of Absentee Property, *loc. cit.*; *Haaretz*, June 15, 1951.

<sup>4</sup> Custodian of Absentee Property, *loc. cit.*, 65,000 living units. Other figures on the number of living units taken over by Jews are: 77,070 apartments taken over by new immigrants (*Haboker*, Nov. 19, 1950); 83,000 rooms, 7,800 shops, offices, workshops, and storehouses (*Haaretz*, Aug. 2, 1950).

<sup>5</sup> Custodian of Absentee Property, *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> *Haaretz*, Nov. 15, 1951; *Government Yearbook, 1951-52*, p. 418.

<sup>7</sup> *Government Yearbook, 1951-52, loc. cit.* The total earnings in foreign currency during 1951 from citrus was £116.7 million, equal to 57.5 percent of the earnings from foreign exports.

<sup>8</sup> *Haaretz*, June 15, 25, 1951; *Davar*, Dec. 14, 1950; *Divrei Haknesset*, vol. 3, pp. 136-39.

<sup>9</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 15, 1949.

<sup>10</sup> The total amount of Jewish-owned land in Palestine at the end of the Mandate was 1,850,000 dunams. See A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London, 1952), p. 278.

<sup>11</sup> Custodian of Absentee Property, *loc. cit.*

respectively by Arabs, Jews, the state, and others. *Village Statistics* also gave the total amount of rural property tax and urban property tax payable by Arabs and Jews in each town and village.

It was by deleting from *Village Statistics* all villages outside the territory occupied by Israel, including the demilitarized areas and the Jerusalem "no-man's" land, that the global figure of 16,324,000 dunams of abandoned property was obtained. In cases where armistice lines did not follow village boundaries, the statistics were adjusted to show the approximate number of dunams in the various categories within Israel. In addition, all land which continued to be held by its original Arab inhabitants was deleted.

After these deletions had been made, the remaining totals of the columns headed "Arabs" in *Village Statistics* give the number of dunams of Israeli-held rural land formerly held by Arabs. Excluding the Negev, it was estimated that 4,186,000 dunams, of which 1,432,000 dunams were uncultivable passed into Jewish hands. In the Negev, the Jews acquired 12,138,000 dunams of Arab land, of which only 1,835,000 were cultivable. The total cultivable area acquired from the refugees was thus 4,575,000 dunams.

For industrial purposes, 20,000 dunams of absentee property have been leased by the Custodian. A third of Israel's stone production is supplied by 52 Arab quarries under the Custodian's jurisdiction.<sup>12</sup>

The amount and value of movable Arab property has never been accurately determined. In the chaos which prevailed after the flight, most Arab property became the victim of war conditions and much of it was destroyed, looted, or lost. However, the value of movable property in the warehouses of the Custodian of Absentee Property in 1951 was more than £4 million.<sup>13</sup>

These facts make obvious the political and social importance of property abandoned by the Arab refugees in Israel. They underscore its value in terms other than that fixed by the CCP's financial evaluation. Its real value can perhaps be better understood in relation to the amount of Jewish property in Palestine at the end of the Mandate and to the role which it played in the new state's economic life, particularly in facilitating the absorption of the 720,000 new immigrants who have arrived in Israel since 1948. Despite the large amount of economic assistance received from abroad through U.S. Government grants-in-aid, German reparations, sale of Israeli bonds, and philanthropic contributions, it would have been impossible to double the country's population during the first three years of its existence without utilizing abandoned Arab property. It not only provided shelter, economic sustenance, and employment for the new immigrants,<sup>14</sup> but has done much to determine the pattern of their social integration into Israel.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*; *Jerusalem Post*, June 1, 1950.

<sup>13</sup> *Haaretz*, June 15, 1951.

<sup>14</sup> The Custodian's Office is one of the largest employers in Israel and the largest single employer of new immigrants. Custodian of Absentee Property, *loc. cit.*



*UNITED NATIONS PROPERTY EVALUATION*<sup>15</sup>

The CCP began its task of evaluating abandoned Arab property in October 1950, when it set up a Committee of Experts on Compensation. Urgency was given to the question by the resolution passed at the Fifth UN General Assembly, which noted with concern that payment had not yet been effected. It called upon the Commission to establish a Refugee Office which would "make such arrangements as it may consider necessary for the assessment and payment of compensation."<sup>16</sup>

Although the Refugee Office was established in January 1951, it did not begin to function until May, when it opened its headquarters in Jerusalem under the direction of Holgar Anderson of Denmark. Its personnel included the staff of the CCP's Committee of Experts on Compensation, a legal expert, an economist, and a land specialist. The task of setting a global evaluation on Arab property was assigned to John Berncastle of Great Britain, who had served in the Mandatory Government's Land Office for fifteen years.

The results of Berncastle's study were included in the comprehensive pattern of proposals for a peace settlement presented by the CCP to Israel and the Arab states at the Paris Conference in the autumn of 1951. The five-point plan proposed that "the Government of Israel accept the obligation to pay, as compensation for property abandoned by those refugees not repatriated, a global sum based upon the evaluation arrived at by the Commission's Refugee Office; that a payment plan, taking into consideration the Government of Israel's ability to pay, be set up by a special committee of economic and financial experts to be established by a United Nations trustee through whom payment of individual claims for compensation would be made."<sup>17</sup>

The CCP's global estimate was based upon the territorial situation as defined by the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states. This estimate fixed the total value of abandoned Arab land at about £P100 million and of movable Arab property in the neighborhood of £P20 million. These estimates were inevitably approximate ones because of the extreme complexity of the problem.

The Refugee Office determined the actual value of land according to the following principles: (a) The valuation was based upon existing use value; in the case of agricultural land, this was fixed by the estimated productivity of crops (of rents in urban areas), plus normal development value. (b) Speculative elements exceeding the normal were ignored. These elements were due to temporary shortages created by post-World War II conditions; to the effect of the Land Transfer Regulations of 1939, which forced up prices of land in areas to which Jewish purchases were restricted;

<sup>15</sup> UN Doc. A/1985, Annex A, pp. 11-15.

<sup>16</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 39(V).

<sup>17</sup> UN Doc. A/1985, p. 3, para. 23, nos. 1, 3.

to the purchase of land by the Jewish National Fund for strategic reasons at prices unjustified economically; and to the Arab nationalist campaign against sales to Jews, resulting in risks to Arabs who sold land to Jews for which they expected compensation. (c) The level of values and condition of property prevailing as of November 29, 1947, the date of the United Nations partition resolution and the beginning of Arab-Jewish hostilities, was the time basis of evaluation. (d) No value was placed upon uncultivable land.

Agricultural productivity was determined by the Rural Property Tax Ordinance, which in 1947 applied to all rural lands except the Negev. It provided for a tax per dunam at varying rates on categories arranged according to the estimated productivity of the soil, and in some relation to the net annual yield. Because of the scanty evidence available, the Office based its valuation of Negev land upon expert opinion.

The value of abandoned urban lands was based upon the notional amount of tax multiplied by ten to arrive at the net annual value. This figure was weighted by 25 percent to take account of the underevaluation of land for various reasons during the Mandate, and by a further 25 percent to take into account the rise of values between the last assessment prior to 1945 and the end of 1947.

The value of Jerusalem abandoned property was based upon the register compiled by the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property.

The total value of abandoned immovable property thus arrived at was:

	£P
Rural lands	69,525,144
Urban lands	21,608,640
Jerusalem lands	9,250,000
	<hr/>
Total	100,383,784

Valuation of all abandoned movable property was impossible, the Refugee Office concluded. Some categories did not lend themselves to global evaluation, and furthermore, there was no way of knowing what property refugees took with them and what they left. The Office received no answer to its request of Israel concerning the nature and extent of movable property appropriated by its authorities, so it based its valuation upon the property belonging to the refugees before their exodus. A figure of £P20 million was reached by comparing the following data: (a) a calculation based on a percentage of the value of immovable property; (b) a percentage of the national income; (c) a calculation based on the aggregate values in 1945 of various descriptions of property which could be grouped under the heading "movable." This included industrial equipment, commercial stocks, motor vehicles, agricultural equipment and livestock, and household effects.

In calculating the worth of movable property relative to immovable property, the proportion of the values in the case of Turks leaving Greece and Greece leaving Turkey after World War I was used. The Turks were a predominantly rural community and the Greeks a predominantly urban. There was a distinct similarity between the social structure of the Turkish and Greek communities and the Palestine Arab rural and urban communities respectively. In the case of the Turks leaving Greece, the value of movables was about 4.7 percent of immovables, and in the case of Greeks leaving Turkey, 60 percent. Based upon this ratio, the value of Arab movable property estimated by the Refugee Office was £P21,570,000.

In calculating the value of movable absentee property based upon national income, the 1945 Arab figure of £P62 million was used. Movable property was estimated to be about 40 percent of this figure, or £P18,600,000.

According to information available to the Refugee Office, the total non-Jewish wealth of Palestine in 1945 as represented by movable property was:

	£P
Industrial equipment	3,400,000
Commercial stocks	4,300,000
Motor vehicles	1,300,000
Agricultural equipment and livestock	13,100,000
Total	22,100,000

These figures represent the wealth of all Palestine Arabs, and approximately three quarters of the total represents the amount belonging to the refugees. To this must be added £P2.5 million representing the value of household effects. Therefore the total value of movable Arab refugee property based upon different descriptions was £P19.1 million.

The Refugee Office based its valuation of movable property upon an average of these three methods of appraisal. However, it emphasized that its total valuations were approximate and that the Office "was not in itself in a position to draw any definite conclusions concerning the value of the property in question."

The Conciliation Commission believed that payment of compensation should be based upon a Palestine pound valued at one per one pound sterling. In its opinion, the Refugee Office global valuation constituted a debt owed to the refugees by the Government of Israel. Although it had made a global estimate, the CCP considered that payment of compensation should in all cases be made to individual property owners, and on this basis it urged the Government of Israel, as a first step, to assume the obligation of paying this sum to the Arab refugees who were not to be repatriated.

In view of Israel's stringent economic situation, the CCP did not expect it to pay its full debt for a period of many years. Because payment on such a protracted basis would be useless to the refugees, the Commission urged that procedures be devised for distributing compensation funds after Israel had obligated itself to pay the amount due. Israel's ability to pay would have to be taken into consideration. It was suggested that a United Nations trustee, through whom individual payments would be made and who would be assisted by a group of economic and financial experts, be charged with the elaboration of the details for a payment plan.<sup>18</sup>

### ISRAEL AGREES TO PAY

Early in the conflict the UN Palestine Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, had asserted that the Provisional Government of Israel was liable for the restoration of private property to its Arab owners and for indemnification to those owners for property wantonly destroyed, irrespective of any indemnities which the Provisional Government might claim from the Arab states.<sup>19</sup>

In 1948 Foreign Minister Sharett's reply to the Mediator was that his Government would consider the problem only as part of a general settlement "when the Arab states are ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel . . . and with due regard to our counterclaims in respect to the destruction of Jewish life and property."<sup>20</sup> Two years passed before Israel agreed to consider the principle of compensation outside a final settlement of the Palestine problem.

The UN Third General Assembly accepted the Mediator's recommendations and resolved that "compensation should be paid to those [refugees] not choosing to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by Governments or authorities responsible."<sup>21</sup>

Immediately after its establishment, the CCP began discussions with Arab and Jewish representatives on the compensation issue. Its Technical Committee on Refugees, after making a preliminary survey, concluded that it would be necessary to set up under the CCP a mixed Arab-Israeli working group on property to make a more detailed study. However, the Committee's recommendations were fruitless and the compensation issue lay dormant for the time being.<sup>22</sup> Late in 1949, the Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, under the Chairmanship of Gordon R. Clapp, was assigned, among its many tasks, the job of facilitating payment of compensation, but in its final recommendations, no mention was even made of

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>19</sup> UN Doc. A/648, p. 14.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Annex II; UN Doc. S/949, Aug. 1, 1948.

<sup>21</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III).

<sup>22</sup> UN Doc. A/1367/Rev.1, p. 27.



the problem.<sup>23</sup> Indeed, little progress was made by either the United Nations or others who proposed payment of compensation during the whole of 1949. No definite proposals or plans for payment were forthcoming, and the issue remained one of principle rather than substance during this early period. In its final progress report of that year, the CCP stated that discussions of compensation had been deferred to the future.<sup>24</sup> However, one of the first indications of a possible change in Israel's attitude occurred on June 15, 1949, during a Knesset debate on the Arab refugee problem. Foreign Minister Sharett then conceded that his Government was prepared to pay compensation for abandoned land, but he did not clearly indicate under what conditions. "There are not many precedents for such a step," he asserted, but as Israel was interested in peace and stability and was concerned over the human suffering of the refugees, it would not follow the exact example of other nations.<sup>25</sup>

The CCP continued to devote attention to the problem during 1950, but without result. After informing Israel of its intention to set up a special body which would be charged with studying the legal and technical aspects of compensation, it was informed by the Foreign Minister that "the Government of Israel, although confirming its decision in principle to pay compensation . . . , persisted in its point of view that this question could be usefully considered only within the framework of a general peace settlement."<sup>26</sup>

The Arab delegations to the CCP were at the time insisting upon compensation in kind for refugees who would not return to Israel. This might, they agreed, take the form of territorial compensation within those areas held by Israel beyond the borders of the United Nations partition plan of November 29, 1947. Late in 1950 plans were being prepared for the presentation of an Arab refugee resettlement scheme to the UN General Assembly. To obtain the reluctant approval of the Arab states, a quid pro quo was needed from Israel. Accordingly, American pressure was exerted on Israel to make a tangible indication of its willingness to pay compensation before the Assembly's opening.

In November Israel did make its first definite concession when the Foreign Minister announced to the UN that "in the spirit of conciliation Israel agreed to waive its previous requirements that refugee property could only be compensated for as part of a general peace." His country was now willing to contribute compensation installments to the proposed UN integration fund. A few days later, Ambassador Eban announced that Israel would pay its first installment through a contribution of £1 million

<sup>23</sup> UN Doc. AAC/25/6 (*Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*), Part I, Appendix I, Dec. 28, 1949.

<sup>24</sup> UN Doc. A/1252.

<sup>25</sup> *Dibrei Haknesset*, vol. 1, p. 721.

<sup>26</sup> UN Doc. A/1367/Rev.1, p. 17, para. 43, 44.

into the integration fund. However, he served notice that in his opinion this payment freed Israel from any individual payments of compensation.<sup>27</sup>

### IRAQI JEWISH COUNTERCLAIMS

Early in March 1951 a bombshell exploded in the midst of CCP plans to move ahead on the compensation issue. Israel's compromise offer was suddenly jeopardized by an Iraqi Government order freezing the property of all Jews who were leaving Iraq for Israel in accordance with a March 1950 Iraqi Government law authorizing such emigration. Departing Jews had been free to dispose of their property as they wished. However, under the new 1951 law, a Custodian of Jewish Property was appointed who could freeze Jewish property whenever he saw fit to do so. He lost little time in withholding nearly all property and possessions of emigrating Jews.<sup>28</sup>

Reaction to the new Iraqi law was swift and outspoken in Israel. Nine days after it was enacted, the Foreign Minister told the Knesset that in freezing property of tens of thousands of Jewish immigrants, "the Government of Iraq has opened an account with the State of Israel. There already exists an account between us and the Arab world, an account with regard to the compensation due to the Arabs who left Israeli territory and abandoned their property following the attack of the Arab states who invaded our country." He served notice that the Israeli Government would take into account the value of Jewish property frozen in Iraq "with regard to compensation we have undertaken to pay the Arabs."<sup>29</sup> The Government's position was supported by nearly all Knesset members except representatives of the Arab parties. Some sections of the Foreign Minister's own Mapai Party went so far as to suggest that Iraq's action freed Israel from its promise to compensate the Arab refugees.<sup>30</sup>

Although no accurate survey and appraisal of Jewish property in Iraq exists, unofficial estimates by leaders of the Iraqi Jewish community now living in Israel place it at between £100 and £150 million, approximately the value at which the CCP's Refugee Office assessed abandoned Arab property.<sup>31</sup>

The more than 106,000 Iraqi Jews who were flown to Israel in operation "Ali Baba" in less than a year and a half soon constituted a strong pressure group. This small but compact Jewish minority became the largest single ethnic group brought into the country in the "ingathering." More than 15,000 of its members were from the intellectual, professional, and capital-

<sup>27</sup> Fifth General Assembly, Ad Hoc Political Committee Summary Records, 64th & 68th meetings; *Haaretz*, Dec. 1, 22, 1950; *Davar*, *Haboker*, Nov. 1, 1950.

<sup>28</sup> *Official Gazette of Iraq*, no. 62, Sept. 3, 1950, reprinted in *Hamizrah Hehadash*, vol. 1 (July 1950); *Ibid.*, no. 2938, Oct. 3, 1951.

<sup>29</sup> *Divrei Haknesset*, vol. 8, p. 1358.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events*, vol. 3, pp. 1049, 1234; *Jerusalem Post*, May 23, 1950.

ist class. They were represented in the Knesset, in the business and financial world, and in the "best social circles." They demanded that the Government of Israel do more to protect their property interests in Iraq, and one delegation requested the Foreign Minister to demand the establishment of an international authority to safeguard their property. Mr. Sharett replied that feelers had been put out for such a move, but with no results.<sup>32</sup>

### ISRAEL'S POLITICAL QUALIFICATIONS

Although the Iraq incident caused a setback in efforts to approach the compensation problem, the CCP continued its pursuit of Israel's promise to consider payment. In his talks with the Foreign Ministry, Holgar Anderson, Director of the Refugee Office, could obtain no commitment beyond Israeli promises to cooperate in an estimate of the value of the abandoned property. Supported by the American and British Governments, he developed the thesis that settlement of the compensation issue would open the door to peace talks, and brought up the question of reparations as a means of payment. However, the Israelis maintained that this was outside the scope of their parley with the UN and insisted upon keeping discussions within the framework of the technical aspects of evaluation. They also insisted upon a prior understanding that such conversations would in no way prejudice Israel's policy toward compensation.<sup>33</sup>

On the technical level the main problems discussed in these direct talks were (1) changes in land and building values brought about by improvements since the Arab flight; (2) deterioration of tens of thousands of buildings and hundreds of thousands of dunams of agricultural property during the fighting; (3) fluctuations in the world market value of Israel's citrus exports, a large proportion of which was the produce of abandoned Arab groves; (4) the relative impact of Jewish immigration, particularly from the Arab world, upon the new state's economy and how it would affect its ability to pay; (5) the value of Jewish property in Iraq relative to Arab property abandoned in Israel; (6) how funds for compensation were to be raised; (7) how compensation would be paid, on an individual or a global basis, in cash or in kind; and (8) the economic effect of compensation on the over-all economy of the Middle East.<sup>34</sup>

Israel's reaction to the CCP's recommendations presented to the Paris Conference late in 1951 was willingness to begin immediate discussions with any UN body on the problem of property evaluation. However, it emphasized that "other no less important factors" would have to be borne in mind. They included recognition that (1) the problem was the "direct consequence of the war undertaken by the Arab states against the State of Israel," and not the result of a land transaction undertaken at a time

<sup>32</sup> *Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events*, vol. 3, p. 1049.

<sup>33</sup> *Haaretz*, June 26, 29, 1951.

<sup>34</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, June 15, 1951.

freely chosen and under conditions freely agreed to; (2) the state of preservation and conditions of use of the property were seriously affected by the 1948 war and its consequences; (3) Israel's total contribution and methods of payment would be directly dependent upon the capacity of the state to meet this charge "mainly resulting from the Arab war," without harming its economic stability; (4) the economic blockade of the Arab states would be an essential consideration in estimating that capacity; (5) the hostile policy of the Arab governments toward their Jewish minorities, resulting in their rapid collective exodus to Israel, imposed heavy material charges upon the Government of Israel; (6) abandoned Jewish land existed in territory under Arab control (such as the Jewish section of the Old City of Jerusalem, the Rutenberg electric works at Naharayim, four Hebron hills settlements, two Jewish settlements on the Ramallah road, Jewish urban property in Hebron, and the potash works at the north end of the Dead Sea). Final agreement would "have to put an end to the whole problem of the Arab refugees in all its aspects, both humanitarian and material, so far as the State of Israel is concerned." Individual claims from Arab owners would have to be addressed to the UN body charged with settling the compensation question.<sup>85</sup>

In a later Knesset speech, Foreign Minister Sharett further amplified these conditions. He emphasized that there could be no question of imposing any obligation on Israel. "Everything depends upon an agreed settlement reached in free negotiation." Israel would need international aid in order to make a worthy contribution. "This means that the settlement . . . will imply the grant to Israel of a loan or assistance in another form." The obligation would be undertaken "only toward an organ of the UN — neither toward the Arab states nor the owners of the lands."<sup>86</sup> In Sharett's opinion, the CCP's estimate of £P120 million as the value of Arab property was merely an "academic appraisal." Because the property was procured "through a revolution," such details as the area and value of land taken over were not necessarily pertinent to the question of compensation.<sup>87</sup>

Within Israel, pressures have continued to bear against the Government's decision even to consider the question before peace. In the Knesset and in the press there has been strong criticism of the Foreign Ministry's "compromise" from political groups upon which the Government generally relies for support in matters of foreign policy. The Mizrachi (orthodox) parties have taken the position that Israel owes the Arabs no compensation and that "peace involving compensation and territorial concessions is no peace but surrender."<sup>88</sup> Even the General Zionists' — the second largest party — *Haboker* insists: "The impression should be dispelled that Israel

<sup>85</sup> UN Doc. A/1985, pp. 17-19.

<sup>86</sup> *Divrei Haknesset*, vol. 10, p. 279.

<sup>87</sup> *Jerusalem Post*, Dec. 28, 1951; *Jewish Agency Digest of Press and Events*, vol. 4, p. 441.

<sup>88</sup> *Hatzofeh*, March 29, 1953.



is under any obligation to assist financially those Arabs who wandered from Israel following the invitation of their 'saviors'." It demanded that international public opinion be enlightened on the question of Jewish property left in Arab lands in order to neutralize Arab claims for property left by the refugees in Israel.<sup>39</sup>

#### ARAB ATTITUDES TOWARD COMPENSATION

Arab reaction to the CCP's compensation proposals and to Israel's offer to consider the question has raised political difficulties no less complex. The Arabs have demanded that compensation payments should be "an individual right of the refugees personally or of their beneficiaries," and that they should be able to exercise it "without any limitations of time or space."

The Arab states have placed the principal responsibility for payment upon Israel; however, they insist that the UN share this obligation because of its role in the establishment of the new state. "It is only fair that it should pay the compensation due to the refugees when the principal debtor is insolvent. The UN has, so to speak, taken upon itself the obligation which belongs mainly to Israel," declared a representative of the Arab states at the Paris conference. He attacked the attempt to establish a relationship of cause and effect between compensation payments and the financial capacity of Israel as "pure and simple confiscation of the property of the Arab refugee." In his opinion, payments should represent capital which the refugees could invest and which would to some extent replace their abandoned property. "To restrict this right or to make the payment of compensation dependent on the financial capacity of Israel would be to make this right an illusion and to make Israel a present of the refugees' property," he declared.

At the Paris conference the Arab delegations outlined the following procedure for payment: (1) It should represent the true value of the property, which Arab authorities estimated at £2 billion (nearly twenty times the appraisal of the CCP's Refugee Office). (2) The refugees must be represented during the different stages of the operations. (3) An appeal procedure for the refugees must be established. (4) The refugees who would not be repatriated should receive a certain proportion of the value of public property, such as roads, railway lines, ports, aerodromes, etc.<sup>40</sup>

When conclusion of the agreement on payment of reparations by the West German Federal Republic to Israel was imminent, the Arab League began to exert pressure for payment of Arab refugee compensation from the funds which Israel was to receive. Both the German and Israeli Governments resisted this pressure, and the Arab attempt to divert part of the reparation payments failed. Israel took the position that the Arab states

<sup>39</sup> *Haboker*, June 18, July 8, 1953.

<sup>40</sup> Seventh General Assembly Ad Hoc Political Committee Summary Records, 25th meeting; A/1985, pp. 20-22.

had no right to intervene in bilateral treaty agreements between it and the Federal German Republic, either inside or outside of the UN.<sup>41</sup>

### PROBLEMS OF INDIVIDUAL PAYMENTS

Although actual payment of compensation is fenced in by a complex of political factors, the CCP is at present devoting nearly all of its attention to technical aspects of the problem. Having completed its global evaluation, the Commission is now concentrating on an attempt to work out a basis of individual payments related to identification of specific units of property. However, the obstacles in the way of individual payments are many and formidable. Identification and assessment of Arab individual property is complicated by the fact that most of the original records of land registration were either destroyed in the chaotic war period or are otherwise missing. A large number of records were microfilmed and taken to England, but many of these films have been found to be illegible.

Even had the records been more complete, the specific ownership of large tracts of land abandoned during the Arab flight would be extremely difficult if not impossible to determine because of the character of the land system prevailing in Palestine up to 1948. Most of the 16,324,000 dunams of abandoned land, including much of the 4,574,000 dunams considered cultivable, had never been registered under the Land Settlement Act, which identified ownership by cadastral survey. Much of this property was registered under the Ottoman system, which identified land parcels according to boundaries stated without reference to a survey. Usually, no parcel was located on the ground prior to a registration of the title deed, and no plan of it was made. Entries in the Register of Deeds could rarely be identified with the parcel of land to which they purported to refer. Encroachments and boundary disputes were not infrequent. In addition, a great number of transactions were effected outside the Land Registry Offices and the title deeds were not recorded. Neither were successions, tending to divide the land into small fractions, as a rule recorded. The Register of Deeds, therefore, particularly in rural areas, did not show the true ownership of the land, and the complications of titles were extremely difficult to straighten out.<sup>42</sup>

Although the new system introduced by the Palestine Government in the Land Settlement Ordinance of 1928 provided for registration of accurately defined parcels based on surveyors' maps of each registered block, by the end of the Mandate only an approximate 5,200,000 dunams had been entered.<sup>43</sup> Most Jewish-owned land was included in this area, but large tracts which are today absentee property, particularly in western Galilee, the Jerusalem corridor, and the regions surrounding Safad, Acre, and the

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, *Haaretz*, Sept. 17, 1952; *Arab News Agency*, Nov. 8, 1952.

<sup>42</sup> F. M. Goadby and M. J. Doukan, *The Land Law of Palestine* (Tel-Aviv, 1935), p. 298.

<sup>43</sup> Granott, *op. cit.*; verbal information from the Land Settlement Office, Government of Israel.

Little Triangle, were never settled. To compute compensation for abandoned refugee property on an individual basis in such cases would give rise to a host of legal and technical difficulties which, if such claims were ever to be accurately determined, would require years of patient arbitration and investigation.

One of the principal aims of the Land Settlement Ordinance of 1928 was to end the widespread amount of land held in undivided ownership (*musha'*) by partitioning such holdings, but it was discovered that a much larger area than had been supposed was in this category, and that it would be extremely difficult to determine the shares of village inhabitants. Large areas were totally in dispute, and in some cases as many as thirty claims to one parcel were submitted. Although there are yet no exact data which would indicate the amount of *musha'* property abandoned by the Arab refugees, on the basis of surveys made during the Mandatory period it would seem that approximately 40 to 50 percent was commonly owned.<sup>44</sup> This factor would raise particular complications in implementing any proposals for payment of individual compensation, because in the Arab flight from Palestine the inhabitants of many villages were separated and mixed with those of others. Without reassembling these populations into workable economic units, within the framework of UN plans for reintegrating the refugees into the life of the Middle East, attempts to pay compensation for *musha'* property would give rise to a myriad of claims, the validity of which would be subject to the greatest doubt.

### CONCLUSIONS

The present United Nations approach to the Palestine question is meant to by-pass political issues. It is based upon the assumptions that a solution of the refugee problem will open the door to Arab-Israeli peace, and that a functional rather than a political beginning should be made. It was hoped that a prior concentration on the issue of compensation would obviate the difficulties likely to arise in negotiations on other issues, such as repatriation, borders, or the Jerusalem question. But the compensation issue itself is so steeped in political implications that great progress beyond technical studies and surveys seems unlikely. Even these studies are so complex that it will be some time before they can substantially contribute to a complete and accurate evaluation of Arab property abandoned in Israel. Indeed, at the present stage of progress on the compensation issue, it would be chimerical to rouse the refugees' hopes of receipt of payment for their losses in the Palestine war.

<sup>44</sup> According to the Mesha'a Land Committee investigation conducted in 753 villages in 1923, about 56 percent of the area surveyed (4,876,000 dunams) was common land. The Johnson-Crosbie Committee investigated 1,876,000 dunams belonging to 104 villages and found that not more than 44 percent was *musha'* land. In 1931 Lewis French estimated that less than 40 percent of the country was *musha'*. From then until the 1939 Royal Commission report there was little decline in *musha'* property. After 1939, partitioning of *musha'* land was suspended altogether.

# DATE CULTURE IN THE OASIS OF AL-HASA

F. S. Vidal

(See map, facing page 375.)

IN POPULAR IMAGINATION, the term "oasis" has come to mean a cluster of palm trees near a waterhole with perhaps a couple of tents, all encircled by sandy desert. Such waterhole oases do exist in great numbers, but nothing could be further from this popular concept than the region of al-Hasa in eastern Saudi Arabia. Indeed, if one considers its sheer size, its large water resources, its date production, and its surprisingly dense population, one wonders whether al-Hasa should properly be called an oasis at all.<sup>1</sup> It is, however, "an area of vegetation surrounded by desert," and thus qualifies as an oasis by dictionary definition.

Al-Hasa is an L-shaped area, extending approximately from 25°21' to 25°37' Lat. N. and from 49°33' to 49°46' Long. E. It encloses some 70 square miles of garden area with perhaps 30,000 acres under continuous cultivation, some 25,000 to 27,000 acres being in date palms. The population totals approximately 160,000 people, distributed among two towns (Hofuf with 60,000, and al-Mubarraz with 28,000) and 52 smaller settlements, ranging from larger villages (2,500 inhabitants) to small hamlets (100 or less). The larger villages are normally built near the edges of the cultivated area, both in order to avoid using up planting soil while still being close to the gardens, and to gain better visibility in case of enemy attack. Most of these larger villages, which consist in the main of masonry buildings, have a substantial defensive wall built of limestone rubble and faced with mud or gypsum cement. Occasionally irrigation ditches have been carried along the outside of the walls to provide an additional obstacle. The small villages and hamlets are generally inside the palm growing area; they are unwallled, and have a large number of dwellings made of wood and palm fronds. During the last generation, after the consolidation of the Saudi dynasty had brought internal peace and security to the kingdom, the number of these hamlets, as well as that of isolated garden residences owned by the wealthy people of the region, has increased considerably. Cor-

<sup>1</sup> This problem of terminology does not appear in Arabia. The word *wahah*, occasionally heard in Egypt and infrequently seen in the Arabic press, is not used in Saudi Arabia. Saudis refer to different oases by their individual names (al-Hasa, al-Qatif, etc.) but do not employ a generic term to embrace them all.

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respondingly, the fortifications for defense, watchtowers, village walls, and such like are now no longer needed and have been allowed to decay.

The large population of al-Hasa supports itself by a variety of economic pursuits. Hofuf,<sup>2</sup> the capital of the oasis, has until recently been also the capital of the whole of eastern Arabia<sup>3</sup> and consequently has had a good number of people working for government agencies, police, army, and administration. Some public servants, although not so many, are also found in al-Mubarraz.

More numerous than the civil servants are the members of the arts, crafts, and professions. In this respect, metalworking (particularly the manufacture of the well-known, large, beak-spouted coffeepots) and textile manufacture are exceptionally noteworthy. While many of the crafts have declined in importance and in the quality of their workmanship, especially in those cases where the availability of foreign exchange has permitted increased imports, the contrary obtains in the case of textiles. The shift to a cash economy and the raised standard of living have apparently made increased demands on the production of the al-Hasa *bisht*, the cloak of wool and camel hair which has long and justly been famous in the Persian Gulf region, and even beyond. The circumstance that the Royal Family of Saudi Arabia, as well as other prominent families in the kingdom, favors al-Hasa textiles, has further enhanced the prestige of the product, with the consequence that other sections of the population, trying to follow the example of their social and political leaders, have stepped up their demands for al-Hasa cloaks. The quality of the weave, as well as the beauty of the gold embroidery, has steadily improved. In this connection it should be stated that though the looms of the al-Hasa weavers (horizontal, frameless, two-bar looms with as many as eight treadles and six shuttles) are hand operated, they are far from being primitive. The machine is extremely efficient and the quality of the produce shows the consummate skill of the workmen.

Culturally and economically more important than the craftsmen are the merchants. Trade in the oasis comprises a multitude of activities: from the big international operations of such a firm as the famous al-Qusaibi family, to the date-marketing operations of wholesalers dealing with Bedouins, and the small cash-and-carry detail deals of young men established by their

<sup>2</sup> More properly al-Hufuf or al-Hufhuf; the spelling Hofuf has long been established in English usage.

<sup>3</sup> The entire region has been called by foreigners "Hasa Province," or "al-Hasa Province." This is a misleading term, since the people of the area use the name to refer to the oasis alone. The use of "Hasa Province" probably started during the Turkish administration, when the whole area was under the jurisdiction of a Mutasarrif Pasha who made his headquarters in al-Hasa. In the statement on the administrative reorganization of this part of Arabia issued on February 8, 1953, by H.R.H. Crown Prince Su'ud, present King of Saudi Arabia, the term "Eastern Province" is used. It is to be hoped that this recently introduced and more accurate term will receive greater acceptance in the future. The capital of the province was moved from Hofuf to Dammam on the Persian Gulf in the spring of 1953.

families in a small general store in a corner of the market, to learn the profession empirically.

Al-Hasa has been an ideal place for the development of commerce. Its plentiful supply of water is able to support a large population and offers the opportunity for large-scale agriculture, the produce of which could be sold to the Bedouins of the region or exchanged for the meat, skins, mohair and wool that the Bedouins produced. At the same time, the proximity of the oasis to the Persian Gulf and the easy route to the sea made al-Hasa become central Arabia's door to the world, much more so than the coastal oases which could not support as large a population. Hofuf became the break-of-bulk center for imported merchandise in this part of the peninsula.

The majority of the people of al-Hasa, however, support themselves by agriculture. Their farming complex revolves around a nucleus composed of water from artesian springs, date palms, donkeys, and alfalfa. The artesian springs, of which there are probably more than 50 in the oasis with a combined waterflow well in excess of 150,000 gallons per minute (in an area that probably has not more than 3 inches yearly precipitation), provide the basis for farming. The date palm, this most practical and economical of oasis plants, gives the Hasawis a cash crop, a basis for barter, and material for construction, for basketry, and a host of other manufactured products as well as other uses; the space between the palms grows alfalfa, which can be used as fodder for the donkeys, which in turn supply the needed transportation, some fertilizer, and the power for lifting water when needed.

Although a variety of agricultural produce is grown in the oasis, the backbone of al-Hasa farming is the date palm. The date gardens and the artesian springs not only provide a livelihood in terms of earning power by fulfilling the functions outlined above; they are a blending factor that brings into relationship most elements in the Hasawis' life. Gardens and springs are centers around which one can meet one's equals to exchange news, gossip, transact business, do the laundry, and discuss family matters; they produce a reward in terms of esthetic gratification and relaxation from the trying climate, and are a prestige-giving item to strive and work for.

The Hasawis have developed an extreme cultural specialization as well as a complex vocabulary around their system of date cultivation,<sup>4</sup> much as has the Bedouin around his camel nomadism. Probably a total of more than 2 million palm trees grow in al-Hasa, representing a majority of the 40 varieties of dates said to be found in the Persian Gulf area. By and large, a date garden grows only two or three varieties, although a few clusters of palms growing other kinds can be seen in most large date groves. The names

<sup>4</sup> The term *bustan*, for instance, should not be used in al-Hasa to refer to a date garden; this is called a *nakhil*. A *bustan* is a garden that does not primarily grow dates. The word *shajarah* (tree) is not used in al-Hasa with reference to date palms; these must be called either *nakhlah* (female date palm) or *fahl* (male date palm).

of the varieties encountered in al-Hasa are as follows (spellings often doubtful):

1. Barihi	13. Khisab	25. Ruzaiz
2. Bukayyirah	14. Khisbi	26. Sabu'
3. Da'laj	15. Khulas	27. Shabibi
4. Ghurr	16. Khunaizi	28. Shahl
5. Hatimi	17. Khusayyib	29. Sunaini
6. Hilali	18. Marzaban	30. Tunaqib
7. Hulayyili	19. Mijnas	31. Tayyar
8. Huraizi	20. Muhaimi	32. Wusaili
9. Hushayyishi	21. Muraihim	33. Zamili
10. Jubaili	22. Muwahhid <sup>6</sup>	34. Zunbur (ahmar)
11. Khadij	23. Nabt al-Saif	35. Zunbur (asfar)
12. Khatasi	24. Raisi	

According to general belief in the Persian Gulf region, the best date grown in this part of the world is the *khulas*,<sup>6</sup> of which a good amount grows in al-Hasa. This variety, and the *hushayyishi*, which is next in quality, are considered to be "cold"; the remaining varieties are called "warm." The people of the area say that the "cold" kinds are not only more palatable, but also more easily digested, while the "warm" varieties cannot be eaten in large quantities without disagreeable aftereffects. Close to these two varieties in quality are the *ruzaiz*, which constitute the bulk of al-Hasa's crop. It is estimated that some 80 percent of al-Hasa dates are *ruziaz*. This fact, according to the statements of some Bedouin old-timers, made the people of al-Hasa acquire the somewhat derogatory nickname of *ruzaizi's*.

The people of the oasis recognize different stages in the maturing process of a date, and have special names for them. During the earliest stage, before the fruit can even be recognized as such, it is called *habumbu*. During the next stage, when the date is small and green, it is called *khalal*. It later turns yellow, without increasing much in size, and is called *busr*.<sup>7</sup> During the following stage, when the date becomes much larger and of a dark yellow or red, it is called *rutab*, and in the last stage, when it acquires its final dark red or dark reddish-brown color, it is called *tamr*. The length of these periods, as well as the harvest time, varies slightly according to the different varieties, but the vocabulary used is the same. Dates are eaten during both the *rutab* and *tamr* stages.

Date gardens in al-Hasa require a great deal of work. Dates are planted from offshoots and it is stated that only very rarely are palms allowed to grow from seeds. Peculiar to al-Hasa is the practice of burning the soil. This is done by filling a long narrow ditch with combustible rubbish, piling

<sup>6</sup> Perhaps not the name of a distinct variety. There may be a few more varieties of dates in al-Hasa, but the author was unable to record their names.

<sup>6</sup> The *khulas* is the only date grown in commercial quantities in the U.S., where it is called *khalasa*. See R. W. Nixon, *Imported Varieties of Dates in the United States*, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Circular No. 834 (Washington, 1950), pp. 49, 96.

<sup>7</sup> Some people maintain that the terms *khalal* and *busr* are interchangeable.

earth on it, and then burning it. The burnt earth and ashes are later spread over the soil. In case of a large garden, this is done only to a section of it each year, so that it may take several years to process the entire property.<sup>8</sup> The soil of a date garden is broken and spaded as a rule every two or three years.

In the winter the thorns of the date palm branches are cut and later used for very effective burglar protection. They are stuck vertically in the mud or plaster on the top of walls, much in the same way as nails and pieces of glass are used elsewhere. Date palms are pollinated at the beginning of spring, and after pollination the female inflorescences are wrapped up in palm fiber or rags. It is interesting to notice that in al-Hasa the number of male spikelets used in pollinating varies according to the variety of female tree, and not according to the variety of the male or the size of the spikelet. It would thus appear that the Hasawis, contrary to the practice of the Basrah cultivators, believe that the decisive factor is the female palm and not the male palm.<sup>9</sup>

The cutting of dead branches and palm webbing and the fertilizing of the soil can be done at any time. Harvest takes place from late summer to early fall, according to the different varieties.

Hasawis try to fertilize the soil of their gardens about once a year. This is a very necessary practice in al-Hasa, which, not being a riverine oasis, does not, like other areas in the Middle East, receive a fresh supply of top-soil with the annual floods. As the importation of automobiles has been followed by a decline in the number of donkeys and, consequently, with a decrease in the supply of fertilizer,<sup>10</sup> it can be predicted that the people of al-Hasa will in the near future either have to manufacture or import substantial amounts of chemical fertilizer if they are to keep up their agricultural production.

Date gardens vary considerably in size. There are some very large gardens of individual ownership, either by private citizens or by the crown, the latter being mostly property acquired by conquest when King Ibn Sa'ud defeated the Turks and took over the Turkish Sultan's properties. A large number of gardens, however, are of multiple ownership. This is of two types; one, called *sharikat mufraz*, is characterized by individuals owning precisely delimited separate plots in a garden which is irrigated in common,

<sup>8</sup> For the significance of this practice from an agronomist's point of view, see V. H. W. Dowson, "To Arabia in Search of Date-palm Offshoots," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. 39 (January 1952), pp. 52-53.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Dowson, *op. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> More significant in this respect than the importation of automobiles has been the construction and general use of the *qari*, a springless wooden box cart pulled by donkeys and provided with automobile tires. The decrease in the supply of fertilizer is compensated by an increased availability of alfalfa, which can be fed to cattle, and by the much greater efficiency of the *qari* as compared to the old pack saddle method. In addition, the very large number of boys who formerly were in charge of watching over the pack trains can now be given free time to go to school.



but worked and harvested separately; the other, *sharikat musha'ah*, consists of gardens jointly owned, worked, and harvested, with shares given out to the different owners after the harvest, according to the individual's interest. Normally gardens with multiple ownership are under the supervision of a hired caretaker or agent (*wakil*), who is in charge of directing the irrigation, work, harvest, and distribution of the crop shares. He is also responsible for hiring the manpower required.

Laborers' wages are rather uniform throughout the oasis. As a rule they fluctuate from about 5 to 6 Saudi riyals (\$1.35 to \$1.60), plus one meal, for a workday of six or seven hours. The workers are paid according to the kind of work they perform. The rate given above is for an ordinary shovel or pick worker; if the labor involves climbing the trees, the workmen get an additional Saudi riyal per day as compensation for the element of risk. Some years ago, part of these wages were paid out in kind (generally dates, sometimes also rice); today, however, the trend is to pay out the entire wage in cash.

Another noticeable change has taken place in the composition of the diet given the workers for the noon meal. While formerly the greater part of the menu, if not all of it, was dates, nowadays it consists basically of a rice dish with some meat and tomato sauce, although a few dates are still eaten as sweets.

When eaten in the *rutab* stage, dates are usually taken to the market in open boxes, baskets, or crates made of palm leaves. If they are marketed as *tamr* they are generally packed into squares of matting, which are wrapped around the heap of dates, and sewn tightly closed. This date sack is called a *kis*. The units of weight used in marketing dates in al-Hasa are as follows:<sup>11</sup>

Unit	Local Equivalent	Avoirdupois Equivalent
Qiyasah	32 rub'ah	21.5-23.5 lbs.
Jarab (or <i>qullah saghirah</i> )	64 rub'ah	43- 47 lbs.
Qullah (or <i>jaluq</i> , or <i>qullah kabirah</i> )	6 qiyasah	130-140 lbs.
Musmiyah	12 qiyasah	260-280 lbs.
Mann	4 qullah	525-560 lbs.

There are two types of date storage in al-Hasa. One is a room in any living compound, where boxes or wooden compartments have been built to keep the different kinds of dates separated. This is called a *jussah*. The second kind of storage building, called a *fida*, is a tower-like structure with a wooden trap door at the bottom, into which the dates are dumped from the top. Due to the action of the heat, progressive maturing of the dates, and particularly their weight, the dates are pressed against the wooden floor, and a thick syrup, like molasses, is squeezed out. This syrup is called *dibs* and is considered a delicacy.

<sup>11</sup> The standard al-Hasa *kis* weighs 1 *qullah*. It must be realized that although the terms used in al-Hasa, al-Qatif, and the Dhahran area for different units of weight are often the same, they are not equivalent in weight.

It is practically impossible to estimate the total amount of dates produced in al-Hasa. Extreme figures given are 110 million lbs. for the lowest estimate, and 1,050 million for the highest. We believe that about 125 million lbs. or somewhat more is a safe guess, though still very much of a guess.

One of the most interesting aspects of al-Hasa agriculture is its irrigation system. From this point of view, the gardens of al-Hasa are of two types: those that are irrigated without the help of any mechanical devices, i.e., where the water flows following the natural slope of the terrain; and those that require some form of mechanical help for lifting the water. The first type, which we might call *saih* (from the Arabic for flowing water), includes the larger gardens growing primarily dates and rice. The second type, which could be called *mugharraḥ* (from an Arabic root meaning to ladle water), consists in the main of smaller plots, largely devoted to vegetables and alfalfa. Some palm trees are found in *mugharraḥ* gardens, but no large date grove is irrigated in this manner.

The most important of these irrigation systems is the *saih* type. Water leaving the spring passes through irrigation canals called *masqa*'s and is diverted into the gardens. The people of al-Hasa classify this water as *hurr*, or pure. Gardens located by a *masqa*, however, have as a rule a superabundance of humidity, so that not all of the water soaks in. The surplus leaves the gardens through another channel, no longer called *masqa*, but *munajja* (possibly from an Arabic root meaning "to save"). Hasawis refer to this surplus water as being *tawayih*, or forfeited.

Occasionally, the surplus from a single *masqa*-irrigated garden is enough to irrigate another garden, in which case the *munajja* will lead directly from one palm grove to the next. But more often several *munajja*'s join their water in a common channel, usually referred to as a *thabur* (sometimes very large, like the one called al-Sulaisil), which takes the *tawayih* water over long distances, and from which small channels branch out into the gardens. This regathering and redistributing system goes on and on, the length and breadth of the oasis, until the water reaches the edges of the cultivation area and either runs off into the sands or accumulates on the *sabkha*'s (salt flats) that surround the palm belt.

As might be expected, Hasawis who own gardens irrigated with *hurr* water from a *masqa* are very proud of this fact, and their prestige is higher than it would be if they were using *tawayih* water. Gardens at the very end of this distribution chain are spoken of with disdain as using *tawayih al-tawayih*, twice-used, or twice-forfeited water.

This system, together with the Hasawis' adherence to the traditionally established watering order and schedule, as well as their manifest interest in keeping *hurr* and *tawayih* water separated, has produced an extremely complicated irrigation network, one of the most characteristic features of al-Hasa landscape: masonry-lined canals, masonry dams for raising the

water level, stone sluices with date palm logs for control of the flow, aqueducts, and bridges. Many of the trails and roads inside the gardens are bordered by irrigation ditches on both sides.

When a Hasawi buys a garden, the *mulkiyah* (title) issued to him by the Finance Office specifies the day and time of irrigation, as well as the canal to be tapped. Every owner is responsible for operating the floodgates in accordance with this schedule. The frequency and length of irrigation periods are variable. As a rule, the larger gardens are irrigated more often and for longer periods of time; gardens by a *masqa* have shorter irrigation times than those far away from the springs, to allow for loss of water through seepage and evaporation.

From the point of view of modern technology, the irrigation system of al-Hasa could certainly be improved upon, and this has been recognized by some of the larger landowners, who are now trying to do something about it. There are in the oasis miles of unnecessary ditches, not all of them properly lined. The channels are often too shallow, the land frequently waterlogged, and the ground water table maintained too high. The multiple ditches use up good planting acreage, the high ground water table keeps the root zone improperly aerated, and the soil is in places being destroyed as the land becomes saline for lack of proper drainage. The increase in salinity is so marked that the water of the springs of al-Haql and al-Khudud (two of the largest), having an average salinity of 1,275 parts per million, reaches the edge of the oasis after a run of some 15 kilometers with a total salinity of 4,120 parts per million.

The *mugharraf* type of irrigation is economically not as important as the *saih* type. Two kinds of waterlifts are used in al-Hasa: one is not unlike the Egyptian *shaduf*, and is man operated. The other kind consists of a series of wooden pulleys over which pass ropes attached to water skins; in the oasis of al-Hasa, as well as in that of al-Qatif on the Persian Gulf, this machine is operated by donkeys, while in other parts of Saudi Arabia camels are used. Such a method is quite efficient for watering the smaller plots; it is also very economical, particularly since donkeys are frugal animals, can be easily trained, and require but little supervision. In recent times a few artificial wells have been dug in the oasis, some by the government and some by a few of the large landowners. In several of the larger gardens gasoline pumps have been installed to take the place of the donkeys.

The date agriculture and the farmers of al-Hasa are now at a crossroads. Their present predicament is not, however, due to any one single dramatic reason, but rather to a combination of interplaying factors. For one thing, although the amount of water in the oasis is still abundant, the supply is dwindling. There appears to be a diminution of flow or a lowering of the artesian water table, as well as an invasion of the edges of the oasis by drift-

ing sands, all causing a decrease in the cultivated area. This gradual desiccation is a very slow process and has been going on for many centuries, an observation that is supported not only by comparing the present extent of the gardens with the limits as described by the early Western travelers in al-Hasa (between the second half of the last century and the beginning of the present), but also by archaeological evidence gathered from the location of former village sites and the relative positions of former Bedouin camps. A detailed study of aerial photographs gives further support to this contention. While the desiccation process is a long drawn out phenomenon, it is quite possible that it may be reaching a critical point.

Evidence of drifting sands is found particularly in the northern edges of the eastern oasis (from the district of al-'Umran to the area around al-Kilabiyah), and along the eastern edge of the northern oasis. Overgrazing of the fringe areas during the temporary sojourns of the Bedouins in the oasis has further complicated matters. The inadequate agricultural practices mentioned above, by gradually increasing the salinity of the soil, have over the years caused a corresponding decrease in the planted acreage, particularly along the fringes of the oasis.

The farmers of al-Hasa have been further affected by the disturbing consequences of the familiar variation in planted areas as a response to price fluctuations in crop economies, as well as by the instability of crop yields in arid countries. Before the conquest of al-Hasa by the late King Ibn Sa'ud, the economic stability of al-Hasa peasants was also impaired on the one hand by the sporadic local opposition to the Turkish administration, and on the other by the periodic depredations of the Bedouin nomads. The Bedouin tribes of the area (notably the 'Ujman, Al Murrah, Bani Khalid, and Bani Hajir) that were able to command the two main trade routes from Hofuf to al-Qatif and al-'Uqair seriously impeded the smooth functioning of caravan traffic, which was considerable at the time. It is reported that at the beginning of the present century as many as 300 camel loads a week reached Hofuf from al-'Uqair, not to speak of an equal if not even larger number of donkey loads. Trade at this time was also considerable with al-Qatif. The people of that oasis, which also produces a large amount of dates, had developed a process to make a peculiar, sweet date confection called *saluq*, which is well liked in the region. Since trade in the Persian Gulf waters had become relatively safe at about the turn of the century, and there was enough of a demand for their produce, the Qatifis discovered that by turning their crop into *saluq* they could realize a considerable profit, and acted accordingly. This meant that dates for local consumption in al-Qatif had to be brought in from al-Hasa. The larger landowners and merchants of al-Hasa were able to engage in such a trade because they could ensure adequate armed or diplomatic protection for their caravans. The individual small farmers, however, and the Bedouins who could not raid



were at a disadvantage. Under such circumstances, the profits of the trade went mostly to the larger merchants, who spent a part of it abroad in consumer goods.

After the defeat of the Turks, the caravan trade in the interior became safer. Intertribal warfare ceased after the defeat of the 'Ujman tribe by the late King in 1928. In order to improve the lot of the lower income groups of the region, particularly of the Bedouins, who are dependent on the availability of cheap dates, the government eventually tried to take steps that would produce a local surplus of dates and bring prices down: it instituted a prohibition of the unlimited production of *saluq* in al-Qatif (keeping it at between 20 and 25 percent of the crop), and established an embargo on the export of fresh dates.<sup>12</sup>

These measures, together with the increased safety of work in the gardens, resulted in an increase in date production. The cumulative effect of these circumstances and the resulting date surplus must have been so great — although accurate figures on this are not available — that the ultimate drop in prices was considerable. The price of one al-Hasa *qullah* of Ruzaiz went from approximately 48 Saudi riyals in 1948 to approximately 10 Saudi riyals in 1951. While it is certain that this decline in prices was in many respects a reflection of local conditions, it is also possible that it might be related to a downward trend of the world date market. In al-Hasa the decline was more than the people had bargained for. The small farmer no longer was making enough money on his dates. The upper merchant class remained relatively unaffected, since it was not dependent on the production and sale of dates exclusively, and furthermore the availability of foreign exchange from oil had contributed to making it independent of the fluctuations of the date economy.

At the present moment, with the development of the oil industry, date exports are not as essential to the economy of the region as they once were, while at the same time, the situation of the world date market continues to be unfavorable. The Hasawi farmers, after years or even centuries of cumulative experience, apparently feel that there is no longer much security in date growing. This loss in the economic importance of the date is paralleled by a decline in its prestige as an item of the diet. Today it is no longer fashionable to offer dates to a guest, but rather any of the varied imported delicacies readily available in the stores of Hofuf and al-Mubarraz. Quite probably the change in eating habits has not resulted in dietary improvement, but it is hardly likely that this degeneration, familiar in other areas of the world, can be easily reversed.

With the shift to a cash economy and industrialization, the farmers of

<sup>12</sup> At the time of writing, conditions having changed over the last few years, the embargo on date exports has been lifted and the quota on *saluq* manufacture, although not officially repealed, is no longer enforced.

al-Hasa would apparently like to find in industry the stability, security, and personal comfort that they do not believe they can find in date growing. Such a trend is, however, somewhat half-hearted. Centuries, perhaps even millennia, of oasis agriculture, as well as the realization of their good fortune in living amidst such a luxuriant growth while the neighboring Bedouins trod among the sands, have given the Hasawis a very definite psychological attachment to the soil. Several observations clearly bear this out. For instance, although the date has lost a good part of its value, the value of a date garden has increased. This very important point, although in part attributable to inflation, is to a considerable extent due to the very much enlarged value of a date garden as a luxury item which gives its owner increased social prestige. The al-Hasa farmer of today does not, as it were, fight to keep his garden productive, but fights to keep his garden. When a date cultivator from a village decides, because of economic pressures, to abandon farming, his first move is to try to get a job within any of the purely local enterprises in the larger settlements of the oasis, or perhaps with some of the local contractors supplying ancillary services to the oil industry. The Hasawi's main aim seems to be to stay in the oasis, or else to be able to visit his village and keep in touch with his small plot of land as often as possible. Moving out to work directly in the oil fields is apparently a second choice. This contrasts with the attitude of the Bedouins, who are not attached to the soil and readily move to a far-away job site. At the present moment, there are more people of Bedouin than of farming stock working for the oil company.

In the 1952 and 1953 seasons, a series of circumstances produced a temporarily improved date market in al-Hasa. These circumstances were mainly connected with the large increase in non-date-producing but still largely date-consuming Bedouin groups recently settled in the oasis, and with the large increment in transportation facilities (notably the operations of the Saudi Government railroad) that made it possible for the date surplus to be taken to the interior of the peninsula. Date prices rose slightly. It is conceivable that this condition might make the Hasawi farmer revert to growing more dates. On the other hand, it may be safely expected that the trend away from the date as a basic food item will continue, and that it will sooner or later significantly affect the Bedouin population. The problem of how to dispose of a large date surplus might well appear again, perhaps with increased urgency.

In the recent past, a number of foreign agricultural experts, giving first consideration to strictly agricultural techniques, have suggested that al-Hasa's economy should be developed mainly by improving the quantity and quality of the dates, by processing them, and by reclaiming extensive areas for additional date production. Taking all aspects of the problem into consideration, this movement in favor of more, bigger, and better dates, by dis-

proportionately increasing the date surplus, might well have some adverse effects. Date processing and packaging for export is of course possible, as is chemical manipulation on an industrial basis, such as the manufacture of molasses, syrups, and particularly alcohol. In our opinion, a great deal of change must take place in al-Hasa before such plants can be established economically on a substantial scale, even disregarding considerations of international trade which fall outside the scope of this paper but might significantly affect such operations.

The people of al-Hasa are an imaginative, industrious, and resourceful folk, and they will eventually work out a solution to their present predicament. Quite probably, local industries will develop. In this respect, the recent establishment of the al-Hasa Electrical Supply Company might well prove to be the impetus toward a modernization and enlargement of the already famous textile industry. In agriculture itself, production of rice and vegetables or the introduction of a new cash crop will probably replace a good amount of date growing; and it is more than possible that there will be a shift toward the production of livestock.

Whatever adjustment the Hasawis eventually choose to make, it seems fairly certain that for a long time to come they will try to maintain the close personal links that tie them to the soil of their oasis. If one has ever been surprised by the beauty of al-Hasa after crossing the sands of the Jafurah, one does not have to wonder why.

# RELOCATION OF A PUNJAB PAKISTAN COMMUNITY

John J. Honigmann

PAKISTAN'S THAL PROJECT, begun in 1942, is one of the biggest schemes of economic development and human resettlement being executed anywhere in the world. Modeled in part after our own Tennessee Valley scheme, utilizing international capital, and aiming to convert a vast Sahara in western Punjab Province to productive use, the undertaking has already settled nearly 200 new villages and brought thousands of acres of the former Thal Desert under cultivation.<sup>1</sup> Larger towns, too, have been constructed and irrigation canals engineered that will eventually spread across some 2 million acres of desert. Many of the new villages, or chaks, as they are called, accommodate Muslim refugees who fled from India to Pakistan following Partition in 1947. What are the patterns of living and the course of adjustment followed by an uprooted people, such as these, who had forsaken the land of their birth?<sup>2</sup>

## THE SETTING

Framing the northern horizon of Chak 41 MB<sup>3</sup> is the Salt Range ridge of West Punjab, which, although it reaches a maximum elevation of only 4,100 feet, is nearly perpetually shrouded in mist. From these mountains the land falls steeply to the Thal Desert, which nestles between the Indus

<sup>1</sup> See *The Punjab: A Review of the First Five Years* (Lahore: Director of Public Relations, c. 1952).

<sup>2</sup> Most of the conclusions in the present paper were written prior to the author's reading of Gardner Murphy, *In the Minds of Men* (New York, 1953). References to the book have been chosen to test some of our hypotheses and to present material of a contrasting type of adjustment by Muslim refugees in India. A report of our own research, *Information for Pakistan* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1953, mimeographed), has been published by the Institute for Research in Social Science.

<sup>3</sup> The practice of designating new villages by number, leaving the settlers to decide on a name, goes back to the so-called "canal colonies" of British times. See Randhir Singh, *An Economic Survey of Kala Gaddi Thamman (Chak 73 G.B.)* (Lahore, 1932), p. i.

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and Jhelum rivers. The northern margin of this area is marked by the motor road that leads from Khushab westward to Mianwali. Paralleling the highway and also skirting the northern edge of the desert run the tracks of the North West Railway. Mithatiwana, a small station on the line, lies about three miles north of Mithatiwana village (population 5,000) from whence a sandy track leads east-southeast to a series of small, newly constructed chaks. This portion of the desert is only recently developed, for previously the sparse rainfall offered little inducement to settlement in the Thal. Where Chak 41 MB is located, a camel track passes en route from Roda, one of the few old desert villages, to the market center of Mithatiwana.

Summer temperatures in this extension of the great Indo-Gangetic plain are, of course, very high. Nights, however, remain cool, and in December the temperature goes down to nearly 40° Fahrenheit. Summer also brings highly uncomfortable dust storms. In the monsoon season (June-July), a little rain falls and an even slighter rainy period occurs in December and January. The monsoon is highly capricious, however, and the annual rainfall rarely exceeds 8 inches. Still, this is more favorable than Sind's 4 inches and was sufficient to permit the raising of a little winter wheat even without irrigation.

In the village live 377 persons, 201 male and 176 female. About 47 percent of this population is under 15, while 51 percent is between 15 and 65, and about 2 percent over 65. The population is divided among 91 families. The relatively slight schooling enjoyed by a random sample of 32 men and 17 women is shown in Table I.

#### MIGRATION AND CHANGE

Plans to irrigate the Thal Desert go back to 1939 but were interrupted by the war and Partition. In July 1949 the Punjab Government enacted a law for the constitution of a public corporation, the Thal Development Authority (TDA), which began actual development operations early in 1950. Water, towns and villages, implements, farm animals, dispensaries, and, of course, administrative and technical personnel, all were provided for carrying through what has been described as an experiment in "Islamic socialism."

The migration by which these villagers came to Pakistan is one of the greatest in history. West Punjab Province alone received 5.5 million Muslim refugees from India. In the chak, 70 percent of the 71 landholders for

Table I: YEARS OF SCHOOLING — CHAK 41 MB

Percent of	None	1-2	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-10	Total
Men .....	53	13	16	9	7	3	101
Women .....	94	6	—	—	—	—	100

whom data are available came from Ludhiana district in East Punjab, 15 percent from Jullundur district, and a sprinkling from elsewhere. Most of those from Ludhiana had lived together in Radzoval, a village of 3,000. Upon crossing the border in late 1947 the bulk of the peasants were resettled in Lyallpur District of West Punjab. Then, on March 3, 1950, the men were transported to the chak to help break the virgin land. In June 1950, wives and children joined the pioneers.

Migration from East Punjab did not expose the refugees to dramatic cultural contrasts; nor did it leave the customary way of life unaffected. Prior to Partition, the farmers lived by Persian wheel irrigation on the relatively fertile banks of the Sutlej. The wheels assured a steady supply of water, so that agriculture could be more intensive than in the chak,<sup>4</sup> three crops being taken annually from the land. Dust storms rarely occurred. Alongside the Muslims dwelt Hindus. The agricultural villages were not only relatively populous but were convenient to still larger towns, so that a market existed for truck garden products and fruits. Informants admitted that they had kept more farm animals "in Hindustan" than they were keeping in the Thal.

The settlers' original impression of the chak, following their sojourn in the more fertile Lyallpur District, seems to have been disheartening. Apparently the choice of migrating had been left up to selected families, who were induced to come to the Thal by the promise of 15 acres of land per family head compared to the 1.5 or 3 owned in Lyallpur District. There the people had felt their position to be poorer than in the ancestral villages; in the chak they found it still worse, despite the increased allotment of land. One man believed that not 20 years of cultivation could make the Thal Desert attain the fertility of lands which he had left. The scarcity of water also came as a disappointment. Only terribly hard work could break the land to the plow (rental of tractors, while possible at a rate of Rs. 12 [\$4.00] per day, is beyond the means of the peasants). The nearest city, Khushab, was over 16 miles away and little prospect existed of truck gardening for a paying market. The settlers also had to assume a new burden of debt — they must repay the Authority for the land, houses, capital equipment, and animals which they received.

Two dialects of Punjabi now are spoken in the country around the chak: Western Punjabi by the original occupants of the country and Eastern Punjabi by the settlers. The noticeable difference between these does not seriously hinder effective communication but has been seized upon as a point of distinction. Only one or two of the village men know a smattering of English. Many officials prefer to talk to them in Urdu (locally called Hin-

<sup>4</sup> For a picture of water wheel irrigation in India, see Baljit Singh, *The Land of the Two Rivers* (Allahabad, c. 1940).

dustani), of which 44 percent of a random sample of 32 men and 18 percent of 17 women admit a good understanding.<sup>5</sup>

The original occupants of the Thal Desert were less explicit in talking about the changes that the Thal Project had introduced into their lives. A few jobs as tenant farmers have become available, but the Authority permits only lambardars<sup>6</sup> in chaks to hire labor. Irrigation has helped some local people, and older residents also expressed pleasure in the diversification of social life following the arrival of refugees. Mithatiwana, long a market town, probably found that business expanded following settlement in the desert. However, some of the pastoralists complain that the chaks, by assimilating the best land to cultivation, have reduced the supply of grazing ground.

### CULTIVATION AND DIET

As in East Punjab, oxen and buffalo are the principal livestock in Chak 41 MB, owned by nearly every family that cultivates land. A third of the families also own at least one goat which they are raising for sacrificial purposes. Half the families own cows or calves, practically always in addition to one or more female water buffalo, whose milk is highly praised. Oxen, of course, furnish power to draw the plow, revolve the mill wheel and sugar press, or, in two households, operate mechanical fodder cutters. From their dairies people derive milk, butter, ghee, and *lasi* (buttermilk). Dairying, like daily dung cake making, is work for women, who also usually drive cattle to the pond. Average dairy production per family (based on a random stratified sample of 9 families) is shown in Table II.

Wheat cultivation occupies a focal position in agricultural activities throughout both eastern and western Punjab. Government procurement drives and the peasants' desire for cash combine to drain wheat from the rural areas, with the result that our chak was plunged into short supply six months before the next harvest. This did not, however, promise famine or

<sup>5</sup> In view of the movement to set up Urdu as the national language of Pakistan, we conducted a brief experiment using the Urdu vocabulary appended to Willatt's *Textbook of Urdu* (London, 1942). Our interpreter went through this list and for every fifth word noted the commonest Punjabi synonym. Counting only clear and obvious phonetic correspondences, 87 percent similarity appears between the Punjabi and Urdu vocabulary. (Between Urdu and Pashto, spoken in the North West Frontier Province, the correspondence is only 43 percent.)

<sup>6</sup> The lambardar is the village revenue collector who occupies a position roughly equivalent to that of a headman.

Table II: DAIRY PRODUCTION, CHAK 41 MB

Milk	Butter	Curd	Ghee	Lasi
(daily)	(daily)	(daily)	(weekly)	(daily)
5 seers <sup>a</sup>	$\frac{1}{2}$ seer	3.5 seers	$\frac{1}{2}$ seer	8 seers <sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> One seer (2 pounds in weight) equals about 1 pint of milk. Forty seers constitute 1 maund.

<sup>b</sup> The quantity is greater than the quantity of milk probably because *lasi* is mixed with water for use.

even severe hunger. Cotton constitutes another cash crop, as does sugar cane. Other important farm products grown on the double-cropped fields include millets, gram, pulses, maize, chillies, and henna. The Authority's program includes irrigated fruit cultivation for every chak. Fallowing, rotation, and manuring help to increase fertility. No chemical fertilizer is used, only cow dung mixed with kitchen slop and wood ash. Highest priority for manure goes to sugar cane; then, in descending order, come tobacco, chillies, maize, and animal fodder. Millet, wheat, and gram are rarely or never manured.

The harvesting of cotton, sugar cane, and maize are pleasant tasks. In the case of cotton and maize, a group of women visits the fields, accompanied by small children. The men will already have cut and stacked the maize stalks and now the women tear free the ears, roasting a few as the work progresses. Sugar cane is harvested by cooperative groups of male relatives and other men who join them with the object of collecting straw or fodder and later receiving some *gur* (brown sugar). The male work parties are, perhaps, quieter than the female groups, but the presence of many friends makes the monotonous routine go faster in each case.

The diet of the East Punjab villagers leans heavily on bread for the noonday meal and on vegetables for the evening. Pulses cooked with onions and burning hot chillies supply a staple almost as important as wheat. Once a week the clay-plastered grain bins are opened by any member of the family and a supply of wheat or millet taken out and ground into flour. Two ox-driven mill wheels prepare flour, the owners charging 1.5 seers per maund (80 pounds). The client supplies his own ox. One of the mills is operated by the blacksmith-carpenter, the other by a farmer. As in other Pakistani villages, food is classified as "hot" and "cold." Most pulses, as well as chillies, meat, and brown sugar, constitute "hot" dishes; maize, *lasi*, melons, okra, and millet are "cold." Salt is neutral. *Lasi* remains the popular drink throughout the year, although tea provides greater prestige and is served to guests.

### CLOTHING

The wrap-around skirt (*dhoti*) is universal with men in the chak, added to which sometimes is a shirt cut in European pattern. Original male occupants of the Thal, however, wear white *salwar* (trousers) and shirt, their women being distinguished from female refugees by wide full skirts. Village women customarily wear brilliantly colored *salwar* and matching shirts but also acknowledge the skirt as part of their traditional costume. Thus, clothing furnishes a point of contrast between the two populations. Few women in the chak wear shoes, but men often don leather sandals except when plowing. A white, casually twisted, cotton turban generally covers the head of a male 12 years or older. Schoolboys, the refugee schoolmaster, and



officials prefer the Jinnah cap to turban and also go bareheaded. Although no serious difference in temperature distinguishes West from East Punjab, the cool mornings of December are extremely uncomfortable to people whose dress is suited primarily to hot sunny days. Many men adapt by wrapping themselves in blankets as they sit in the weak, early morning sunlight. A few possess second-hand woolen overcoats, apparently often imported from America. Clothes are washed by women in the canal running alongside the village.

Men affect little adornment, except that mature men henna the head hair and beard. All shaving of face and armpits is done by the village barber. Presumably here as elsewhere in Pakistan the pubes are shaved at home. Women wear ear ornaments, henna the palms, and apply antimony to their eyes and to the eyes of their children.

#### VILLAGE PATTERN

The spaciousness of Chak 41 MB contrasts strikingly with the tight compression of houses and courtyards in other villages that we visited and probably also represents greater village spaciousness than the refugees knew in their Ludhiana and Jullundur settlements. The houses themselves, however, are significantly smaller. Each agricultural family is provided with a two- or three-room dwelling made of burnt brick. The houses are set on three sides of an open place, nearly half a mile square, in which an orchard and playground are to be developed and where a small mosque and school already stand. Every farmer's unit includes a private court or terrace, about 12 by 14 feet, surrounded by a mud wall only about two feet high. Two such houses and their terraces are grouped in pairs within a larger courtyard, about 100 by 75 feet, containing space for barnyard buildings that dwellers are free to build and surrounded by a 5-foot wall. In this larger yard a number of enterprising families in those parts of the village receiving irrigation water have planted pleasant shade trees. The relative isolation of certain menials (blacksmith, carpenter, chaukidar or village porter, oil presser, and faqir) at the west end of the village and their simpler mud-brick houses oriented east (in Pakistan, whoever can, orients his dwelling south or west) interested us much, especially in view of the ideal Islamic tendency to overlook caste and class differences.<sup>7</sup> A simple explanation was offered for the contrasting facilities: the mud-brick houses are cheaper, costing only Rs. 600 each in comparison to a farmer's burnt-brick house, that might cost Rs. 900. The menials are not to pay for their homes: the cost will be added to the bill of the cultivators. Hence, the simpler accommodations of the village servants is economical for the farmers.

<sup>7</sup> The pamphlet *The Punjab: A Review of the First Five Years* points out that only landless or small-owning refugees are eligible for allotment of land, each receiving 15 acres to cultivate with his own hands. "This provides a basis for the development of strong and healthy social traditions of equality, dignity of labour and individual freedom and self-respect. . . . The Thal Project is a great social experiment in building up a living example of Islamic Socialism."

Villagers and not the TDA constructed the mosque. Made of mud brick, it forms a simple building 20 feet long and 11 feet wide with a small court in front. The orientation is to the east, so that men face west while at prayer. In contrast to the mosque, the three-room school (office and two classrooms) appears quite magnificent. The high rooms are abundantly lighted with windows on the south and north, and a 40-foot verandah runs along the south, or front face, of the building. The contrast between school and mosque, and the fact that the Province supports the former but not the latter, reflects something of the values of contemporary Pakistan. To understand the situation, it is well to recall that the elaborate mosques in Muslim countries are often monuments to emperors or wealthy men who built them to earn credits toward salvation. If the impersonal government were to build elaborate mosques, who would earn such credits? We have here an illustration of what Northrop means when he says that Western governmental forms are often not integrated with existing patterns of Asiatic thought.<sup>8</sup>

Early hours and long work days, which may be taken to identify a high level of morale, mark the chak as they mark peasant existence in other communities of Pakistan. Morning begins with toileting in a secluded place outside the courtyard. Then may come a drink of fresh *lasi*, but the true morning meal waits until, perhaps, 10 o'clock (precise time is of little moment). With the decline of the afternoon, men head bullock carts and footsteps home from the fields, wash, and prepare for sundown prayers. Evenings there may be a little singing in the lambardar's *batok* (men's house and guestroom) and then comes early retirement. The Western visitor may conclude this to be a dreary and unrelieved round of existence. The settlers, however, hardly suggest boredom. Story-telling by men, gossip by women who visit adjacent courtyards, the great annual holidays when a goat or ox is sacrificed, and visits from near and distant relatives at birth, marriage, and death provide occasions for recreation.

The customary Islamic rituals appear in Chak 41 MB, the members of which — like most of their neighbors — are Sunnis. A number of men pray several times a day, although many more are probably careless in this respect. Circumcision is performed by the barber. The first ten days of Muharram are observed with restrictions on wearing anything red, smoking the hookah, using antimony or henna, and singing. Id-ul-Zuha means the sacrifice of a goat and distribution of the meat and other dishes to menials. Ramzan (Ramadan) brings a month-long restriction on eating during daylight hours. People begin little tasks murmuring "bismillah." Only one old man, a visitor, used a rosary. The tendency to invest strong faith and respect in holy men is apparent, but no such figure commands attention from the chak at the present time. The faqir is considered holy but hardly enjoys the status and respect of a pir.

<sup>8</sup> F. S. C. Northrop, *The Taming of the Nations* (New York, 1952), pp. 114-19.

## ECONOMIC RELATIONS

As already noted, most families in the chak (excluding tenants and menials) have been allotted 15 acres of ground, slightly more than the average in East Punjab and three or four times the average peasant holding in West Pakistan. The blacksmith, carpenter, mullah, and chaukidar also hold but do not own 5 acres each to farm, a sharp reversal of the traditional pattern under which menials do not cultivate. The lambardar controls 30 acres himself and supports his elderly father. The headman's 12-year-old son is also listed for 15 acres, with which he supports his mother and four siblings. The lambardar and one or two other heads of families who, through several mature sons or junior brothers, control relatively large land holdings, utilize tenant labor. The tenants — original occupants of the area — receive 50 percent of the crop they raise. Generally, a man does not give his entire tilled area to tenants for cultivation. These heads of families furnish a functional equivalent to the landlord leisure class encountered in other villages of West Pakistan. Including them, 85 percent of the male population subsists by agriculture. The proportion increases if we include menials and mullahs who, however, do not cultivate full time.

Menials are not unaware of their strategic role in the community. This was indicated when, in the course of a brief quarrel between two factions in the village, the menials supported the lambardar's group and refused to serve his chief opponent. The latter seemed most affected by the barber's refusal to work, a situation reminiscent of what a work stoppage by "sweepers" may mean for urban dwellers who use commodes. Menials receive cash for the services they render only in the form of gifts at marriage, birth, betrothal, or upon large holidays. This means that they work largely for a share in the harvest. Half a maund of wheat or maize is the customary compensation paid by every farmer to a menial at harvest time. The faqir, however, whose role includes begging and care of the graveyard, receives only 5 seers of these grains. Custom expects each family in turn to supply his daily meals. The blacksmith estimated (probably with a little exaggeration) that he and his younger married brother, who does mostly carpentering, together receive about 100 maunds — that is, 8,000 pounds — of grain annually from the village farmers. Some chillies, pulses, jute for rope making, and other crops may also be offered to a menial or requested by him. A portion of *gur* goes to the carpenter for every sugar press that he, the specialist, keeps in repair; there were three such machines in the village when we left.

The chak engages in a small export and import trade with the surrounding society, largely based on Mithatiwana. There cultivators sell oxen, grain, *gur*, cotton, and henna, and purchase cloth, meat, lumber, and other commodities. Part of the cash received for the economic surplus is also used to pay taxes and debts or spent in the chak at the small shop maintained by

the son of a farmer. The items sold in the local store are imported from Mithatiwana and cities like Khushab and Lyallpur. Stock is small, consisting of kerosene oil, wicks, cotton thread, herbs, soap, dyes, and a few sweets. The shopkeeper conducts a sizable portion of his business on credit, an arrangement he prefers, saying, "I get more profit as a reward for waiting." Villagers also sell straw to camel herders — the original occupants of the desert. In the season of the wheat harvest, itinerant merchants visit the chak to buy grain. Women sell ghee to an adjacent chak, many members of which were formerly musicians in India and do not keep dairy cattle.

In the course of trade men, as is customary in the subcontinent, are more mobile than women. They frequently visit Mithatiwana, Jauharabad (the new town where TDA headquarters will be established), and Khushab. More infrequently both sexes visit relatives who remain near Lyallpur city or other regions of central Punjab.

It is hard to assess the chak's standard of living even in qualitative terms. Perhaps in some respects, as informants consistently implied, the people are less prosperous than in East Punjab. But the new problems which they must face in the Thal probably influence their outlook. Some of the menials, like the faqir and chaukidar, subsist very precariously — the former by begging alone. Men with a large number of able-bodied males to work the jointly operated farmlands live more favorably but nevertheless complain of poverty. During our stay four such heads of extended families purchased apparatus for making brown sugar (a press and boiling tray) costing nearly Rs. 500. Another installed an ox-driven fodder cutter (the first we had seen in any village of Pakistan) which had cost him Rs. 160 cash. We concluded that the standard of living in the chak is relatively good and that most people do not exist in dire poverty. Their wants, however, exceed the means available for procuring satisfaction — a not unfamiliar pattern of dissatisfaction.

#### *PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION*

Villagers give, and largely accept without complaint, the following prestige hierarchy: cultivators, tenants, and then menials, with some itinerant Afghan (or Pathan) masons perhaps at the base of the pyramid. People tend to class the mullah as a menial "because he receives a share of the harvest." On the other hand, they admit his standing to be higher than, for instance, the barber, carpenter, or blacksmith. The schoolmaster-cum-postmaster, who comes daily to the village from an adjacent chak and has only a high school education, ranks on a level with the mullah. The sweeper attached to our household and a temporary resident of the village enjoyed lower respect than the menials and resented his position. He was not completely isolated by the farmers and menials, but never shared in the hookah as it circulated from mouth to mouth.



Social stratification basically resembles the pattern of any village on the subcontinent, but we were impressed with the degree of egalitarianism that seemed to mark relations between the various social categories. Such an ethos does not appear in villages dominated by a wealthy landlord class. However, the blacksmith, a man who had been a small contractor and then lost his business through bankruptcy, told us he found it hard to stand the "indecent" remarks of the farmers. He resented having to be at the beck and call of the community and contrasted his role with the "perfect liberty" to which he had been accustomed. The man appeared to be smarting under the sting of downward mobility.

Women's rank probably differs little in the chak from elsewhere in rural Punjab, East or West. In distinction to other provinces, rural Punjabi women often do not practice rigid seclusion. They go to the fields or water pumps and work in their courtyards unveiled. However, they carefully avoid joining a group of males. A youth from North West Frontier Province who visited us in the chak expressed surprise at the freedom with which unrelated males could enter the chak dwellers' courtyards. In his area the privacy of the courtyard is earnestly defended.

About 85 percent of the population belongs to a single farming caste — Arain. This group includes about 95 percent of the cultivators. The rest of the villagers, primarily menials and tenants, are distributed among 10 castes. Because all members of a caste are putative kinsmen, the men of the village speak of each other as blood relatives. Actually, a number of families are truly related, one lineage including over 14 family heads as well as having affinal ties with members of several other families.

The warmth that manifests itself between villagers and that rapidly developed between male informants and our family differs from the stylized warmth found between business associates and neighbors in America. With us, this is largely ceremonial in nature and associates can part from one another with short regret. The attachments in the chak are on a far more personal and deeper basis. Continued correspondence from one villager more than six months after departure indicates that the interpersonal tie created on his part has still not weakened.

Youthful marriage may contribute to family adjustment. Available information indicates that 10 percent of the married males and over one-third of the females were married when they were less than 15 years old. About one-third of the males married between 15 and 20 and another third between 20 and 25. (See Table III.) Men marry until 45 years of age but no

Table III: AGE OF MARRIAGE — CHAKS 40 AND 41 MB

Percent of	Below							Over	Total
	15	15-20	20-25	25-30	30-35	35-40	40-45	45	
Males .....	10	26	33	17	10	4	1	—	101
Females .....	37	31	24	7	2	—	—	—	101

Source: Mr. Sadiq Ali, field worker for the Board of Economic Inquiry, Punjab.

woman married after she was 35. The youthfulness and inexperience of brides is cushioned by the custom of patrilocal residence in which the girl joins the household of her husband's extended family.

The village itself possesses few social sanctions. The headman (lambardar) confirmed by the TDA, whose position is ordinarily hereditary, acts as government representative. He is assisted by the chaukidar. Duties of the lambardar include the collection of land taxes based on an assessment of the cultivated acreage, which it is the responsibility of the visiting patwari (registrar) to fix. The lambardar may also impose small fines, Rs. 2 to Rs. 20, for such things as failure to keep the main distributory channel clear or to observe the fast of Ramzan. The money goes for community ends, as repairing the mosque, or for charity. There is little indication that the lambardar relies on this power, although the sanctioning power of the provincial government no doubt helps him to execute his duties effectively. The lambardar also owes hospitality to visiting officials, including the patwari. His extra land allotment is intended to help him defray the expenses growing out of this role. No formal panchayat (the 5-man body that normally handles village affairs) assists in village government. However, an organizational meeting to plan for such a body took place shortly before our arrival in the chak. The chaukidar has no administrative functions but acts as porter for visitors, serves guests in the lambardar's *batok*, and acts as village messenger.

A young man, matriculated but with no college training, teaches four standards (grades) of primary school in the village. About 30 students are registered and 6 more attend middle or high school in Mithatiwana. Eligible children total about 58 boys and 43 girls in the chak. We never noticed more than 15 children (including two or three girls) present in the school on any one day. No girls attend Mithatiwana girls' middle school. This means that about 20 percent of the children between 5 and 15 are actually scholars, or about one third of the eligible village boys. School attendance is equally limited in other villages of Pakistan. Parents may exert some pressure for a boy to attend a few years of school, but the length of attendance depends as much on the labor force available in the family as on the father's aspirations. The fact that free provincial education in Punjab Province extends only through the fourth standard also limits the period during which many families can afford to provide schooling. The school for learning to read the Qur'an, conducted by the mullah, did not operate in the village during our stay. Presumably a larger proportion of girls attend these classes.

#### EXTERNAL RELATIONS

In some of the relations which the village maintains with the larger political system, strain and confusion are revealed. These relations, in turn, are

often directly related to the resettlement of the refugees. The transition can hardly be regarded as having been painless or without economic liability. For example, settlers allege that the TDA promised to delay repayment of loans for cattle and equipment until the refugees could get on their feet. Resentment is now being promoted in the face of demands by the TDA that installments be paid promptly. When we left the chak, feeling also ran high among men who felt they were being overcharged for wheat seed and implements received from the Authority. One man said:

The seed or other implements which we bought — we have no records. . . . They have copies of receipts for all that has been received. The record books also show a thumb print certifying the receipt of these things. . . . People get a receipt for the installments they pay. In the beginning we did not ask for receipts. . . . When we were bold enough to speak up they threatened to put us in prison. . . . Of course we cannot read so that we can't say if the entry for wheat seed was correct or not. In the beginning we were told, "You won't be charged for this or that." . . . Now these officials say, "Pay the amount for what you originally bought. For the rest you may present yourself to the authorities."

Of police protection the people do not complain, although an informant admitted that frequent dacoities made life more uncertain in Ludhiana than in the Thal.

Relations between the village and surrounding chaks, many of them accommodating resettled persons but some given over to military men, are predominantly informal and slight. Neighbors come to use the *gur*-making apparatus in Chak 41 MB; an adjacent village, Chak 40 MB, whose members lack cattle, come to purchase ghee and receive free *lasi* in the chak, and passers-by from other communities stop to visit and chat at the lambardar's *batok*. Once, when a death occurred in our village, a mullah and delegation of elderly men came from Chak 40 MB to mourn with the bereaved family. As indicated, relations with Mithatiwana and more distant towns are predominantly commercial and impersonal. As a matter of fact, relatively few personal relationships can be said to have developed between the village and the surrounding area, including other refugee settlements.

Facilities for the specialized treatment of illness do not exist in the community. There is neither a physician trained in Western medicine, hakim knowledgeable in Greek or Unani medicine, or resident pharmacist, as one finds in some of the larger villages of Pakistan. The shopkeeper sells a small selection of herbs, but when he prescribes he follows the same folk basis as other villagers. A government physician serving 41 MB and adjoining chaks practices in Mithatiwana, where hakims are also available. A village two or three miles distant houses a dispensary. The Province sends a vaccinator to make regular tours in the Thal to inoculate against small-pox, but the people of the chak largely ignore the government's medical facilities. One man gave the opinion that the government doctor is extremely incapable and another informant said that "ever since we have come from

Hindustan it is our experience that the medicines the government doctors give are ineffective." The village thus remains as relatively self-sufficient (but hardly secure) with respect to health as it does with regard to food and services. It is far from the ideal of the TDA to encourage such self-sufficiency, but the Authority has not yet succeeded in inducing people to seek medical attention from practitioners.

In the event of death a person of the same sex washes the corpse: usually the faqir or mullah handles a male body and the mullah's wife performs the same function for women. Messages are sent to summon relatives. A grave with a side chamber is reported to be dug and interment takes place within 24 hours of death. Neighbors bring food to the household of the deceased, where for three days wailing by women advertises the loss they have sustained. Villagers and more distant friends and relatives come to help console the mourners during this period.

### CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusion of this paper is that the chak dwellers, while uprooted from a traditional environment and forced to cope with new problems in a difficult terrain, have made a successful adjustment in their new milieu. Such indices as conflict, discontent, apathy, or desire to move are either absent or developed only to a degree normal in community living. The problem remains of isolating factors that may be responsible for this satisfactory adjustment; in other words, of determining what cultural conditions related to the migration and resettlement helped to avoid social disintegration by maintaining personal equilibrium in what must have been a trying experience.

Four principal factors appear to have contributed to this end: (1) the degree of cultural continuity between the old and new milieux; (2) the maintenance of group integrity; (3) the unifying power of an ideological system — Islam; and (4) effective government planning.

*Cultural continuity.* Chak 41 MB reflects elements of both the Middle East as a culture area and of the South Asian (or "Indian") area. Western Pakistan lies astride the imaginary boundary separating these two cultural divisions of the Asiatic continent.<sup>9</sup> Camels, mode of agriculture, and Islam are complexes that identify the country with the western continental margin. The *salwar*, caste organization, language, and primary vegetarian diet (at least in Punjab and Sind provinces) are traits looking east. In other words, not only does the chak represent the fusion of the two areas but so does much of the nation. Hence, when the refugees came to the Thal Desert (and, earlier, to Lyallpur District) they did not move into a radically dif-

<sup>9</sup> Elizabeth Bacon, "A Preliminary Attempt to Define the Culture Areas of Asia," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 2 (1946), pp. 117-32.



ferent configuration of living, although the shift did entail adaptation to a more arid and impoverished environment.

This suggests that the successful adjustment of the settlers after resettlement may be related to the fact that many previous patterns, especially adaptive skills, were not rendered inoperative in the new setting. The new milieu demanded no wholesale process of re-education, nor were the Punjabis faced with the alternative between relearning or clinging to traditional customs in the face of conflict and conspicuousness. More importantly, however, they have largely managed to continue to follow their previous occupations without the frustration that comes from adopting unfamiliar tasks or tasks below one's rank.<sup>10</sup> It is precisely at this point that Gardner Murphy criticizes refugee camps as an unsatisfactory solution to the resettlement problem, since they hinder the adjustment of the people and hold them back from becoming normal members of the community.<sup>11</sup> The refugees from Ludhiana and Jullundur in eastern Punjab who came to the chak moved with their way of life and reinstated that way under favorable circumstances when the migration ended. It is significant that precisely at those points where customary rewards from unfamiliar techniques do not appear, where a degradation of status is subjectively envisaged by the individual, or where unaccustomed effort is required in the exploitation of resources (e.g., with reference to the land perceived to be dry and unfertile) do the settlers most heartily manifest their disillusion and dissatisfaction.

*Group integrity.* Better than half of the adults living in the chak lived in a single community in East Punjab. In other words, the villagers to a great extent represent people who had established interpersonal ties and built up customary relationships prior to Partition. This background factor helped the members readily to achieve a new equilibrium following migration.

Social homogeneity is further indicated by the fact that 85 percent of the villagers comprise a single caste, the members of which adhere to a dogma of being related as kinsmen. Actual kinship ties further knit the population into relatively more intimate kinship groups. These are all powerful factors for creating bonds of social solidarity in the community, or, what is more accurate, they help the community to maintain its solidarity in the shift from East to West Punjab. The background and composition of the settlers, as well as the small number of adults involved, helped the community after migration to achieve quickly the character of a relatively primary group in which social pressure could operate effectively to maintain consensus of values. The fact that the group as a body experienced the stresses of migration presumably also aided the constituent individuals to withstand these strains.

<sup>10</sup> Frustrated use of skill is a profound reason for refugee demoralization in India, according to Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198.

*Unifying power of Islam.* The settlers left their villages in post-Partition India in part from fear and partly under the compelling power of an ideal with which they identify themselves — Islam.<sup>12</sup> This ideal, as already pointed out, is one of the features common to both the original occupants of the Thal and to the refugee Punjabis.

To understand correctly the significance of Islam as a unifying factor, the meaning of Islam in contemporary Pakistan must be borne in mind. Islam, even among peasants, is not a system of rituals and ideas reserved for exercise on the sabbath and cast out of mind the other six days of the week. From the standpoint of many Muslims, Islam constitutes, first, a collection of sentiments that hold up a way of truth and establish the Muslims as those people whose adherence to the truth makes them superior to others. Probably few farmers follow all the precepts of the system, but most do talk with a glow of sincerity about the excellence of Islam. Second, Islam includes a collection of moral imperatives which, even when they are not unfailingly practiced, promote identification between people who share or affirm them. Third, while Islam is a symbol of an international group, it also identifies the new nation, Pakistan, to which the refugees fled. In that role it promotes identification with the nation, reinforces social bonds, and contributes to the feeling of adjustment.<sup>13</sup>

The community, the members of which all belong to a single sect of Islam, is integrated around this symbol and by the constituent sentiments and norms that Islam affirms. The symbol is a powerful force for creating consensus, one that is also helping to overcome narrower provincial loyalties in contemporary Pakistan. At the same time, Islam introduces a strong note of cultural continuity between the settlers and the original occupants of the Thal. Both these populations express their common ideology through the same rituals; thus they are not as foreign as they might be. In the capacity of Islam to provoke strong emotional responses in its adherents lies its power to promote social solidarity and consensus and to facilitate social adjustment.

*Government planning.* Murphy points out that it costs a great deal of money to rehabilitate refugees, and that the problem is an especially acute one in the subcontinent where capital is scarce.<sup>14</sup> Many refugees in Pakistan have not been rehabilitated as successfully as the Punjab peasants in Chak 41 MB, where administrative machinery functioned with relative smooth-

<sup>12</sup> Actually, informants seemed to find it difficult to give a comprehensive explanation of why they had migrated. Murphy, on the basis of Hindu refugees in India, generalizes that they did not migrate "endowed with a great hope for a new life" (*op. cit.*, p. 167). The official propaganda of Pakistan affirms quite the opposite condition so far as Muslim refugees in that country are concerned.

<sup>13</sup> Islam is also reported to provide a unifying symbol in West African Sudan. See Horace Miner, *The Primitive City of Timbuctoo* (Princeton, 1953), p. 275.

<sup>14</sup> Murphy, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

ness and skill.<sup>15</sup> Effective planning by the national and provincial governments, through the Thal Development Authority, is the final factor which facilitated the establishment of a new equilibrium promptly in the Thal. Provision of housing, schools, communication; initial leveling of the rolling desert; supply of water across many uninhabited miles, as well as food, irrigation canals, and health services; the transportation of the settlers themselves; the provision of seed, equipment, and cattle — all these and other prerequisites of agricultural living were beyond the resources of the small community. They were provided through the Thal Development Authority. Of course, the provisions of the government were not offered free of charge, and the settlers choose not to avail themselves of all government facilities. Evidence of conflict between officials and villagers is also apparent, the customary suspicions and ambivalently respectful attitude of the Pakistan peasant toward authorities not being absent in the chak. It is doubtful, however, if without the far-flung organization of government, drawing on capital from many parts of the world, the refugees would have so quickly secured the prerequisites allowing them the develop community life.

The effectiveness of government was undoubtedly facilitated by the presence of cultural continuity, group integrity, and the unifying power of Islam discussed above. As a matter of fact, all of the conditions we have enumerated worked together. In some such combination of forces appears to lie a predictable guarantee of successful migration and resettlement.

<sup>15</sup> This has been admitted by the Government and is revealed in editorial opinion. See the editorial in *Dawn* (Karachi), July 6, 1953.

## DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

**A**GREEMENT WAS REACHED during the summer on two of the major disputes of the Middle East: the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone base and the operation of the oil industry in Iran. Both issues had been precipitated by aggressively nationalistic governments in 1951; the road to settlement had been reopened by coups d'état in the summers of 1952 and 1953 respectively. The spirit of nationalism and fear of renewed Western domination persisted, however, and it was only after prolonged and tortuous negotiations that acceptable solutions could be worked out.

### Iranian Oil Agreement

Three basic issues were involved in the Iranian oil problem: (1) Iran's unwillingness to permit the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, under no matter what disguise, to regain control of oil operations in the country, set against Anglo-Iranian's reluctance to admit other oil interests to a share in the enterprise; (2) Iran's insistence that the National Iranian Oil Company play a dominant role in the oil industry, set against Anglo-Iranian's unwillingness to enter into a long-term contract for Iranian oil without effectively controlling production as well; (3) the inability of the Government of Iran and Anglo-Iranian to agree on compensation due the latter for its nationalized properties and income, or even any basis for arriving at an equitable figure. Each of these issues had to be resolved in turn before overall success could be hoped for.

The U.S. Department of State was instrumental in sponsoring the organization of an international consortium of all the major oil companies operating in the Persian Gulf area to replace Anglo-Iranian as the producer in Iran. To accomplish this, it was not only necessary to secure Iranian acquiescence and convince Anglo-Iranian of the necessity of some such arrangement, but also to persuade U.S. oil companies to participate. This they were not at all eager to do, for they were in no desperate need of additional sources of supply, they hesitated to affront a sister company with whom they were associated in Iraq and Kuwait, and they feared that the headaches would outweigh the value of the profits. On the other hand, the oil companies were genuinely anxious

to stabilize the situation in the Persian Gulf, and a solution to the Iranian problem was an essential move in this direction. The five major U.S. companies (Socony-Vacuum, Standard of New Jersey, Standard of California, Texas, and Gulf) therefore finally agreed to participate in a consortium together with Royal Dutch Shell, the Compagnie Française de Pétrole (both participants in the Iraq Petroleum Company), and Anglo-Iranian. Each of the American companies received an 8 percent share (to 14 for Royal Dutch Shell and 6 for the Compagnie Française de Pétrole), equaling in the aggregate the 40 percent reserved to Anglo-Iranian. The amount paid Anglo-Iranian for this 60 percent participation has not been disclosed, but it is believed to be in the neighborhood of \$500 million. The consortium was incorporated in the Netherlands and is to be registered in Iran.

In order to provide the National Iranian Oil Company with a responsible role but at the same time to assure the consortium of a dependable flow of products in accordance with its market needs, the operation of the oil industry in Iran was split three ways. The consortium would form one company to prospect for and produce the oil and a second company to operate the refinery at Abadan. The NIOC would assume responsibility for all non-producing functions (industrial training, health, housing, roads, etc.), as well as the operation of the Naft-i-Shah field and Kermanshah refinery, whose products are consumed within the country. It was expected that foreign technical personnel would be greatly reduced from Anglo-Iranian days and would not total more than 500.

What had been the third major obstacle to a settlement — the problem of compensation — was largely overcome by the sums which the members of the consortium paid Anglo-Iranian for their participating shares. Iran itself agreed to pay the equivalent of \$70 million over a period of 10 years, beginning in 1957. This sum, together with the much larger sums being paid by the oil companies, provided Anglo-Iranian with the \$500 million or more which its representatives had previously mentioned as the order of compensation it would expect.

To set these arrangements in motion, the consortium agreed to begin production three months after ratification. In the first year it



would produce for export a minimum of 17.5 million cubic meters of oil (110 million barrels); in the second, 27.5 million cubic meters (173 million barrels); and in the third, 35 million cubic meters (220 million barrels), making a 3-year total of 80 million cubic meters, or approximately 500 million barrels. Of these 80 million cubic meters, 35 million (220 million barrels) would be refined at Abadan. In order to stimulate production beyond these guaranteed minimums, Iran agreed to grant a 5 percent discount on the first 10 million cubic meters above the minimum, 7.5 percent on the second, and 10 percent on everything above that.

To pay for this oil and market it, each member of the consortium agreed to set up in Tehran a trading company which would receive the oil at cost and sell it for export to its parent company at the Persian Gulf posted price or at discount as provided above. The profits of these trading companies would be subject to a 50 percent income tax which would represent the oil companies' major payment to the Iranian Government. Other payments would consist of compensation to the NIOC for services performed and a commission of 2s. 1½d. (\$.30) per cubic meter of oil utilized in the refinery for the use of NIOC installations. All payments would be made in sterling (which Britain would free for convertibility) except that the NIOC would receive payment in kind up to 12.5 percent of total production. This oil it could use for domestic consumption, sell to members of the consortium, or auction on the open market as a means of testing the validity of the Persian Gulf posted price. As a further safeguard against one of the sore points in the previous Anglo-Iranian concession agreement, the consortium's books would be open for inspection by the Iranian Government at all times. It has been estimated that Iran will receive under this arrangement, on the basis of present prices, the equivalent of \$420 million during the first three years of operation. The agreement is to run for 25 years, with renewal privileges for another 15 years.

Iran intends to use this new flow of income for developmental purposes. The law for the Seven-Year Development Plan, passed five years ago, assigned all income from oil royalties to this purpose; however, in view of the impoverished state of the Iranian treasury and the pressure that would develop under any circumstances to apply some of this income to the ordinary budget, it is doubtful whether the

whole sum will be made available. On the other hand, supplementary credits may be secured from the International Bank or the U.S. Export-Import Bank to make up the \$500 million which Prime Minister Zahedi has declared his Government proposes to invest in development projects. On September 1, the Planning Organization was placed under the direction of Dr. Ebtehaj, the able, independent former governor of the Bank Melli. Under his leadership, and with the nationalization issue settled, there is a chance that renewed efforts for development will meet with a better fate than the Seven-Year Plan of five years ago.

## Suez Agreement

The Anglo-Egyptian agreement over the Suez Canal zone base, providing for the withdrawal of all British troops within 20 months, is as important for the stability of the Middle East as the solution of the Iranian oil problem, even though Egypt's gain—in contrast to Iran's—is almost entirely psychological. The British Conservative Government agreed to this withdrawal, contrary to previous assertions, because of "changed circumstances." These were probably a realization that air and atomic warfare have altered the strategic importance of the Suez base; that the goodwill of the government and people in such an area as Egypt—in peace as well as in war—is a greater strategic asset than the possession of the base in a hostile environment; and that nothing was being gained by tying down over 80,000 troops which could be dispersed to greater advantage elsewhere. For Egypt it was a victory of persistent nationalism over European imperialism. Nevertheless, the Revolutionary Command Council was bitterly criticized by extremists, notably members of the Muslim Brotherhood, for the closer relations with the West which were implicit in the agreement—both for the provision permitting the return of British troops in case of an attack on one of the members of the Arab League or Turkey, and for rumors that Egypt would now join a Western defensive alliance of some sort, toward which a U.S. promise of arms was regarded as the first step. This criticism was serious enough to force Prime Minister 'Abd al-Nasir to disclaim any intention of strengthening ties with the West at this time but not enough to alter general Egyptian acceptance of the agreement.

The withdrawal of Britain from its Suez base marked the end of an era, but it was to

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a new era in Middle Eastern-Western relations that thoughts were turned. Strategic considerations were the most immediately affected, but a few short-term political repercussions also cropped up. Israel protested to the United States against the granting of arms to Egypt when the Suez agreement had not included a guarantee against Egyptian aggression and blockade of Israel-bound cargoes through the Suez Canal. The U.S. Government took the position that the usual ban on the use of military equipment for aggressive purposes applied to Egypt and that the 1950 tripartite guarantee of Israel's armistice lines still held. As for the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, it is obvious that none could have been concluded had Britain insisted on a clause so much as mentioning Israel's interests; moreover, control of the Suez Canal zone base and control of traffic through the Canal itself were two different matters.

If the U.S. lost sympathy in Israel — to judge from hostile statements of government officials — it seemed to be about to regain some of its position in Saudi Arabia as a result of Egyptian intimation to King Su'ud that it was anxious just now for good relations to be maintained with the West. Early in the year and during the first part of the summer, for reasons unknown, the Saudi Arabian Government appeared to be intent upon irritating — or capitalizing on — U.S. interests in the peninsula. An item in this trend was the exclusive carrier deal which the Saudi Arabian Government signed with Mr. Onassis, by which the lifting of oil products would gradually fall entirely into his hands. So also was Saudi Arabia's request that the U.S. Government support its position in the Buraimi dispute with Britain and its abrupt termination of the Point Four program as of June 30 when the U.S. refused

to comply. Since the conclusion of the Suez agreement on July 27 and Prime Minister 'Abd al-Nasir's visit to Arabia early in August, however, there has been a noticeable easing of attitude, at least toward Britain. The Saudi Arabian Government has agreed to arbitrate the Buraimi dispute; there are now rumors that it may soften its position on the Onassis matter and even that Point Four may be re-established.

How the Suez agreement will affect Egypt's relations with the northern Arab states is impossible to determine at the moment. The long-standing sources of rivalry remain: pro-unity sentiment in Iraq and Syria versus Egypt's desire to remain the dominant Arab state and preserve the Arab League intact to that effect. Both Egypt and Iraq also feel the urge, at times, to conclude bilateral agreements with outside powers at a cost to Arab unity. It was over such issues, in particular a promise of Egyptian support for Iraqi-Syrian unity in return for an Iraqi engagement not to draw closer to Turkey and Pakistan that caused the rift between Prime Minister 'Abd al-Nasir and Minister of National Guidance Salah Salim which resulted in the latter's being placed on temporary leave on September 9. 'Abd al-Nasir is fearful, among other things, of what effect a rapprochement with Iraq might have on his currently close relations with Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Syria's domestic political situation remains unsettled, with leadership divided, political groups unable to find a common meeting ground, and security seriously endangered by the prolonged drift among wayward currents. Egypt has been freed by the Suez agreement to set a new course, but for the time being is caught in the cross-currents of Middle East politics.

## Chronology

JUNE 1 — AUGUST 31, 1954

### Aden and Aden Protectorates

1954

*June 17:* Following a meeting with the Yemeni Minister in Cairo, the Arab League issued a statement accusing Britain of threatening to use force against tribal chiefs in the disputed area between southern Yemen and the Aden Protectorates if they refused to obey the orders of the

Aden Government implementing the British plan for a federation of Aden Protectorates.

*June 18:* According to an Aden Government announcement, a Yemeni force of from 100 to 150 men crossed the frontier of the Western Aden Protectorate from al-Suma' and attacked the village of Marta' in the Awdhali Sultanate. Fighting continued throughout the day, the raiders eventually being repulsed with a loss of 4 dead

and many wounded. Two tribal guards of the Protectorate were killed and several wounded. Protests were being lodged with the Yemeni Government.

*June 21:* The Yemeni Minister at Cairo told a press conference that he had asked for an immediate meeting of the Arab League political committee to discuss the British aggression at al-Suma'.

*June 23:* The Yemeni Legation at Cairo denied the British allegation that the clash between Yemeni and Aden Protectorate forces on June 18 had taken place in Aden territory. The Yemeni statement claimed that a force of Awdhali tribesmen, owing allegiance to the British Government, had attacked the town of al-Suma' in Yemen with support from units of Aden levies and British military aircraft.

*July 7:* The Aden Government claimed that Yemeni forces in al-Suma' opened fire on a rationing party entering Marta' in the Awdhali Sultanate, that later the same day about 15 Yemeni regulars shot at 5 Awdhali tribal guards near Marta', and that government guards had joined in an exchange of fire which followed.

*July 8:* The British Foreign Office handed a note to the Yemeni Chargé d'Affaires calling attention to the "very serious situation" on the Aden-Yemen frontier. It stated that the British Government had evidence that the Yemeni Government was fomenting rebellion in the Protectorate and that in spite of the agreements of 1934 and 1951, the Yemeni Government was giving color to the belief that it laid claim to the whole of the Western Aden Protectorate and had no intention of settling the frontier problem. The note recalled the Yemeni Government's acceptance of a suggestion that the frontier authorities should consult together and warned the Yemeni Government that if the attacks continued the British Government reserved the right to take the necessary steps to protect the territory and inhabitants of the Aden Protectorate.

*July 10:* The Yemeni Chargé at London delivered a note to the Foreign Office protesting flights by R.A.F. aircraft over the town of Beidha.

*July 10-11:* The Aden Government reported two small raids on Mukeiras airfield on the Yemeni border. The raiders, believed to be Yemeni tribesmen, were driven off after an exchange of fire.

*July 13:* The Yemeni Legation at London published a statement charging raids by Aden forces into Yemeni territory. It also said "terrorizing flights" by British aircraft over Beidha city and district "were continuing."

*July 19:* British Minister of State Hopkinson stated that in the first half of July Yemeni regulars and irregulars had raided or fired on Western Aden Protectorate from Yemeni territory in at least 4 cases and that there had been 28 frontier incidents in areas of the Protectorate where Yemeni influence was known to be concentrated.

In a formal reply to the Yemeni note of July 10,

the Foreign Office categorically denied that R.A.F. aircraft had flown over Beidha.

*July 20:* The Yemeni Legation at London issued a statement to clarify "misconceptions" over relations with the United Kingdom. After reviewing Yemen's point of view since 1941, the statement concluded with a denial of reports of internal dissensions in the Yemen and of the allegation that the Imam hoped to enlist popular support by adopting an aggressive foreign policy.

*Aug. 6:* A group of Yemenis, led by Hasan Aqil, attacked a trade truck, killing 1 person and wounding 2 others. The Aden Government authorized assistance to be given to the Maisari tribe so they could protect themselves against these raiders and also assist the Protectorate levies and guards.

*Aug. 7:* The Aden Government issued a statement saying that the Government of Yemen had agreed to the British proposal that British and Yemeni frontier officers consult with a view to restoring tranquillity on the frontier, but that when on July 7 the British frontier officer approached his Yemeni counterpart, the Amir of Beidha, suggesting a meeting on or after July 14, he was told that the Yemeni frontier officer was ill at Taiz and that the meeting would have to be postponed. The statement continued that while these meetings were "delayed," it became "difficult not to doubt the sincerity of the professions of peace made by the Yemeni Government."

## Arab League

(See also Aden and Aden Protectorates)

1954

*June 16:* The Legal Committee approved the scheme for a "unified Arab passport."

*June 30:* The League Council resumed its last ordinary session at Cairo. It endorsed the appointment of Kamil 'Abd al-Rahim, Egypt's former Ambassador to the U.S., as Director of the League's Information Bureau to be opened in New York; the appointment of Dr. 'Abd al-Karim al-Ayyadi as Director General of the Arab Bureau for the Economic Boycott of Israel; and Brig. Mahmud Ra'fat, as Deputy Director. It also decided to contribute financially to the establishment of a religious institute in the Gaza Strip, and accepted the resignation of 'Asad Dagher as Director of the Press and Publication Department.

*July 12:* The Permanent Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs, meeting at Cairo, decided to form a 3-man subcommittee to study a plan for establishing a joint institution to finance economic development schemes in the Arab countries.

*July 20:* The Supreme Economic Council met at Cairo. It referred the formation of an Arab Mercantile Company to a subcommittee for consideration; postponed consideration of a sugges-

tion to exploit mineral deposits in the Dead Sea area to give Jordan time to study the question; and approved the unification of Arab action to combat smuggling to Israel.

*Aug. 7:* Secretary General 'Abd al-Khaliq Hasunah cabled the UN Secretary General drawing his attention to the "serious situation in Morocco" and to the "repressive measures" taken by the French authorities in the Protectorate.

*Aug. 19:* Secretary General Hasunah left Cairo for a tour of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

## Cyprus

1954

*July 28:* Greek Foreign Minister Stefanos Stefanopoulos protested a British Government proposal to give Cyprus a constitution, saying it was "even less democratic" than the charter offered in 1948 and that the people of Cyprus had not been consulted.

*Aug. 1:* Members of the Turkish community in Nicosia met and agreed to accept the constitution offered by Britain, provided it safeguarded the interests of the Turkish minority.

*Aug. 2:* The Attorney General of the Cyprus Government told a press conference that the government had decided on a strict enforcement of existing laws against sedition, i.e., advocacy of union with Greece.

*Aug. 11:* Eighty-five mayors and municipal councilors met and voted to reject any British-sponsored constitution that failed to make provision for an ultimate union of Cyprus with Greece.

*Aug. 12:* A 24-hour strike in support of union with Greece was observed by most of the offices and shops in the major cities.

*Aug. 15:* About 6,000 students of the University of Athens demonstrated in favor of union of Cyprus with Greece.

*Aug. 20:* In line with a decision of May 3, Greece asked the UN General Assembly to place on its agenda for the September meeting the question of holding a plebiscite in Cyprus to decide whether the island should remain under British control or be united with Greece. The British representative to the UN announced that Britain would oppose placing the item on the agenda.

## Egypt

(See also Iraq, Palestine Problem)

1954

*June 6:* Minister of National Guidance Salah Salim left for Saudi Arabia on a 4-day state visit.

*June 11:* Major Salah Salim at a press conference announced that Egypt and Saudi Arabia had decided to pool their military resources and set up a unified military command.

*June 22:* Nine officers of the Cavalry Corps, which supported President Nagib in the February differences in the military junta, were sentenced

to prison terms of up to 15 years by the Revolutionary Tribunal.

*July 9:* The British Government announced the release of £10 million of Egypt's blocked sterling account.

*July 11:* British and Egyptian negotiators reopened talks regarding the Suez Canal base; these had been deadlocked since October 1953.

Egypt announced the removal of almost all restrictions on imports of goods from the sterling area.

*July 15:* President Eisenhower sent a letter to President Nagib assuring him that "simultaneously" with the conclusion of a Suez agreement the U.S. would enter into "firm commitments" with Egypt for economic assistance for strengthening the Egyptian armed forces.

*July 23:* The British Government announced that it was sending War Secretary Antony Head to Cairo for top-level talks regarding the proposed British withdrawal from the Suez Canal base.

*July 27:* An accord, entitled "Heads of Agreement," was signed with Britain for the removal of the 83,000 British troops from the Suez Canal zone defenses but providing that the West might still use the base in case of aggression against an Arab state or Turkey. (For text, see page 460.) British sources estimated it would take a month to draft the details of a formal treaty.

*July 29:* The British House of Commons approved the "Heads of Agreement" of July 27 by 257 votes to 26.

*Aug. 1:* The Federal Economics Ministry of the West German Government announced that the latter would underwrite the shipment of DM 65 million (\$15,470,000) worth of industrial equipment to Egypt.

The economic blockade of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone was lifted, permitting fresh food, etc., to go to troops for the first time in two years.

*Aug. 7:* Prime Minister Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir left for Saudi Arabia to participate in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and attend a conference of Arab leaders.

*Aug. 8:* It was announced in Cairo that U.S. Ambassador Caffery would retire from the Foreign Service in January 1955 and would be replaced by Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs.

*Aug. 10:* The first detachment of Britain's Suez garrison, 300 men, sailed for England.

*Aug. 15:* Prime Minister Nasir returned to Cairo.

*Aug. 19:* Prime Minister Nasir told a press conference that leaders of Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, who had met in Mecca, had decided on a missionary campaign in Africa to compete with Christian missions there.

*Aug. 30:* The embargo on the sale of British arms to Egypt was lifted; the Foreign Office spokesman making the announcement called attention to the fact that the purchase of arms was still governed



by the assurance that the weapons would not be used for aggression.

## Ethiopia

1954

*Aug. 3:* Emperor Haile Selassie returned to Addis Ababa after a 9-week tour of the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

## India

(See also Pakistan)

1954

*June 4:* Talks between France and India regarding the future of the French colonies in India ended at Paris without agreement.

*June 12:* Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru, on his return from Paris, told a press conference that travel restrictions between India and the French settlements, relaxed prior to the Paris talks, would be reimposed.

*June 13:* The administration of the French territory of Yanam was seized in a local uprising, but the Indian Government contemplated no unilateral action to absorb the territory.

*June 16:* About 50 French troops and 10 officers landed at Pondicherry. Foreign Secretary R. K. Nehru protested to the counselor of the French Embassy in New Delhi that the troops, which had come from Indochina, would not be considered part of the civil police.

*June 25:* Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai arrived in New Delhi from Geneva to discuss with Prime Minister Nehru an Asian consultative committee and extension of a "peace area" in Asia. Simultaneously with Mr. Chou's arrival, the Indian Ministry of Commerce announced the initiation of talks between officials of the two countries on the possibility of expansion of trade between them.

*June 26:* The Indian Embassy at Washington issued a communiqué stating that India intended to put into operation the Bhakra canals, since India considered that Pakistan had rejected the proposal of the International Bank for development of the Indus River basin which was in dispute between the two countries.

*June 28:* A communiqué on the talks between Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Nehru reaffirmed the 5 principles set forth in the preamble of the Indo-Tibetan agreement of Apr. 29 as a guide to relations between the two countries. The Prime Ministers hoped that "these principles would be applied to the solution of problems in Indochina."

*July 4:* Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, general secretary of the Praja Socialist party, was arrested by the Uttar Pradesh Government for organizing a movement against the state irrigation surcharge.

*July 8:* The Ministry of Food and Agriculture announced the abolition of rice controls.

Prime Minister Nehru opened the flood gates of the Nangal dam in East Punjab, one of the world's longest irrigation networks.

*July 15:* The French Government withdrew its Administrator and 3 other officials as well as its police force from the settlement of Mahé on India's west coast. The government at Paris announced that Mahé had been surrendered "to avoid grave incidents."

*July 22:* One Portuguese policeman was killed and 5 other persons injured when Indian nationalists invaded the village of Dadrá in the Portuguese possession of Damao on India's west coast. The Portuguese Foreign Ministry at Lisbon said Indian troops had surrounded Dadrá and also the village of Nagar Aveli. The Indian Government denied the allegation.

*July 24:* The Government handed the Portuguese Embassy at New Delhi a note asking that no citizens from Portuguese settlements arrested for pro-merger activities be maltreated or deported to Portugal. It also asked that Indian consuls be permitted to interview those arrested and obtain statements or reasons for the arrest and conditions of treatment in jail.

*July 26:* The All-India Congress Committee, highest policy-making body of the Government party, concluded a 4-day conference at Ajmer after adopting a resolution on foreign policy which observers believed was opposed both to the Western plan for a collective defense system in Asia and to Communist China's proposal for a collective peace treaty including all Asian countries.

*July 29:* A band of Goan nationalists marched into the enclave of Nagar Aveli in the Portuguese territory of Damao and seized the village of Neroli. The Portuguese police surrendered. The Indian police were reported to have cordoned off the area and to have set up day and night border patrols.

*July 31:* The Praja Socialist Ministry in Travancore-Cochin fell on a policy matter involving appointment of additional judicial officers in the state.

*Aug. 2:* The Governor General of Goa assured the police and army officers in that territory that reinforcements from Portugal were on their way.

*Aug. 8:* The Portuguese Legation in New Delhi handed a note to the Indian Government proposing that observers from 6 neutral nations inspect the Portuguese enclaves in India; the note asked that a reply be received by the following day.

*Aug. 10:* India accepted the Portuguese proposal for neutral observers to inspect the Portuguese territories in India but did nothing about appointing them.

*Aug. 13:* India imposed currency restrictions on Goa. Portuguese authorities in Goa sealed off all border areas facing India and restricted entry to persons with special safe-conduct passes.

Troops were moved into position to back up police.

*Aug. 15:* Only small groups of demonstrators arrived at Goa for the promised "march" against the territory on Indian Independence Day. Demonstrators were taken to the local prisons and protected from an angry populace; over 1,000 were prevented from entering the Portuguese territory by Indian police.

The fortress of Terekhol at the northern tip of Goa was seized by a group of Nationalists.

The Indian Government announced relaxation of currency restrictions with Goa.

*Aug. 16:* Portuguese forces from Goa bombarded the fortress of Terekhol from a cruiser in the Indian Ocean and then sent in a landing party of 120 men to retake it from the Nationalists.

*Aug. 20:* The Indian External Affairs Ministry handed a note to the Portuguese Minister at New Delhi protesting the shelling of the fortress in Goa.

*Aug. 28:* Fifteen persons were killed and 50 injured in rioting between Hindus and Muslims at Hyderabad City and a neighboring village.

*Aug. 30:* The Chief Minister of Madras state inaugurated an anti-Communist front with headquarters in Madurai. The organization was to operate also in Travancore-Cochin.

Portugal handed India two further notes concerning its enclaves in India. The notes repeated Portugal's proposal to have impartial observers study the situation, as well as Portugal's request for travel facilities.

## Iran

1954

*June 13:* It was announced at Tehran that the U.S. Point Four program in Iran would go out of existence as such on July 1. A common fund for technical and economic development was to be created, to be headed by William Warne of TCA and Jallal Shadman, Iranian Minister of Economy.

*June 17:* A new commercial protocol was signed with the Soviet Union by which that country would export cars, trucks, tractors, agricultural implements, and industrial machinery to Iran.

*June 20:* Negotiators for the consortium of 8 worldwide oil companies and their technical, legal, and financial experts arrived in Tehran.

*June 28:* The Foreign Office announced that the Soviet Union would release 300 Iranian nationals held in the Soviet Union.

*June 29:* It was announced that Soviet representatives would meet to prepare to turn over to the Iranian Government the installations of the Iran Soviet Oil Company.

*July 1:* Hamid Sayah, former Iranian Ambassador to Moscow and leader of Iran's delegation in negotiations with the Soviet Union for the liquidation of financial and border disputes, announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to turn over to Iran 11 tons of gold and goods worth \$8 million.

*July 8:* The Soviet Union protested to the Iranian Government that participation by Iran in any "military measures of the U.S.A. in the Near and Middle East" would be a contravention of the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1927.

*July 17:* Dr. 'Ali Amini, Finance Minister and chief of the Iranian delegation in the talks with the representatives of the 8-member oil consortium, announced that the latter had abandoned its demand for a 10% discount on the "minimum guaranteed production" from the Persian Gulf posted price, and that the consortium's share of profits before taxes would be on a strict 50-50 basis. Above the minimum guaranteed production, Iran would give a 5% discount on the first 10 million tons, 7½% on the second 10 million, and 10% on the third 10 million.

*July 18:* Foreign Minister Entezam handed the Soviet Ambassador a reply to the Soviet note of July 8. It stated that Iran would participate "publicly and in good faith" in regional groupings authorized by the UN Charter if the Government was convinced such alliances were in Iran's interest. At the same time it denied that Iran was being drawn into aggressive military blocs directed against the Soviet Union.

*Aug. 5:* An agreement was signed with a consortium of 8 worldwide oil companies, which undertook to extract, refine, and market the products of Iran's nationalized oil industry and give the country approximately half of the net profits. Simultaneously, it was announced that Iran would pay £25 million (\$70 million) over 10 years as its share of compensation to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

*Aug. 11:* Prime Minister Zahedi announced that Iran would shortly embark on a 5-year development program to be financed by revenues from the reactivated oil industry and credits which Iran would seek from the International Bank. Projects outlined included: (1) the Sefid River dam; (2) a hydroelectric project at Karaj; (3) the Durud dam in Luristan; and (4) reclamation of farmlands in Khuzistan.

*Aug. 17:* Hosayn Fatemi, foreign minister under Dr. Mosaddeq, was indicted on 5 counts of treason by chief Army prosecutor, Brig. Gen. Hosayn Azmoudeh, who asked the death sentence for the accused.

*Aug. 28:* The Military Governor of Tehran disclosed that about 250 persons had been detained since Aug. 25 in an attempt to smash an anti-Government network in the Army and police.

## Iraq

1954

*June 5:* The Ministry of Agriculture announced that 75,000 acres of cultivated land in southern Iraq was being distributed among small farmers.

*June 6:* Seventeen persons, including 7 candidates of the extreme nationalist-leftist National Front coalition, were arrested at Basra for participation

in a political meeting in violation of the ban imposed on May 19. The Minister of Interior announced that the arrested candidates would be released before election day.

*June 9:* In a minor Cabinet reshuffle, Dr. Subhi al-Wahhabi was appointed Minister of Health, Dr. Hadi al-Pachachi Director General of Social Affairs, and Nuri al-Karhafuli Minister of Communication.

Electors went to the polls to elect 135 Deputies to the Majlis (lower house) in Iraq's first direct election.

*June 11:* Election results were announced as follows:

Constitutional Union Party	56
Umma (Nation) Socialist Party	14
National Front coalition	12
United Popular Front	0
Independents	51
Undetermined	2
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*June 15:* 'Abd al-Ghani al-Dali resigned as Minister of Agriculture; Dr. 'Abd al-Majid 'Abbas was appointed to succeed him. Dr. 'Abd al-Hamid Kazim was appointed Minister of Education, a post formerly held by Foreign Minister al-Jamali. Shafik al-'Ani was appointed to succeed Fakhri al-Tabaqqali, who resigned as Minister of Justice to replace Sa'id al-Qazzaz as Minister of Interior.

*June 22:* Foreign Minister Fadil al-Jamali left for a tour of the U.S.

*June 26:* Former Prime Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaydi called for the formation of a new party, whose main object would be to combat Communism.

*July 6:* An agreement was signed with India by which the two countries would exchange cultural missions and establish cultural institutes in each other's country.

Four newspapers were suspended for one year.

*July 21:* Prime Minister al-'Umari left for Turkey on a 2-week holiday.

*July 23:* The Cabinet resigned during the absence of the Prime Minister, Nuri al-Sa'id being asked to form a new Government. He announced the dissolution of the Constitutional Union Party.

*July 26:* In his Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament, King Faysal said that lack of cooperation between the Chamber and the Government had led to the Cabinet's resignation. 'Abd al-Wahhab Nurjan, Deputy leader of the former Constitutional Union Party, was elected Speaker of the Chamber, and Muhammad al-Sadr President of the Senate.

The National Front, composed of the Istiqlal, the National Democratic Party, and a number of Independents announced the formation of a parliamentary bloc pledged to the liberation of Palestine and the non-participation of Iraq in international blocs.

*Aug. 4:* Gen. Nuri al-Sa'id, moderate leader of the former Constitutional Union party, formed the

following Cabinet to succeed the caretaker Government of Arshad al-'Umari:

Nuri al-Sa'id — Prime Minister and Defense  
 Dr. Musa al-Shabandar — Foreign Affairs  
 Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud — Justice  
 Shakir al-Wadi — Social Affairs  
 Dr. Dhia Ja'far — Finance  
 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan — Agriculture  
 Khalil Kanna — Education  
 Dr. Nadim al-Pachachi — Economics  
 Sa'id al-Qazzaz — Interior  
 Dr. Muhammad Hasan Salman — Health  
 Salih Sa'ib al-Jaburi — Communications,  
 Works  
 Ahmad Mukhtar Baban — Without Portfolio  
 'Ali al-Sharqi — Without Portfolio  
 Burhan al-Din Bashayan — Without Portfolio  
 Rashid al-Chalabi — Without Portfolio

King Faysal II decreed the dissolution of Parliament so that the new Prime Minister might put to the country his policy, which included termination of the British-Iraqi treaty of alliance and mutual assistance.

*Aug. 15:* The Minister of Interior announced that general elections would be held on Sept. 12.

*Aug. 18:* Salih Jabr, leader of the Umma Party, returned from Beirut. Simultaneously, it was announced that the Umma Party had been dissolved.

Major Salah Salim of Egypt completed several days' discussions with King Faysal and government officials. A joint declaration stated that one of the results of the talks would be the reinforcement of the Arab Collective Security Pact.

A petition signed by 800 students, lawyers, and members of the Progressive Youth Organization was submitted to King Faysal requesting the pardon of Rashid 'Ali Gaylani, who led the abortive revolt against the British in 1941.

*Aug. 19:* It was announced that King Faysal had accepted an invitation to visit President Nagib of Egypt the first week of November.

*Aug. 21:* The National Democratic Party and the Istiqlal dissolved their National Front. The former decided to boycott the coming elections; the latter to contest them.

## Israel

(See also Palestine Problem)

1954

*June 16:* It was announced that the Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv and the Israeli Legation in Moscow had been raised to the status of embassies.

*July 11:* It was announced that the Government had decided to invest £110 million of West German reparations in orders for 12 ships to be built in West German shipyards during the coming 3 years.

*July 28:* A charter, giving special status to the World Zionist Organization and outlining its duties and privileges in Israel, was signed by

Prime Minister Moshe Sharett and the chairmen of the organization's executives in Jerusalem and New York. In addition to the charter, two letters from the Prime Minister to the executive chairman of the organization specified (1) that the Government would send the organization copies of all orders involving searches or arrests in any Zionist agencies; and (2) that the chairman of the Zionist Organization would rank officially immediately after members of the Cabinet, and that members of the Zionist executive would rank with members of the Knesset.

*Aug. 3:* Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol presented a \$190-million development budget to the Knesset.

*Aug. 30:* Prime Minister Sharett, in a review to the Knesset of Israel's relations with "enemies near and friends afar," said that Britain and the U.S. had evinced a lack of concern for Israeli security in the British-Egyptian Suez Canal pact and in their offer of arms to Arab nations. Despite their assurances of good faith, Mr. Sharett looked for "deeds that will demonstrate the sincerity of the assurances."

## Jordan

(See also Palestine Problem)

1954

*June 12:* Samir al-Rifa'i and a number of other persons applied to the Government for a license to form a new political party to be called the Umma Party.

*June 13:* King Su'ud of Saudi Arabia arrived at Amman for an official visit. Shortly after his arrival street crowds demonstrated against "Zionist America," Great Britain, and the Jordanian Government. A Government spokesman credited the disturbance to the fact that Muslim Brotherhood scouts had been denied part in the reception for King Su'ud.

*June 15:* The U.S. State Department announced the conclusion of an agreement with Jordan under which Jordan would receive U.S. aid for economic development. The announcement added that specific projects relating to irrigation, afforestation, and road building were under consideration, and that the amount would depend on the nature and number of projects mutually agreed upon by the two Governments.

*June 22:* Parliament was dissolved by royal decree shortly before it was to vote on a question of confidence in Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda's 7-week-old Government.

*June 28:* The Cabinet rejected an application from the Socialist Arab Renaissance Party for a license to carry on political activities.

The U.S. Foreign Operations Administration allotted \$8 million to Jordan for development, reforestation, and road construction projects.

*July 10:* It was announced that Jordan and Syria would open legations in each other's capitals.

*Aug. 17:* The Prime Minister suspended 5 weekly newspapers for attacking his Government.

*Aug. 25:* The Government forbade the entry of Hasan Hudaybi, former supreme leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brethren, and Allal el-Fasi, Moroccan Independence party leader.

## Lebanon

(See also Palestine Problem)

1954

*June 5:* President Camille Chamoun returned from a visit to Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.

*June 9:* Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali arrived in Beirut and discussed Middle East defense problems with Prime Minister 'Abdullah al-Yafi.

*June 28:* Prime Minister al-Yafi won an overwhelming confidence vote in an extraordinary session of Parliament.

*June 29:* Egypt's Minister of National Guidance Salah Salim arrived in Beirut for a 5-day visit.

*July 9:* The U.S. Foreign Operations Administration submitted to the Government a study outlining a possible development project for the Litani River. The scheme called for the irrigation of 69,000 acres.

*July 10:* Prime Minister al-Yafi returned to Beirut after a visit to Cairo.

*July 18:* Crown Prince 'Abd al-Ilah of Iraq arrived in Beirut to discuss Arab affairs with President Chamoun.

*Aug. 26:* The bishops of Christian communities met to discuss sectarian demands and counter-demands touched off by a booklet by George Shakir, which contained statements considered offensive to the Prophet and caused violent Muslim demonstrations in Beirut. The National Organization (a Muslim group) had demanded that the Government either abolish sectarianism or make a correct census of the population. The bishops' declaration denounced sectarian trouble and advocated the preservation of the present status. The Muslim Najjadah answered the bishops' declaration, saying that it did not agree that the present status was essential to the maintenance of Lebanon as a state.

## Libya

*June 25:* See Turkey.

*July 3:* It was announced in London that Great Britain and Libya would raise their diplomatic missions to embassies.

*July 18:* Prime Minister Mustafa ben Halim arrived in Washington for discussions regarding conclusion of an air base agreement with the U.S.

*July 31:* The first stage of a census in the cities and provinces was taken with the aid of a team from the UN Technical Assistance Administration.

## Morocco

(See also Arab League)

1954

*June 14:* M. François Lacoste arrived in Morocco to take up his duties as the new Resident General.



*June 10:* The French Government established a new Ministry of Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs, with M. Christian Fouchet as its head.

*June 20:* Maj. Gen. Marie-Antoine d'Hauteville, military commander of Marrakesh, was seriously wounded by a Moroccan terrorist.

*June 30:* Dr. Emile Eyraud, publisher of a French newspaper in Morocco, was assassinated in Casablanca.

*July 1:* Officials at Rabat announced that 4,000 French troops would arrive in Morocco beginning July 6.

*July 2:* Addressing more than 15,000 mourners at the funeral of Dr. Eyraud, Resident General Lacoste urged the people to avoid retaliating with "blind violence."

*July 3:* Resident General Lacoste flew to Paris to discuss measures to deal with terrorism.

A detachment of Republican Guards arrived at Casablanca from France.

*July 7:* The principal witness in the investigation into the attempt on General d'Hauteville was shot to death by an unknown terrorist.

*July 10:* The security services made public the following figures on terrorism since Aug. 20, 1953: 335 armed attacks; 118 explosions of bombs or grenades; 6 instances of railway sabotage; 390 cases of arson; 30 Europeans and 89 Moroccans killed; 122 Europeans and 290 Moroccans wounded. In addition, 7 terrorists killed and 13 wounded while resisting arrest; about 400 persons arrested on charges of terrorism; and 111 terrorists sentenced by military and civil courts. Of 30 terrorists sentenced to death, 5 had been executed.

*July 13:* Shops remained closed in Casablanca and Rabat following an order by terrorists not to open on pain of reprisals. In Casablanca, food shops had been closed for 5 days.

*Aug. 1-2:* Five persons were reported trampled to death in riots near Fez, and a Frenchman was reported shot to death in Casablanca. The riots were touched off by rumors of the return of Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, former Sultan.

*Aug. 7:* Eleven persons were killed and at least 30 injured when troops were called in to reinforce the police at Port Lyautey during a riot against the French-appointed Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa.

The Istiqlal (nationalist party) ordered its followers to carry out a general strike.

*Aug. 8:* Rioting was renewed at Port Lyautey, Fez, Casablanca, and several smaller localities; 2 Europeans were killed at Port Lyautey.

Mohammed Hassan el-Wazzani, leader of the Moroccan Shura and Istiqlal Party, and Mohammed el-Makki el-Nasry, leader of the Moroccan Unity and Independence Party, living in self-imposed exile in Egypt, wired King Su'ud urging the Islamic Conference in Mecca to adopt a resolution appealing to France to put an end to the present repressive measures in Morocco, to expedite the granting of independence to the Pro-

jectorate, and to restore the ex-Sultan to his throne.

*Aug. 9:* About 1,000 persons were confined by French and North African soldiers as a result of rioting in the principal cities.

*Aug. 10:* It was reported from San Sebastian, Spain, where the Spanish Cabinet was meeting, that the Spanish Government was framing a statement on Moroccan policy which would censure France and reaffirm Spain's refusal to recognize France's unilateral ouster of Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef in August 1953.

By a vote of 398 to 126, French Premier Mendès-France obtained postponement of a full-dress debate on the situation in Morocco and Tunisia. He told the Assembly that his present objective was to restore peace in Morocco and that the Government would ignore claims for the return of the former Sultan. He defended his program for Tunisia, and concluded with a strong appeal to the Moroccans to refrain from violence.

Thousands of Berber tribesmen, armed with knives and rifles, forestalled nationalist outbreaks planned to prevent observance of the religious feast of Aid el-Kebir in protest against the removal of the former Sultan.

At least 20 persons were killed in Fez. French police surrounded the Medina to stop nationalists from making raids into the European section of the city.

*Aug. 12:* A dock strike at Casablanca lost its effectiveness when most of the workers returned to work.

*Aug. 14:* Lt. Gen. Rafael Garcia Valiño, High Commissioner in Spanish Morocco, addressed a gathering of Moorish chiefs at Tetuan on the final day of the Aid el-Kebir festival. He said that Spain was pushing its policy of giving Moroccans an increasing share in the administration of the Spanish zone and criticized French policy in the "neighboring zone."

*Aug. 19:* A new wave of violence ended a week-long calm. Two persons were killed in Casablanca and 1,000 acres of forest were set afire in the Oulmes region.

*Aug. 20:* On the first anniversary of the deposition of the former Sultan, Ahmed Balafrej, secretary general of the outlawed nationalist Istiqlal Party, speaking at Geneva, Switzerland, declared that the first condition for peace in Morocco was the transfer of the deposed Sultan from exile in Madagascar to France, where he could negotiate with the French Government. Among other conditions, he included liberation of political prisoners in Moroccan jails and a formal and precise declaration recognizing Moroccan sovereignty. Allal el-Fasi, president of the Istiqlal, speaking at Madrid, demanded the restoration of the former Sultan.

*Aug. 23:* Resident General Lacoste flew to Paris for discussions with the French Minister of Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs.

*Aug. 26:* The Minister of Tunisian and Moroccan

Affairs told the French National Assembly that the Government had prepared a "vast program of action" to lead Morocco to sovereignty and democracy.

*Aug. 27:* Speaking at the end of a 2-day debate on North African policy, French Premier Mendès-France told the French Assembly that the Government, through its Resident General in Morocco, would begin a "frank and loyal" discussion with representatives of all forms of Moroccan opinion, who would be asked to form a council to discuss basic reforms. He also said that the Makhzen would be recognized, that farm workers would soon receive an increase in wages, that labor unions would be permitted, and that labor legislation would be instituted. He also promised an improvement in the "personal situation" of the deposed Sultan, which was interpreted by some to mean that he would be transferred to France. Former Premier René Mayer urged that both Tunisia and Morocco be brought into the zone of defense covered by NATO. The Assembly voted in favor of the Government's policy by a vote of 451 to 122.

## Pakistan

(See also India)

1954

*June 1:* Seventy more persons, including 6 members of the provincial legislature, were arrested by the new East Bengal Government of federal Defense Minister General Iskander Mirza in an effort to stabilize the new regime.

In West Pakistan, police arrested 15 alleged Communists, including 5 newspapermen.

*June 2:* Officials of the International Bank announced a loan of \$14 billion to the Sui Gas Transmission Company, Ltd. of Pakistan, toward the laying of a gas pipeline from the Sui gas reservoir to Karachi.

*June 7:* Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali inaugurated the first commercial flight of the Government-owned Pakistan International Airways.

*June 10:* Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali arrived in Ankara to begin talks with Turkish officials for the implementation of the Turkish-Pakistani defense pact signed on Apr. 2.

*June 14:* It was announced that arrests in East Bengal since the dismissal of the Fazlul Huq Ministry on May 30 totaled 900.

*June 16:* The Government announced its decision to merge the princely states of Kalat, Las Bela, Makran, and Khairpur with the province of Baluchistan.

*June 21:* Akhtar Husain was appointed Defense Minister to succeed Maj. Gen. Iskander Mirza, who had been named Governor of East Pakistan in May. Iftikhar Husain was appointed to replace Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola as Governor of Sind, and Mr. Rahimtoola was named Governor of Punjab to succeed Mian Aminuddin, who was to go to Turkey as Ambassador.

Salah ben Yusuf, secretary general of the Tunisian Neo-Destour party, arrived in Karachi to seek Pakistan's support in a move for liberation of Tunisia from French control.

*July 5:* The Communist Party was banned in East Pakistan.

*July 8:* Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali called an emergency Cabinet meeting to consider the opening of the Nangal canal by India in East Punjab, which was considered a violation of the agreement signed with India on Mar. 13, 1952.

*July 22:* A Deputy Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry handed a note to the Soviet Ambassador notifying him that Soviet diplomats and their families would henceforth be restricted to an area 35 miles in radius from the center of Karachi.

*July 24:* The Communist Party was banned in West Pakistan, thus making the ban countrywide.

Over 25 Communists were arrested in Karachi. A tally of arrests in other provinces showed Sind, 28; North West Frontier Province, 7; Baluchistan 12; and Punjab 13. Among those arrested were Feroz Uddin Mansoor, acting general secretary of the Pakistan Communist Party, and Mira Muhammad Ibrahim, president of the Pakistan Trade Union Federation.

*July 28:* \$50 million worth of 3% 5- and 8-year Government loan certificates went on sale to finance the National Agrarian expansion program.

*Aug. 1:* In a nationwide broadcast, Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali announced that the Government had embarked on a number of canal projects that would make up for the shortages in the country's water supply caused by India's opening of the Bhakra-Nangal Canal on July 8.

*Aug. 5:* The Prime Minister reaffirmed a unanimous Cabinet decision that Pakistan abandon its 7-year-old canal waters dispute with India. He said Pakistan had accepted "conditionally" the proposal of the International Bank that the two countries divide equally the 6 rivers flowing through their territories.

*Aug. 14:* President Eisenhower authorized an airlift of 16 U.S. planes to carry medical and food supplies to the more than 10 million flood victims in East Pakistan.

## Palestine Problem

1954

*June 1:* Israeli representatives at Washington handed Mr. Eric Johnston a Jordan Valley plan prepared by a U.S. engineer, Joseph S. Cotton, as an alternative to his UN-sponsored proposal. This plan reportedly would provide Israel with water to irrigate 1,790,000 dunams in contrast to 420,000 dunams provided for in the Johnston plan; Syria would be able to irrigate the same amount; Lebanon (not provided for in the Johnston plan) would be able to irrigate 350,000 dunams; and Jordan, 430,000 dunams as compared to 490,000 in the earlier plan. The cost

would be \$470 million as compared to \$121 million in the Johnston plan.

*June 13:* Eric Johnston began a series of meetings with Arab experts in Cairo on proposals for Jordan Valley development. Arab delegates presented their plan, prepared in March, which would give Israel 20% of the Jordan waters.

*June 16:* At the conclusion of talks between Arab experts and Eric Johnston, a joint communiqué was issued saying that the talks had served to "define the bases of agreement on which, it is hoped, an acceptable plan may be formulated."

*June 25:* Eric Johnston and Arab delegates in Cairo issued a joint communiqué agreeing on the necessity of "international controls" over the distribution of the Jordan River waters.

*June 28:* Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett told a conference of editors in Tel Aviv that Israel was against any kind of international supervision of the Jordan water resources, and that Mr. Johnston had ruled out the inclusion of the Litani River in the negotiations because of Lebanese objections.

*June 30:* The city of Jerusalem was subjected to over 2 hours' mortar and machine gun fire.

*July 1:* Israeli and Jordanian representatives agreed in the presence of Truce Supervisor Maj. Gen. Vagn Bennike to a cease-fire effective at 6:30 p.m. The 2-day sporadic shooting in Jerusalem ended with 5 Arabs killed and 25 wounded, and 4 Israelis killed and 31 wounded.

*July 5:* Jordan's King Husayn sent messages to Arab monarchs and heads of state asking them to send aid for Jordan's National Guard against "Israeli aggression."

Syria's Prime Minister Ghazzi announced that he and Prime Minister al-Yafi of Lebanon had agreed on a program of military aid to Jordan.

*July 6:* Eric Johnston reported to President Eisenhower on the results of his trip to the Middle East. He said Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan had accepted the principle of international sharing of the waters of the Jordan.

*July 10:* Six Egyptian soldiers and 1 Israeli were killed in a skirmish near the Israeli settlement of Kisufim, according to an Israeli Army statement. Egyptian military forces charged that 100 Israelis had been pitted against one-third that many Palestinian frontier guards and that firing had lasted for 90 minutes.

*July 11:* General Bennike proposed to the Jordan-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission that the principle of condemnatory resolutions be dispensed with in the matter of Jerusalem firing of June 30-July 1. He proposed further that adequate officers and noncommissioned officers be furnished to supervise border patrols on both sides of the frontier. However, both delegations presented resolutions condemning the other side for the attack.

*July 15:* General Bennike withheld his decisive vote on resolutions by both Jordan and Israel condemning the other for the attack of June 30-

July 1. He announced he would report on the case to the UN Security Council.

*July 16:* Israel was condemned by the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission for the Kisufim incident of July 10. At the same time Egypt was condemned for placing land mines that blew up an Israeli vehicle and wounded 5 Israeli soldiers on July 8.

*Aug. 1:* An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said his Government had presented identical notes to Britain, France, and the U.S. accepting 3 proposals made by them on June 20. Those accepted were (1) to demarcate Israel's border; (2) to erect physical barriers at suitable frontier points; (3) to discuss an arrangement to permit groups of Arabs now in the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip to cross Israeli territory into Jordan on condition they go for good.

*Aug. 3:* UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld appointed Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns of Canada to succeed Maj. Gen. Vagn Bennike as head of the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine.

*Aug. 15:* A Syrian submarine chaser seized a 50-ton Israeli fishing boat in the Mediterranean and took it to Latakia harbor.

*Aug. 17:* The Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission found Israel guilty of 2 attacks on the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip. The UN chairman abstained on an Israeli charge that Egyptians had dynamited a Negev water main.

*Aug. 19:* The new UN administrator, Maj. Gen. Burns, arrived in Jerusalem.

*Aug. 23:* Egypt demanded that the UN Truce Supervision Organization reopen the case in which Israel was accused of maintaining a fortified stronghold disguised as an agricultural settlement at El Auja, from which Israel made a military attack into the demilitarized zone on Sept. 27, 1953. The demand was based on evidence given by an Israeli deserter.

## Saudi Arabia

1954

*June 3:* The Saudi Arabian Embassy at London issued a statement proposing the setting up of a fact-finding mission to look into the dispute over the al-Buraimi oasis. A British Foreign Office spokesman declared that Britain thought the proposal inadequate.

*June 5:* The world's largest tanker, named for King Su'ud, was launched in Hamburg. The 47,000-ton tanker, the first to fly a Saudi Arabian flag, was to be followed by others under an agreement between A. S. Onassis, the Argentine tanker magnate, and the Saudi Government.

Major Salah Salim, Egypt's Minister of National Guidance, arrived in Riyadh for talks with King Su'ud.

*June 7:* The Minister of Commerce stated that the oil transportation agreement with A. S. Onassis

did not give him a monopoly, but would give him fourth place in transporting Saudi oil.

*June 9:* Major Salah Salim left Jidda for Cairo. The two countries agreed to coordinate their armaments and to oppose Western efforts to bring Arab countries into regional defense pacts.

*June 10:* Saudi Arabia appealed to the International Red Cross and the World Health Organization to send vital food supplies to the blockaded village of Hamasa in the al-Buraimi oasis.

*June 14:* King Su'ud left for Amman on a state visit to Jordan.

*June 17:* King Su'ud returned to Riyadh. It was announced that he had donated JD 100,000 to Arab refugees in Jordan.

*June 18:* Amir 'Abdullah ibn Faysal resigned as Minister of Health so that he could devote full time to his duties as Minister of Interior. Dr. Rashad Fir'awn, Ambassador to France, was appointed Minister of Health.

*June 22:* King Su'ud began a 3-week trip through the southwestern province of 'Asir.

*June 23:* King Su'ud inaugurated the country's first munitions factory at al-Kharj.

*June 26:* The Saudi-Onassis oil tanker agreement was protested by the principal concessionaires in Saudi Arabia as well as by the U.S. Department of State.

*July 4:* Shaykh Hafiz Wabbah, Ambassador to London, arrived in Riyadh to brief King Su'ud on the latest developments in the negotiations over the al-Buraimi dispute.

*July 17:* King Su'ud left for San'a, the capital of Yemen, on a 3-day state visit.

*July 23:* The King donated JD 150,000 toward the development of Jordan's National Guard.

*July 28:* British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden announced that Britain and Saudi Arabia had agreed to arbitrate the al-Buraimi dispute. The arbitration tribunal would consist of 5 members, 1 nominated by Britain on behalf of the Sultan of Muscat and the ruler of Abu Dhabi, 1 by Saudi Arabia, and 3 neutrals to be chosen by these two. Saudi Arabia would withdraw its officials from the village of Hamasa and Britain would withdraw the British-officered Arab force that had been blockading the oasis. Each side would contribute 15 men to a police group to be stationed in the oasis during arbitration. As for oil operations, the disputed areas would be divided into two parts, separated by a neutral zone. In the northern part, British companies would continue operations and Aramco would be free to prospect in the southern part.

*July 30:* A formal agreement was signed with Britain providing for arbitration of the al-Buraimi dispute.

*Aug. 6:* Lt. Col. Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, Prime Minister of Egypt, arrived in Jidda to perform the pilgrimage and hold talks with King Su'ud.

*Aug. 14:* The Government announced that it would reject all future Point Four aid, and that Point

Four officials in Saudi Arabia would be asked to leave the country immediately.

*Aug. 16:* Amir Faysal, Crown Prince and Foreign Minister, was appointed Prime Minister as well by Royal Decree.

*Aug. 22:* Amir Turki ibn 'Utayshan, the Saudi official who had been in Hamasa (al-Buraimi) for two years, and the Trucial Oman levies and Abu Dhabi irregulars occupying parts of the disputed territory were ordered to withdraw in accordance with the arbitration agreement.

*Aug. 26:* Sir Reader Bullard, a British diplomat, was named Britain's representative on the arbitration tribunal.

*Aug. 30:* Shaykh 'Abdullah Al Sulayman, Minister of Finance for many years, resigned. Shaykh Muhammad Surur al-Sabban, Minister of State and Adviser to the Ministry of Finance, was appointed to succeed him.

## Sudan

1954

*June 9:* Prime Minister Isma'il al-Azhari inaugurated a new rail line linking Central Sudan with Tong in the southeast.

*July 4:* A Khartoum court sentenced Awad Salah, director of the Umma Party newspaper, to death and 3 other Sudanese to prison terms for instigating the nationalist riots on March 1.

*Aug. 8:* The death sentence imposed on Awad Saleh on July 4 was reduced to 14 years' imprisonment.

*Aug. 16:* Eight Sudanese were promoted to the post of Provincial Governor to replace British officials.

## Syria

(See also Palestine Problem)

1954

*June 10:* The Cabinet of Prime Minister Sabri al-'Asali resigned. President Hashim al-Atasi began talks with leaders of political parties and independents regarding the formation of a new Government.

*June 16:* Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali of Pakistan arrived in Damascus for talks with Syrian officials.

*June 19:* A new Cabinet was formed as follows:

Sa'id Ghazzi — Prime Minister, Defense  
Izzat Sakkal — Foreign Affairs, Finance  
Asad Kurani — Justice, Economy  
Isma'il Quli — Interior  
Nihad Qasim — Education, Agriculture  
Nabih Ghazzi — Public Works, Communications, Health.

*June 30:* Textile workers in Damascus went on strike for higher wages.

*July 8:* The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party opened an office in Aleppo. Religious leaders demonstrated against the party, accusing it of being against religion.



*July 11:* Owners of several textile factories in Damascus threatened to close down and hand over their premises to the Government. Some threatened to move their factories out of the country.

*July 12:* Textile workers in Damascus demonstrated in the main streets and before the government offices.

*July 13:* The 'ulama (religious leaders) of Damascus issued a proclamation supporting the attitude of their colleagues in Aleppo against the atheistic tendencies of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party.

*July 18:* President al-Atasi issued a decree fixing elections for Aug. 20.

Textile workers in Damascus again demonstrated in the streets. At a special Cabinet meeting it was decided that the government would take over the factories unless the owners accepted the recommendations of a special mediation committee.

*July 20:* The Cabinet decreed that the number of seats for the new Chamber would be 117 for Muslims, 16 for Christians, and 6 for Bedouin tribes (later increased to 9).

Leaders of the Union of Labor Syndicates decided to call a general strike in Damascus for July 24 and in the other Governorates for July 26. The strike was postponed, however, to give the Government time to submit a special Labor Bill to Parliament.

*July 28:* The Chamber approved an amendment to the Labor Code giving the government the right to decide if a laborers' strike was legal and allowing it to grant salaries to laborers if the factory owners refused to open their factories.

*July 29:* Syrian magistrates went on strike for higher pay.

*July 30:* The Sha'b (Peoples') Party announced its decision to boycott the coming elections because of the belief that they would not be free.

*Aug. 5:* The Government issued a decree postponing elections until Sept. 24.

*Aug. 7:* Ex-president Shukri al-Quwwatli arrived in Damascus after an absence of more than 5 years in Egypt. He declared he had no political affiliations.

*Aug. 8:* A number of employers filed a case with the Supreme Court against the Government in connection with the new Labor Law.

*Aug. 21:* The magistrates' strike ended upon a promise by President al-Atasi that their demands for increased wages would be considered by the new Parliament to be elected Sept. 24.

## Tunisia

1954

*June 1:* The Bey, Sidi Mohammed el Amin, and Habib Bourguiba, exiled leader of the Neo-Destour, both issued appeals for an end of violence and asked for French-Tunisian cooperation.

*June 13:* Elections to the regional and municipal councils were postponed indefinitely because of unsettled conditions.

*June 13-15:* Terrorist activity and counter measures were responsible for 18 deaths.

*June 16:* The Cabinet of Prime Minister Salah M'Zali resigned.

*June 21:* See Pakistan.

*July 1:* Resident General Voizard returned from Paris and issued an appeal for "calm and concord." France gave its Defense Minister authority to call up reservists for an indefinite period following fresh outbreaks of terrorism in Tunisia.

*July 5:* The resignation of the 19-day-old Cabinet of Mohammed Salah M'Zali was accepted by the Bey. Governmental affairs were entrusted to permanent civil servants.

Three battalions of French troops landed at Tunis to strengthen the security forces. Seven rebels and 3 members of the security forces were killed in a clash at Jebel Orvata.

*July 14:* Dr. Abderraham Mami, personal physician to the Bey, died from gun wounds received from terrorists in a Tunis street on July 13.

*July 15:* Resident General Voizard issued a proclamation declaring he was determined to enforce order at all costs.

*July 18:* Neo-Destour leader Habib Bourguiba was transferred from the island of Groix, west of Brittany, to a chateau near Montargis, 65 miles south of Paris.

*July 19:* A French engineer in the Tunisian Ministry of Public Works was shot and killed at Tunis.

*July 24:* Col. René de Benoit de Lapaillone, chief of the Bey's palace guard was shot and killed on a street in Tunis. Police ordered all Arab cafés in the city closed and roadblocks set up.

*July 30:* Aziz Djellouli, a moderate member of the Neo-Destour, returned to Tunis after conferences with French leaders in Paris.

The French Cabinet, after a 5-hour session, agreed to accept Premier Mendès-France's program for reforms in Tunisia. The Cabinet also voted to replace Resident General Voizard by Gen. Pierre Georges Boyer de la Tour du Moulin, who had been serving as military commander in Tunisia.

*July 31:* French Premier Mendès-France arrived in Tunis by air with an offer of complete internal autonomy for Tunisia provided that order be restored. In a broadcast from Tunis the French Premier appealed to the French Tunisians to accept his proposals and to bury their differences.

Habib Bourguiba, from his place of confinement near Paris, issued a statement describing the Premier's offer as "a substantial and decisive step toward Tunisia's complete sovereignty."

*Aug. 2:* A French-educated moderate Nationalist, Tahar Ben Amar, was appointed by the Bey as Prime Minister and instructed to pick his Cabinet. Habib Bourguiba appealed to Tunisians to cease all violence and called for a "general cease-fire" throughout the protectorate.

*Aug. 3:* The Voice of the Arab broadcast from Cairo urged Tunisians to continue their fight for independence. Bandits shot a French civil servant in Sousse and a Tunisian near Tathouine.

*Aug. 4:* French parachute troops killed 2 bandits of the "Army of Liberations" in an attempt to seal up the group in the central mountains near Kasserine; 1 French parachutist was killed and 2 wounded; traffic was prohibited in the area.

French reinforcements continued to arrive; 700 Tunisians were searched and questioned in Sousse; a curfew was imposed from 8 p.m. to 5 a.m. in Medina de Sfax.

*Aug. 8:* The Bey invested the following Cabinet of 4 Neo-Destourians, 1 Socialist, and 5 Independents, including the Prime Minister:

Tahar ben Ammar — Prime Minister  
 Mohammed Masmoudi — Minister of State  
 Mongi Slim — Minister of State  
 Abdel Aziz Djellouli — Minister of State  
 Hedi Nour — Commerce  
 Ali ben Hadj — Agriculture  
 Naceur ben Said — Housing  
 Chadly Rhaïm — Labor  
 Dr. Sadok Mokkadem — Justice  
 Tahar Zaouch — Public Health

French directors were to remain in charge of Finance, Education, Public Works, and Communications until the autonomy agreement had been concluded by the Cabinet with the French Government.

*Aug. 10:* See Morocco.

*Aug. 14:* The French Foreign Ministry announced that Tunisian Prime Minister Tahar ben Ammar and Minister of State Masmoudi would visit Paris Aug. 17 and 18 as official guests of the French Government, to settle details of the forthcoming formal negotiations for Tunisian autonomy.

*Aug. 18:* French and Tunisian leaders in Paris agreed to a conference in Tunis in September to establish Tunisia's internal autonomy.

*Aug. 19:* Prime Minister Tahar ben Ammar and Minister of State Masmoudi left Paris for Montargis to confer with Neo-Destour leader Habib Bourguiba.

*Aug. 27:* See Morocco.

## Turkey

1954

*June 1:* Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüstü Zorlu, Minister of Defense Etem Menderes, Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry Nuri Birgi, Commander of the Turkish ground forces Gen. Nureddin Baransel, and a party of 13 other officials and newspapermen arrived in Washington for a 5-day visit, during which talks were to be held with U.S.

officials regarding Turkish military and economic plans for the next 4 years.

*June 5:* A communiqué was issued in Washington stating that the U.S. Government recognized that the Turkish defense program placed "a heavy strain upon the resources of its country and its people." Prime Minister Menderes was assured that Turkey would receive about \$200 million worth of military aid in the next year, and that delivery of \$500 million worth of arms already promised would be hastened. Turkey would also get \$76 million in economic aid for the next year.

*June 10:* Pakistan's Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali arrived in Ankara for three days of conversations with Turkish officials.

*June 11:* The Grand National Assembly ratified the Turkish-Pakistani pact signed April 2.

Turkish officials asked Prime Minister Mohammed 'Ali to use his influence to prevent a conference of all Islamic states to deal with the Arab-Israeli issue, as proposed by Pakistani Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan.

*June 25:* Libyan Prime Minister Mustafa ben Halim, Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Salam Busayri, and Finance Minister 'Ali 'Unazi arrived in Ankara for discussions with Turkish officials. A joint communiqué was issued in Ankara and Tripoli declaring that the two governments had decided to collaborate "with a view to reinforce peace and understanding among all countries."

*June 30:* The Grand National Assembly passed a bill amending the electoral law. It provided, *inter alia*, that broadcasting stations should not be used for party polemics and that civil servants must resign 6 months before an election if they wished to stand for Parliament, or 7 days before in case of sudden dissolution.

*July 2:* *Zafer*, organ of the Democratic Party, published statistics showing that Turkey's foreign trade deficit during the first 5 months of 1954 was more than 3 times the deficit for the same period of 1953.

*July 3:* Deputy Prime Minister Fatin Rüstü Zorlu announced that the government would curtail commercial credit to importers to hinder the speculative accumulation of imported goods, and take other measures to combat inflation. The Central Bank would increase its special reserves fund from TL 216 million to TL 400 million.

*July 13:* The first conference of Turkish diplomatic representatives in the Middle East opened at Ankara, with President Celal Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes participating.

*Aug. 9:* Foreign Minister Köprülü signed a 20-year military pact with Greece and Yugoslavia at Bled, Yugoslavia.

## Yemen

(See Aden and Aden Protectorates)

# DOCUMENT

## Anglo-Egyptian Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base

The following is the text of the Heads of Agreement initialled by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Egyptian Governments in Cairo on July 27th.

1. It is agreed between the Egyptian and British Delegations that with a view to establishing Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship, and taking into account their obligations under the United Nations Charter, an Agreement regarding the Suez Canal Base should now be drafted on the following lines.

2. The Agreement will last until the expiry of seven years from the date of signature. During the last twelve months of this period the two Governments will consult together to decide what arrangements are necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.

3. Parts of the present Suez Canal Base will be kept in efficient working order in accordance with the requirements set forth in Annex 1 and capable of immediate use in accordance with the following paragraph.

4. (i) In the event of an armed attack by an outside power on Egypt, or on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities will include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

(ii) In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above-mentioned countries, there shall be immediate consultation between the United Kingdom and Egypt.

5. The organisation of the Base will be in accordance with Annex 1 below.

6. The United Kingdom will be accorded the right to move any British material into or out of the Base at its discretion. There will be no increase above the level of supplies to be agreed upon without the consent of the Egyptian Government.

7. Her Majesty's Forces will be completely withdrawn from Egyptian territory according to a schedule to be established in due course within a period of twenty months from the date of signature of this Agreement. The Egyptian Government will afford all necessary facilities for the movement of men and material in this connexion.

8. The agreement will recognize that the Suez Maritime Canal which is an integral part of Egypt is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and will express the determination of both parties to uphold the 1888 Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal.

9. The Egyptian Government will afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified

flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any flights the Egyptian Government will extend most favourable nation treatment.

10. There will be questions of detail to be covered in the drafting of the Agreement including the storage of oil, the financial arrangements necessary, and other detailed matters of importance to both sides. These will be settled by friendly agreement in negotiations which will begin forthwith.

### Annex 1: Organisation of the Base

Her Majesty's Government shall have the right to maintain certain agreed installations and to operate them for current requirements. Should Her Majesty's Government decide at any time no longer to maintain all these installations they will discuss with the Egyptian Government the disposal of any installation which they no longer require. The approval of the Egyptian Government must be obtained for any new construction.

2. Following the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Forces the Egyptian Government will assume responsibility for the security of the Base and of all equipment contained therein, or in transit on Egyptian territory to and from the Base.

3. Her Majesty's Government will conclude contracts with one or more British or Egyptian commercial firms for the up-keep and operation of the installations referred to in paragraph 1 and the maintenance of the stores contained in these installations. These Commercial Firms will have the right to engage British and Egyptian civilian technicians and personnel; the number of the British technicians employed by these Commercial Firms shall not exceed a figure which shall be agreed upon in the detailed negotiations. These Commercial Firms will have also the right to engage such local labour as they may require.

4. The Egyptian Government will give full support to the Commercial Firms referred to in paragraph 3 to enable them to carry out these tasks and will designate an authority with whom the contractors can cooperate for the discharge of their duties.

5. The Egyptian Government will maintain in good order such installations, public utilities, communications, bridges, pipe-lines and wharves, etc., as will be handed over to it according to agreement between the two Governments. The Commercial Firms referred to in paragraph 3 will be afforded such facilities as may be required in their operations.

6. Her Majesty's Government will be afforded facilities for the inspection of the installations referred to in paragraph 1 and the work being carried out therein. To facilitate this personnel shall be attached to Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo. The maximum number of such personnel will be agreed between the two Governments.

## BOOK REVIEWS

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL regrets to inform its readers that it no longer offers the Book Purchase Service formerly announced in this space. (Editor)

### GENERAL

**OIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ITS DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT**, by Stephen H. Longrigg. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1954. (Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.) 305 pages, appendices, maps, index. \$4.00.

*Reviewed by John A. DeNovo*

Brigadier Longrigg has written the most inclusive and satisfactory account of petroleum development in the Middle East yet to appear. No public servant, petroleum executive, or scholar whose professional interests impinge on the area from Egypt through Iran can afford to ignore this book. It derives much from the author's unique combination of long public service in Iraq, his acquaintance with Arab history already demonstrated in his two books on Iraq, and his twenty years as an executive of the Iraq Petroleum Company. In addition to these qualifications, he brings to his task a broad view which enables him to present the events in a world setting and with considerable appreciation of the large forces at work.

After a brief analysis of the geological formations of the Middle East, the author devotes much space to the oil searches and diplomacy of the half century before World War II. Slightly more than half of the book is devoted to the last fifteen years, a decision justifiable in view of the tumultuous recent history and future prospects of Middle East oil.

Longrigg avoids becoming a mere apologist for the foreign oil companies, but it bears notice that he finds much to praise and little to criticize in their operations. His account will serve as a useful corrective for any who still cling to the notion that the international petroleum industry is a sinister business operating

in mysterious ways under questionable assumptions and with dire consequences. The industry as it operates in the Middle East is one of stunning complexity, with its requirements of huge capital outlays; its expensive, arduous, and often fruitless development efforts; its political risks; and its physical problems of operating in the thankless desert terrain of primitive regions. Such enterprise and imagination as the industry has shown justify reasonable financial returns. The companies also deserve credit for their notable contributions to the improvement of education, medical and public health facilities, housing, roads, and water supplies in the Middle East. Longrigg paints a picture of the responsible mid-20th century corporation that has superseded the "robber-baron" of yesteryear; however, he omits any mention of net profits or dividends, and certainly these are among the essential criteria for judging fairly the record of the companies.

A major virtue of the book is its comprehensiveness, yet the narrative sometimes becomes tedious with details of barren wells and abortive agreements. Fortunately, the author takes advantage of the dramatic high points too, such as the recent Anglo-Iranian controversy. Here his indignation shows through, but he avoids intemperance. Most readers will find no fault with his premise that there is a rational basis for promoting simultaneously the interests of the Middle East countries, the foreign companies, and the consumers. Respect for sanctity of contract is the obviously indispensable prerequisite. While the Iranian attitude is suggested, he labels opposition to the oil companies "irresponsible," and nationalist aspirations "emotional." Occasionally he tempers this point of view by cautious qualification, for example: "It is not here suggested that all such emotion is necessarily ignoble or that all



such criticism must necessarily be wholly groundless." Americans will be interested in Longrigg's critical view of the American role in the dispute and will wish that space had permitted him to elaborate the basis for his strictures.

It is unlikely that any scholar could at present or in the near future assemble the wealth of information Longrigg has at his disposal. It is therefore regrettable that the author did not see fit to document this important book, for it will necessarily be the starting point for much future research. The researcher's envious curiosity about the sources of much of the hitherto unassembled factual data will go unrequited. Readers will, however, be grateful for the excellent maps and appendices.

◆ JOHN A. DeNOVO is an assistant professor of history at the Pennsylvania State University. He is engaged in research on American oil diplomacy in the Middle East.

## EGYPT AND THE SUDAN

SUDAN DAYS AND WAYS, by H. C. Jackson.  
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. 262  
pages, photographs, maps. \$3.50.

*Reviewed by Ried F. Shields*

This is a timely book, although it deals almost entirely with the past, being the experiences of a British administrator in the Sudan during the early years of the condominium. It is an entertaining one as well, giving a detailed and intimate picture of life in this country when it was only beginning to come under Western influence.

Mr. Jackson served the Sudan Government for 24 years as District Commissioner and Province Governor, coming out in 1907, only nine years after the battle of Omdurman, which ended the Dervish regime. The Sudan was "an almost empty waste . . . few people had enough to eat . . . there were no courts of justice, no medical services or schools, no proper roads or adequate means of communication." The civilizing process had begun and the general pattern of government set when Mr. Jackson arrived. However, British officials were very few and were responsible for vast territories. They spent most of their time on

trek, when they sometimes rode ponies but more often camels, mules, or even bulls, or tramped through grass twelve feet high, wading into vast swamps and swimming unbridged streams. They pitched their tents in the villages, settling disputes, trying criminal and civil cases, giving advice about agriculture and cattle raising, inspecting schools, dispensing simple medicines. It was slow and hard and lonely, but these men learned to know the people and the land as few foreigners do in these easier and more hurried days when airplanes crisscross the country and motor transport reaches everywhere, when an amplitude of officials deals expertly with special phases of government, and when the people are everywhere more enlightened. Mr. Jackson's service included assignments in every part of the Sudan — city, town, savannah, irrigated land, desert, and "bog," with their tremendous differences of race, religion, and manner of life. He dealt with all these people sympathetically and now writes of them with appreciation and humor, his most vivid remembrance "the kindness, friendliness and generosity" of the people.

The book contains a brief introductory summary of Sudanese history, and in an epilogue the author speaks of present problems of the new, independent government. But for the most part, *Sudan Days and Ways* deals with the first three decades of the regime which is just now ending. There are no stirring historical events and no clash of opinions. These were absent from the life of the Sudan in that period. Here is a record of the type of unselfish and devoted service that went into the establishment of the excellent government which fostered rapid progress, developed a national consciousness, and trained the men who would later demand and administer an independent government. Such a book needs to be read by foreigners who would understand the Sudan of today — and one feels that its reading is badly needed by the present generation of Sudanese who easily forget what their country was like fifty years ago, and what was involved in its good government. Mr. Jackson is prepared to find the young nation, like a young man, resentful of advice from older and more experienced administrators. However, the people whom he calls "the saner element," who would reject the extravagant ultra-

nationalist talk that "for the past fifty years the Sudanese people . . . have been prey to poverty, diseases and ignorance," are apparently silent, and the Prime Minister in his Bairam speech could talk of "fifty years of gloom and oppression." This book should help to set the record straight.

Progress, civilization, independence were inevitable even had they not been the aim and purpose of the British administrators, but there are those of us who, amid electrical gadgets, traffic jams, and political furore, like Mr. Jackson look back nostalgically to the days of quiet and peace and great friendliness and leisurely life. He succeeds admirably in making one see what the Sudan was like in the "simple, unsophisticated days."

♦ RIED F. SHIELDS has, since 1917, been a member of the American Mission (United Presbyterian) in the Sudan.

**THE NILOTES OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN AND UGANDA**, by Audrey Butt. London: International African Institute, 1952. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part IV.) 198 pages. 15s.

**THE AZANDE, AND RELATED PEOPLE OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN AND BELGIAN CONGO**, by P. T. W. Baxter and Audrey Butt. London: International African Institute, 1953. (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part IX.) 152 pages. 15s.

*Reviewed by Grant V. McClanahan*

The gradual emergence of the Sudan as an independent factor in Middle East affairs is a basically significant trend. Yet students of Middle East problems find themselves on unfamiliar ground when they step into the three southern provinces of the Sudan. Here one crosses a southern boundary of the Muslim world and Arab civilization. While still within the jurisdiction of the Khartoum government, one has entered an area where Islam and Arabic are outside influences in the lives of individuals and societies. Historically, the relationship between the two culture areas has never been more than temporarily static, and one of the most interesting questions attending the future of the Sudan is the policy which a North Sudani-controlled government will pur-

sue in the three southern provinces, with an estimated population of 2,250,000.

These two volumes of the Ethnographic Survey of Africa, while they are primarily and almost exclusively intended for the use of students of anthropology, will be of great help to those who approach the subject from a northern or Middle East-centered viewpoint. For together, these books provide a brief systematic classification and description of the somewhat baffling complex of primitive societies to be found in the South Sudan and immediately adjacent areas, as well as the best available estimates of distribution and numbers. The detailed but clear maps which accompany each volume are a most valuable feature. Extensive bibliographies are also included, with, however, only a few hints of the compilers' evaluations.

The Nilotic peoples, of whom some of the most numerous are the Dinka (500,000), Shilluk (100,000), Nuer (260,000), Lango (275,000) and Acholi (over 200,000), have been known and studied by Europeans only since the 19th century. They are pastoral, hunting, and fishing peoples, and, in a limited way, agriculturists. Audrey Butt summarizes their behavior as "proud, individualistic, and truculent . . . towards each other and particularly towards foreigners. They consider their country the best in the world and everyone inferior to themselves . . . despise clothing, scorn European and Arab cultures, and are contemptuous and reserved with foreigners." The Nilotes are one of the tallest of human races. They are fond of ornaments, cicatrization, and elaborate coiffures. Many of them have a value system in which cattle play a supreme role. In the case of the Nuer, "daily life revolves round the needs of cattle; Nuer think cattle and talk cattle" and their "language is rich in terms describing the various attributes of cattle."

The Azande (singular "Zande") and related peoples number about 750,000, of whom only 250,000 live in the Sudan, the remainder being mostly in the Belgian Congo. They are shorter in stature than the Nilotes, less individualistic, and much more inclined to adopt European ways. They are organized under autocratic chiefs, who are mostly members of one clan, the Avungara. "The Azande were formidable and well-organized warriors whose

prowess enabled them to resist the disintegrating pressure of the Arab slavers and to prevent an organized resistance to the Europeans which won their respect. They were intelligent opportunists who, when they saw the futility of continued resistance to European conquest, were prepared to cooperate." In the 18th and 19th centuries they conquered and Zandeized many other peoples. In fact, a sophisticated modern Zande might easily argue that had it not been for European penetration and domination of the Congo and the Sudan, a great Zandeland might have been formed out of much of the upper Nile and Congo. In 1945 the Zande territory in the Sudan was selected by the Sudan Government as an area for intensive economic and social development. The resulting project, which is unfortunately scarcely mentioned by Baxter and Butt, seems to be doing well and holds much promise for the whole South Sudan.

In so extensive a compilation of detailed facts there are bound to be minor errors. For example, on page 21 of the volume on Nilotes, one of the four missions is wrongly named. It should be the "American Mission" — that good United Presbyterian, J. Kelly Giffen, who established it in 1902, would regret its identification as "Methodist" and possibly also the omission from the bibliography of his interesting book about work among the Shilluk, *The Egyptian Sudan* (1905). A more glaring deficiency on the same page is the neglect of any mention of the cardinal decision made by the Sudan Government in 1950 that Arabic should be introduced into all southern schools and that higher education would be provided in Khartoum instead of in Uganda.

The South Sudan is already in profound political transition as symbolized most dramatically by the all-Sudanese elections in which it participated in 1953. Its tribal societies will be open to both constructive transformation and shattering disintegration during the next decade. These two survey volumes provide a tremendous aid to the comprehension of the starting point from which the future of the Nilotes and the Azande will grow.

♦ GRANT V. McCLANAHAN, a student of Egyptian and Sudanese affairs, contributed "Postwar Books on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan" to the Summer 1952 issue of *THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL*.

NEUE WELT AM NIL, by Gisela Bonn. Wiesbaden: F. A. Brockhaus, 1953. 202 pages, 104 illus. DM.18.

*Reviewed by Elizabeth S. Ettinghausen*

Drawing on her experiences in Egypt and the Sudan in 1952, Miss Bonn presents us now in word and picture glimpses of the lands on the Nile; put together in kaleidoscopic fashion they add up to a fairly comprehensive picture of the countries and their inhabitants. A Ph.D. with training mainly in history, she has been active as a journalist since World War II. Three years in North Africa and short travels in other Arab countries have provided her with a sympathetic approach to the Middle East.

The author chose this particular subject because here was the heart of a new world in the making. Egypt and the Sudan are treated together in spite of the great discrepancies in their development, since Miss Bonn considered their fates tied together by their common, life-bearing stream.

As its title indicates, the book deals preponderantly with the modern period: recent political developments, the progressive spirit, the struggle for improvement, modernization and freedom, the new hope of the common people for betterment of their lot, their development into conscious citizens, the gradual awakening of the women and their struggle for equal rights. But we find the "new world on the Nile" coexisting with age-old customs and techniques, just as new structures rise near revered ones of the past. Miss Bonn takes us to some of the great monuments and tells their stories as witnesses of great men and as representatives of the ancient Egyptian and Islamic cultures. However, the focal point always remains the people — from the ruling elite to the peasant.

Miss Bonn's enthusiasm for the people carries her away at times to picture the new spirit and achievements in too rosy a light. Also, her approach is not always unbiased: although she tries to present the case of the British in fairness, she does not always succeed. On the other hand, the love of Egyptians for Germans, as a neutral party, seems exaggerated. Some remarks about Islamic art are unfortunate, e.g., her choice of the late and

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Westernized Turkish-type mosque of Muhammad 'Ali and its ornamentation as one of the finest examples of Egyptian-Islamic art. Although the language of the book is sometimes heavy, good observations are often expressed in effective word pictures. The many black-and-white and color photographs, all taken by the author, are a great addition to the book.

Miss Bonn's aim — to show what has been stirring Egypt and the Sudan — is generally accomplished and the book can be recommended to the layman as an introduction into the world on the Nile, and as such also a starting point for an acquaintance with the Islamic East.

◆ ELIZABETH S. ETTINGHAUSEN, former research fellow at Dumbarton Oaks, Harvard University, Washington, spent five years in Turkey and more recently fourteen months travelling through almost all of the Muslim countries.

## INDIA

THE MEN WHO RULED INDIA. Vol. I, *The Founders of Modern India*, by Philip Woodruff [pseud.]. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. 402 pages, index. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by Horace I. Poleman*

This is the first of two volumes, covering the period from 1600 to 1858. The second volume, to be published later this year, will be entitled *The Guardians* and will bring the story to August 1947. The author, Philip Mason, first won distinction as a writer with the publication of a novel on India, *Call the Next Witness*. He has a penetrating understanding of India and of the Indian mind through long association with that country, and his style of writing makes it thrilling to read him. Although the author states that this is not a reference work, it contains within its covers an enormous amount of information gathered from many sources. The notes at the end of the volume make interesting reading and offer a well-appraised basic bibliography. However, Woodruff intended his book to be enjoyed as literature by those who like to read, and as such it deserves the attention of the reading public.

The first volume of *The Men Who Ruled*

*India* is a history of the East India Company told through biographical accounts of its officers in India, beginning with William Hawkins and ending with the Mutiny. The biographical approach to history here justifies itself. The East India Company employed the services of hundreds of men in India. Selections in the presentation of the story had therefore to be made. The most colorful, the best, and the worst figures are here, and some of the lesser ones. They are well chosen and accurately presented. At first glance one might consider the book to be a biased praise of British rule in India. That it is an appreciation cannot be denied, but the author does not spare the phrase or word which justly evaluates. This is not to say that the explanation of the land revenue system resulting from the Company's labors will satisfy the carping economist or the rabid politician.

The second volume will be concerned not with the remote and somewhat romantic past but with the more recent years. The author's and the reader's objectivity will then be put to a stern test, since both have lived through part of that period.

◆ HORACE I. POLEMAN is Chief of the South Asia Section of the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress.

THE CHILDREN OF HARI: A STUDY OF THE NIMAR BALAHIS IN THE CENTRAL PROVINCES OF INDIA, by Stephen Fuchs, S.V.D. New York: Praeger, 1951. xviii+463 pages, illus. \$7.50.

*Reviewed by Dorothy M. Spencer*

*The Children of Hari*, as the title implies, is a study of a depressed caste. In his efforts to raise the "untouchables" to a position of dignity and respect in Indian society, Gandhi gave them the name of Harijan, Born of God; in the case of the Balahis it has a special applicability in that they claim for the members of their caste a divine descent.

The general features of the caste system as they define and determine the position of those lowest in the social hierarchy are well known, and a few studies have hitherto been made of particular depressed castes. Father Fuchs' account of the Balahis, however, gives us the first full-length, detailed, and comprehensive



picture of an "untouchable" group. He has had a long and close association with the subjects of his study, and has investigated all important aspects of their life. His descriptions of the various elements which make up the sum total of Balahi culture are a substantial and very welcome contribution to Indian ethnography.

The more general reader interested in India's attempts to solve its social and economic problems will find particularly interesting those sections of the book dealing with relationships between the Balahis and other castes, both higher and lower, and with the results of Fuchs' careful investigations into the economic condition of the Balahis. While the information on caste is not so full nor so systematically treated as one might wish, the author presents ample material illustrating the fact that the problems involved in removal of untouchability are extremely complex. Attitudes of the Balahis themselves toward the system and their own status within it provide some of the stumbling blocks in the way of their progress. "Most of the Balahis," writes Fuchs, "are quite indifferent towards the crusade which aims at the abolishment of untouchability." It is their conviction that "fate has placed them in this particular position and that they have no right to revolt against their destiny." This is all the more interesting in that the doctrine of *karma*, a key concept in Hinduism according to which a man's deeds in this life are held to determine his condition in his next existence, occupies no important place in the belief system of the Balahis and has been by them considerably modified. Other difficulties stem from their attitudes toward those even lower in the scale than themselves. Balahis have resisted efforts to break down caste barriers when they are thereby brought into closer contact not only with higher castes but with groups whom they regard as inferior and unclean. Fuchs refers to a "bold attempt towards greater union between the different castes . . . [which] failed miserably" when some Balahis, who in this experiment in social reform had eaten with representatives of a lower caste, were outcaste by the members of their own group because they were considered to be polluted by this act of sharing food.

As is the case with most of the lower caste

groups, the Balahis are "depressed" economically as well as socially. Today in Nimar District only 2.6 percent practice their traditional occupation, weaving. The majority gain an uncertain and meagre livelihood as agricultural laborers in the fields of their higher caste neighbors. One of the main lines of agricultural reform in India is the redistribution of land and the provision of land to the landless. A band of earnest and selfless workers is devoting its entire effort to this end. In view of this program, the report, though brief and too concise, on those Balahis who have been able to acquire land makes interesting, though not encouraging, reading. Characterizing the Balahi cultivator, in comparison with the "hard-working and thrifty farmers of the cultivating castes," as "indolent, ignorant and improvident" and as one "whose heart is not in his work," Fuchs expresses the opinion that "their whole mentality is not yet sufficiently adjusted to steady and consistent cultivation of the soil." He thus points to some of the important human factors involved in the problems of agricultural reform, factors which are too often given insufficient consideration.

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PRISON AND CHOCOLATE CAKE, by Nayantara Sahgal. New York: Knopf, 1954. xvi+236 pages. \$3.50.

*Reviewed by Marguerite McKenna*

Nayantara Sahgal's book gives one an intimate picture of the spirit which animated three of the leaders of the Congress Party when they were engaged in the early struggle for separation of India from Great Britain: her father, Ranjit Sitaram Pandit; her mother, Mme. Pandit; and her uncle, now Prime Minister Nehru. Its title, *Prison and Chocolate Cake*, is indicative of the author's attitude toward the very serious, mixed always with the light-hearted, with which Gandhi's followers accepted personal suffering for the cause of Indian freedom. The first time Mrs. Sahgal's Congress Party parents went off to prison the occasion was celebrated with a dinner including chocolate cake. Trips to the prison were

characterized by singing to lighten the hearts of Nayantara and her sisters, who as young children visited their parents there.

Mrs. Sahgal's description of Indian home life does not seem very different from that of the average American slightly-above-middle-class family. This, no doubt, stems from the democratic attitude which characterized the founders of the Congress Party. In fact, her father's wish that his wife engage in politics just as — if not more — actively as he, is almost a step ahead of American families, where wives more frequently take the place simply of hostess to their politician husbands. About the only thing that apparently differentiates the Pandit women from American women is the wearing of the sari.

From the works of other authors on India, one is led to the conclusion that Mrs. Sahgal's description of Indian home life is hardly representative of India generally. In the same way she dismisses "caste" as a thing of the past. When queried about it by an American reporter, her sister Lekha told him, "Don't tell a soul, but our cook at home is an untouchable!" One hopes that Congress Party ideals in this respect will soon be accepted generally throughout India.

The author speaks affectionately of Gandhi, "Bapu," describing his first visit to their home when she was a very small child, her last visit to him shortly before his death, and her participation in his funeral procession. However, she concedes that "Gandhiji was not a politician. He was not afraid to change his mind or to contradict himself if he believed he had made a mistake. He was not ashamed to proclaim that his religion was his guide." Despite an upbringing with very little mention of religion, she was impressed with Gandhi's otherworldliness:

Could it be true that a man could talk of love and truth and goodness, and apply these religious terms to politics, and not be laughed at? Could it be true that such sentiments could actually guide a nation's policy? Yet in India all these things were true. I felt wonderfully elated that I was an Indian and that to be an Indian in Gandhi's India would forever be associated with this eminently sane way of thinking.

About half of the book is devoted to the life of the Pandit girls in America, where they

came to school to escape the wartime restrictions of life in India. We laugh uproariously with Nayantara when she attended her younger sister's graduation at Putney, that unique school in Vermont where the students, dressed in blue jeans or shorts and open-necked shirts, in addition to their studies milk cows, clean stables, collect eggs, and feed pigs. Exhausted from the polkas, waltzes, and the square dances, Nayantara finally falls to sleep in a sleeping bag, being too late to win one of the few extra beds provided for guests. Americans as well as Indians will enjoy her tours of Hollywood studios and her early impressions of Los Angeles and New York.

Her stay in New York witnessed the opening of the United Nations with her mother as India's chief representative. Intimate descriptions of world leaders, many of whom are still in the public eye, are well worth reading. One's only regret is that the book ends in 1947, when the author returned to India to find her uncle the Prime Minister of the second most highly populated country in the world. A sequel, written with the same clarity and precision, would be most welcome.

◆ MARGUERITE MCKENNA is Editorial Assistant of THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL.

THE RELIGION OF THE HINDUS, ed. by Kenneth W. Morgan. New York: Ronald, 1953. 398 pages. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by Fredericka Cobren*

*The Religion of the Hindus* is both a well-conceived and well-executed piece of work. The object of the editor and of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education, the body responsible for initiating the work, was to present to the Western student or interested layman a sympathetic and informed portrayal of the major beliefs and practices of Hinduism in India today. To achieve this object, Mr. Morgan, consulting with several American scholars, drew up an outline of the subjects that would need to be covered to give the Western reader a well-rounded and yet sufficiently substantive view of Hinduism. He then proceeded to India, where he enlisted the cooperation of seven Indian scholars. The result

is unique in that it presents to the American reader for the first time a comprehensive and yet brief and scholarly account of the most important aspects of Hinduism, together with a careful translation of representative selections from the major Hindu religious writings. While the book is particularly well suited for use as a classroom text, it should prove equally useful to the ordinary reader who is looking for a general introduction to the subject.

The book is organized into seven chapters, each written by a Hindu scholar especially selected for his competence on the particular aspect he treats. Four of these scholars are from West Bengal, two from Madras, and one from Bombay. The chapters in brief scope and clear style present an excellent introductory account of the nature and history of Hinduism, followed by a descriptive analysis of the Hindu concept of God, the six major schools of Hindu religious thought, the role of man in Hinduism, the Hindu concept of the natural world, and Hindu religious practices. It concludes with an introduction to the Hindu sacred writings.

The presentation is essentially one of sympathetic descriptive analysis rather than an apologia or a critical evaluation of the ideas and practices described. Since most writings available to the Western reader on Hinduism are in the field of religious philosophy, the chapters on the religious practices of the Hindus and the selections from Hindu religious literature are particularly useful features of this volume. In addition to its clear, intelligent style, other assets that merit mention are a good bibliography, whose only serious omission is the lack of any major reference on the Hindu caste system, a glossary of Indian names and words used in the text, and a good index.

◆ FREDERICKA COBREN, a specialist on Indian and Pakistani affairs, has recently completed research on the religions of India.

## IRAN

LES PAPIS: TRIBU PERSANE DE NOMADES  
MONTAGNARDS DU SUD-OUEST DE L'IRAN,  
by C. G. Feilberg. Copenhagen: National-

museets Skrifter, Etnografisk Raekke, IV,  
1952. 166 pages. Kr.27.50.

*Reviewed by Raphael Patai*

This recent volume by the well-known Danish ethnographer, Prof. C. G. Feilberg, on the Papis, a Persian mountain tribe, is based on four months of field work undertaken by the author from March to July 1935.

The Papis are a seminomadic tribe in Luristan (southwest Iran), practicing transhumance within a relatively limited wandering territory between Dizful and Khurramabad, across the southeastern part of the Zagros Mountains. They are Shi'is who live mainly on animal husbandry, secondarily on agriculture; they inhabit stone huts in the valleys in the winter and twig huts or black hair tents up in the mountains in the summer. The tribe is divided into two social classes, that of the ruling Khans and that of the much more numerous vassal *re'aya*, with no intermarriage between the two. They spin and weave, making felt rugs, jackets and caps, and engage in basketmaking; the women adorn themselves with jewelry and tattoo marks.

Professor Feilberg first describes the topography and physical geography of the area inhabited by the Papis. Then follows what is the main part of the book: 96 pages devoted to their economic life and material culture. Finally, the author discusses all too briefly what he calls "social and spiritual culture": the life cycle of the individual, the family, property, law, religion, popular beliefs, forms of salutation and politeness, games and pastimes.

Professor Feilberg is a keen observer and a meticulous recorder. His chapters on the shelter, domestic animals, hunting, agriculture, food, clothing and decoration, and arts and crafts of the Papis are excellent, both in scope and in detail. The only criticism one may level against him is that he seems to have had the interests of the Danish National Museum, which sponsored his field trip to Iran and for which he collected the objects, too much at heart. This resulted in a relative neglect and an all too summary presentation of the non-material aspects of Papi culture. For instance, as against a detailed and extremely valuable

treatment of agriculture in 17 pages, or of the forms of shelter used by the Papis in 12 pages, all he has to say on the social classes and the organization of the tribe is condensed into less than 3 pages, and the chapter on family, property, and law comprises no more than another 3 pages. The author gives no estimate of his own as to the size of the tribe (although he quotes in a footnote estimates made by others). No information is found in the book concerning the presence of vertical subdivisions of the tribe, although a proverb is quoted according to which "each tribe has its chief and each village (or as Professor Feilberg translates the term *abadi*, cultivated territory), its headman (*katkhuda*)." This proverb, statements of earlier writers quoted in footnotes, and a brief reference to a fourfold chieftainship make us suspect that the tribal structure of the Papis is more complex than would appear from the brief description of the rulers-vassals dichotomy.

But it would be unfair to judge the book by what it does not contain and what it probably did not intend to contain. It offers much, and what it does offer is reliable, accurate, detailed, and of high quality.

◆ RAPHAEL PATAI is Professor of Anthropology at the Dropsie College, Philadelphia, and Visiting Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University.

## NORTH AFRICA

REVOLUTION AU MAROC, by Robert Montagne. Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1953. 415 pages. 690 fr.

*Reviewed by Daniel F. McCall*

This book can well serve as an introduction to Morocco. M. Montagne has had twenty-five years of experience in the Muslim world — most of it in Morocco — and his vast familiarity with his subject makes it possible for him to carry through his extensive survey with credit. It is a pity that a book of this scope has not also appeared in English.

In the first chapter, the author briefly reviews the history of the Sherifian Empire to the present day. Unfortunately he limits himself to chronicling the rise and fall of dynasties, the expansion and shrinking of boundaries, and

the founding or embellishing of capitals, and neglects the cultural side of life. One regrets the lack of mention of Morocco's role during the period of Islam's greatness, which gave impetus to the renaissance.

After this introduction, M. Montagne outlines the social relationships that existed before the Protectorate, gives thumbnail sketches of the men who helped shape the present situation, discusses current problems, and examines programs and possibilities for the future. While it is impossible to give detailed treatment in one small book, again there are places where one feels a definite lack. For instance, a clear picture of Lyautey does not emerge, despite the author's evident admiration for him. Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, the deposed Sultan, is more clearly drawn but Montagne's picture does not equate with that of Ch. André Julien in the latter's *L'Afrique du Nord en marche* (Paris, 1953).

In fact, Montagne and Julien differ on many points. Montagne would have us think of the area as shut off by its mountains from most of the eddies of civilization that whirled around the Mediterranean; Julien sees the Moroccans holding their mountain passes against the Romans and Turks and opening them only when they chose to do so. Montagne sees the government of the Sultan huddling in the towns with the countryside an anarchic jumble of tribes of varying hostility; Julien sees the government as a stable arrangement of changing tribal elements.

Whatever the role of the mountains in the past, they are today one of the prime factors in the transformation of the country. Their tumultuous torrents are being harnessed to generate hydroelectric power; from their sides are mined phosphates, iron, tungsten, and other metals. Around the mines and the older towns, which have a medieval character, new shanty towns are growing up. Tribesmen are becoming townsmen; nomads are becoming sedentary employees; and investment has brought with it European settlement, thus giving many towns a tripartite structure. In these growing new cities of rampant contrast, the social problems of the country are most evident and here are the centers of nationalist agitation. M. Montagne's discussion of the problem of the cities is based in part on the work of his col-



leagues published under his editorship in *Les cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie*, vol. 3, which includes some of the most important contemporary social research on this area.

*Revolution au Maroc* appeared shortly after the removal of Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef. What does Montagne think of this? He feels that the French have made some mistakes — that they should have taken, for example, more pains with Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef's education — but essentially he puts the fault in the Sultan's weakness of character ("a man of the harem"), which made him prey to the influence of his "emancipated" children and their extremist friends. The consequences of the act, he says, cannot all be foreseen, but Montagne seems to feel that the Administration, being now wiser, will find the solutions. This is in keeping with his general sympathy for the administrators, most of whom he looks upon as old friends and companions.

M. Montagne's confidence is not shared by all of his countrymen. Former Premier Schumann called the removal "the initial error" which was "aggravated" by the failure "to apply without delay strenuous reforms which might have diminished the criticisms made of us." The present Premier, Mendès-France, has indicated a lack of satisfaction with the situation. What Mendès-France, after his offer of reform in Tunisia, intends to do in Morocco is an interesting question.

Within Morocco, support for the former Sultan is not unanimous. Differences of opinion are found among Arab, Berber, and Jew, modernist and orthodox, town dweller and mountaineer. On the other hand, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef has a strange combination of international supporters. This is how they are listed by J. Joesten, journalist for a French paper: French liberals, Catholics, Communists, Spanish Falangists, German Neo-Nazis, Arab Leaguers, and "most American civilians in Morocco."

Ambivalence, then, is characteristic of France and Morocco on the question of the Sultanate. What the outcome will be is not yet clear. Only one thing is certain: the deposition of a traditional authority in a Protectorate in these sensitive and agitated days is a difficult thing for a protecting power to carry out

smoothly, as the British in Uganda are also finding out.

Addressing himself to French rather than American readers, M. Montagne has not considered the points just mentioned, but *Revolution au Maroc* can, nonetheless, serve as an introduction to Morocco. Because of the ferment in all of North Africa it is helpful to have some understanding of Morocco in the light of trans-Mediterranean relationships.

♦ DANIEL F. MCCALL, Research Associate and Instructor in the African Research and Studies Program, Boston University, recently traveled overland from Algiers across the Sahara to French West Africa, the Gold Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, and the British Cameroons.

MAROC ET TUNISIE: PROBLÈME DU PROTECTORAT. Paris: Julliard, 1953. 224 pages. 560 fr.

*Reviewed by Philip Deane*

This collective effort of nineteen distinguished authors is most remarkable by what it tries hard (and politely) not to say. No one in the book faces up to the crucial question: Will the Moroccans and the Tunisians eventually accept any solution which does not first provide for complete independence from France? This is an obvious question for anyone who deals with French North Africa, however inexperienced he is. How much more obvious, then, must this question be for the nineteen experts who have contributed to this collection on the North African protectorates. Yet the whole book is directed at avoiding it. In that way the book is illuminating with regard to French thinking, and to the influence exercised by the French on such foreigners as the American correspondent, David Schoenbrun, whose contribution to the volume, "Les Américains sont au Maroc," should have been entitled "M. David Schoenbrun est au Maroc," since it says precious little on the Americans in Morocco.

To keep the crucial question out, serious economic considerations are omitted. The rapidly growing problem of population pressure is not analyzed. Nowhere in the book is an attempt made to show how the constantly increasing Tunisians will be kept from falling below their present low living standards. A hint at the question and its solution can be found in the piece by François Mitteraud,

"Conditions d'une negotiation." He proposes dual nationality for Frenchmen and Tunisians. Tunisians will have the rights of Frenchmen in France; the French will have the rights of Tunisians in Tunisia. That implies freedom of emigration to France for the Tunisians. But already, Algerian immigrants are creating an almost insoluble social problem in the big industrial cities of France. Dickensian slums are sprouting where it has taken half a century to eradicate them. Can the French, apart from all other considerations, cope with the problem of satisfying the North African's wish for continuing material improvement? This book does not attempt an answer.

Last year, when I was in North Africa, the recently assassinated spokesman of the settlers, Eyraud, told me, "If we improve their lot too much, if we educate them too much, they will have us out because they will feel they don't need us. If we do not educate them and improve their lot, again they will have us out, because keeping us doesn't do them any good."

But, although militarily France can hold down the Moroccans and the Tunisians, peaceful negotiation is better than repression. David Schoenbrun and Jacques Duhamel put the case for negotiations well, and their arguments are made clearer in the light of Pierre Corval's contribution, "Les forces en presence." Corval gives an objective description of actual conditions. He contradicts (this book has many contradictions) Maurice Duverger, another contributor who sounds too much like a clever lawyer putting a case for the defense. Duverger comes closest to the crucial question I mentioned at the beginning, while pleading that the North Africans should not be given independence because they might fall into anarchy and thereby weaken the Western world to which they belong. He even defends the thesis that authoritarian regimes can be justified by their ends — Messrs. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have held the same view. Duverger places the problem on a plane of international self-interest. But on that plane, could it not be argued that to rid itself of the embarrassing "colonialist" label, the West should apply the principles it proclaims — self-determination as soon as possible, for instance? Might that not make relations easier with free Asia?

This book, including the arguments ex-

pounded by North Africans, is a presentation of the French case, despite the disagreements among the contributors. Even when they must be knowingly disregarding facts, the authors of this book sound disturbingly sincere, an interesting insight of what happens to logical French political thought when its premise is doubtful.

◆ PHILIP DEANE is a correspondent for the London *Observer*.

ALERTE EN AFRIQUE DU NORD, by Roman Fajans. Paris: Peyronnet, 1953. 157 pages, 9 plates, map. 360 fr.

MOROCCO TODAY, by Bernard Newmann. London: Robert Hale, 1953-54. 288 pages, 16 pages halftones, map. 18s.

*Reviewed by Carleton S. Coon*

In May 1952 a Belgian reporter, Roman Fajans, went to Tunisia to see what was wrong. Interviewing everyone he could reach, of all parties and persuasions, and doing documentary research as well, he succeeded in making sense out of a troubled political situation, as narrated in the first part of *Alerte en Afrique du Nord*.

In 1881 France and Tunisia signed the Treaty of Bardo, giving France protectorate rights. Since then Frenchmen have tilled huge estates, built roads, bridges, and harbors, wiped out certain diseases, and spread French culture widely. Young Tunisians have gone to France to work and to study. In 1952 the French of Tunisia, many of whom were born there, up to the third generation, numbered 150,000, or 4.3 percent of the total population.

In contrast to the excellence of its technical and cultural works, France showed no consistent administrative policy. Until 1914 this made little difference, but between world wars the increasingly numerous group of French-educated Arabs grew more and more restive, wanting more part in the government than the Bardo treaty granted them. In 1930 Habib Bourguiba started the Neo-Destour party, which soon received the support of the labor unions; then the local Communists, led by French renegades, muscled into the theater of unrest. Meanwhile Paris continued vacillating. Fajans predicted in 1952 that unless France adopted a firm policy Tunisia would

follow Vietnam and Bourguiba would become another Ho Minh. In 1954 M. Mendès-France agreed to partition Vietnam and has offered the Tunisians self-government.

Moving westward to Morocco, Fajans finds that it resembles Tunisia in the rise and manner of organization of nationalist movements and in the lack of a French policy, but that the two countries differ as follows: Morocco contains two native peoples to Tunisia's one; the Sultan is a spiritual leader of ancient tradition, the Bey a temporal ruler only; Tunisia has usually been a province, while Morocco was an empire; Morocco is three times as populous as Tunisia and many more times richer; Tunisia has been under French tutelage for 70 years, to Morocco's 40. Thus Tunisia has had time to produce a larger class of disgruntled intellectuals than Morocco, and has taken the lead in nationalist agitation. Yet where Tunisia goes, Morocco will shortly follow.

Fajans divides the blame for the present situation in Morocco between the vacillation and decadence of the Paris government, the machinations of the Communists, the immaturity of the Nationalists as egged on by the Arab League, the fumbling interference of the Americans (he specifically names Franklin Roosevelt and Mark Clark), and, most of all, the corruption, venality, and arrogance of a whole class of French colonial nouveau-riche capitalists who despise the Moroccan people and close the door to other Europeans and Americans.

Had Fajans developed even more strongly one aspect of his last point, that the arrogance of some French colonists, who treat Moroccans like fourth-class citizens, is the greatest of all sources of trouble, this reviewer would agree with him. However, Fajans at one point says that American newspapers have no more right to expose unjust conditions in Tunisia than French papers would have to talk about matters in Texas. This ignorance of America exemplifies the author's principal weakness in an otherwise very perceptive book. Like many other Europeans, he needs a new Columbus to show him the size and unity of the world.

*Morocco Today* is the account of a journey through Morocco made in May 1952 by a well-known British travel lecturer, who had pictures of himself taken riding a mule and eating with a local dignitary. Writing about

daily life, politics, economics, justice, and the future, he assumes an attitude of conspicuous impartiality which fails to disguise his admiration of the French and his low opinion of the Nationalists, and of Americans as well.

The text contains an inadequate and in some places incorrect historical sketch, some moderately useful observations of current conditions, and some possibly valid predictions. Yet its virtues are seriously marred by frequent repetition and by a barrage of stale jokes and shabby puns (e.g., chapter heading: "Way Down Sous") obviously intended for lecture audiences but likely to offend any serious and intelligent reader who wishes to learn something about Morocco.

Aside from subject matter, the two books have little in common.

♦ CARLETON S. COON, Curator of Ethnology at the University Museum, University of Pennsylvania, has recently returned from an expedition to Afghanistan, Siam, and Northern Australia.

## TURKEY

LA TURQUIE, by Jean-Paul Roux. Paris: Payot, 1953. 192 pages. 750 fr.

*Reviewed by Niyazi Berkes*

This useful book by M. Jean-Paul Roux of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in Paris covers the geography, economy, history, civilization, and culture of modern Turkey. Part I, which in about 50 pages deals with physical and human geography together with the economy of Turkey, is largely descriptive and factual. Part II, dealing with the history of the Turks from the early Turks (whom the author calls proto-Turks) of the 7th century B.C. to the present day, is on a more scholarly level. In about 75 pages, the author gives a very good sketch of the history of the Hiung-nus, the Tu-kius or Tüürüks, the Uygurs, the spread of Christianity, Buddhism and Islam in Central Asia and the Islamization of the Turks, the empires of the Great Seljuks and the Anatolian Seljuks, and, finally, of the Ottomans. He then describes, in separate chapters, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the modern republic of Turkey. The author also gives some information on the Turkish-speaking peoples of the Soviet Union.



However, he does not include in his historical treatment the medieval Muslim states in India, Persia, and Egypt, which were founded by Turkish dynasties — apparently because these were Turkish only insofar as the ethnic origins of the dynasties were concerned. Nevertheless, they are significant to our understanding of certain aspects of the political, administrative, fiscal, and military history of the Muslim Near East. Part III deals with culture and civilization, both in the past and at present. Religion, language, literature, music, and art are taken up in turn; so also such movements of thought as pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, socialism, secularism, and Westernization.

The book seems to be written for the general public rather than the specialist. In some sections it resembles a traveler's guide, giving, for example, lists of banks and museums. On the whole, it is a useful and reliable book for those who want to learn something about the Turks and Turkey in general. Since the author's scope is wide, topics such as economic and social conditions or present-day cultural movements receive only cursory treatment. For this reason there are some minor confusions. Mentioning Ziya Gökalp among the leading novelists and story writers, side by side with such names as Burhan Felek and Ercüment Ekrem, is rather an amusing juxtaposition. There are also a few unjustifiable mistakes in the spelling of proper names. It is regrettable that the author did not follow a consistent transcription system, according to either the French or the Turkish spelling.

In spite of such minor shortcomings, M. Roux's book is a comprehensive, sympathetic, reliable, and well-thought-out volume on Turkey and the Turks.

◆ NIYAZI BERKES of the University of Ankara, Turkey, is a visiting professor at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal.

## LINGUISTICS

ESSENTIALS OF MODERN TURKISH, by Herman H. Kreider. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1954. 328 pages. \$5.00.

*Reviewed by Sidney Glazer*

Although not explicitly so stated, *Essentials of Modern Turkish* seems to be a revision of

the author's *First Lessons in Modern Turkish*, published in 1945. Except for some practice material and the two glossaries, it is a completely new book and extremely attractive in its sturdy binding, clear print, and typographical accuracy.

Anyone who intends to go to Turkey for any length of time or who would like to be able to read modern Turkish will find Mr. Kreider's manual an excellent introduction to the language. Even without a teacher an intelligent student possessing adequate motivation could, if it were necessary, work his way through the 42 well-organized lessons in as many days, because none of them is overcrowded with forms, syntactic rules, or vocabulary. The author has paid due regard to the principle of frequency and gradation of difficulties; rarities, exceptions, etc., have been omitted so that the basic structure of the language can be clearly seen and, owing to the simple and lucid explanations, readily learned.

Each lesson contains a small amount of morphology, several rules of grammar amply illustrated, a number of typical sentences, a vocabulary recapitulating the new words employed, some English to Turkish exercises, and a short selection from a Turkish literary text. Only the first 19 lessons contain the English to Turkish exercises and a key to them is placed in the back of the book. The author's idea of inviting "isolated students with no other means of having their translations corrected" to correspond with him was generous, if impracticable. It would have been preferable had he continued the English to Turkish sentences beyond Lesson 19 and provided a key to them as well as to the remaining reading passages for the benefit of teacherless students. Indeed one of the main defects of the book is the insufficiency of practice materials which puts the heavy burden on teachers of seeking more themselves. These are necessary both to ensure greater comprehension of the grammatical rules and to facilitate vocabulary learning.

We question the desirability of devoting almost half the book to a 7,000-word Turkish-English and 9,000-word English-Turkish vocabulary that was constructed in accordance with no declared or readily deducible principles, but loaded with purely literary and comparatively uncommon words, e.g., *serbetçiotu*, "hop plant"; *sundurma*, "roof without walls";



*sünger taşı*, "pumice stone"; *müseddes*, "hexagon"; *iblik*, "capon." On the other hand, we could not find such important modern words as *bakan*, "cabinet minister"; *başkent*, "capital"; *belirtmek*, "to make clear"; *işbirliği*, "cooperation"; *basın toplantısı*, "press conference"; and many others occurring on the first page of every newspaper. Almost everyone who is studying Turkish or is planning residence in Turkey will want or need to read the daily press, magazines, and non-fiction books. It is unreasonable to expect to find bound within the covers of a single easily-handled volume on grammar a good dictionary, i.e., one that includes all the words that the majority of readers wants to know. Anything less, no matter how many more words are listed than actually occur in the book, serves no really useful purpose, for it will still be necessary to consult a dictionary. Instead of the bulky glossary, we wish that Mr. Kreider had furnished additional reading passages and more colloquial idiomatic phrases and sentences in natural conversational style. He has given us too many artificial creations like "The mischievous child began to pluck flowers from the tree"; "If the man beside you is a shepherd, tell him to bring us a lamb"; and "Gradually the women, though they had been one, two or three, came to be five." The lack of an index is especially regrettable. However full, a table of contents (in the present instance including not only lesson headings but paragraph topics, numbered consecutively) for a book with reference value cannot take its place.

The above criticisms are minor and do not touch on the basic pedagogical soundness of *Essentials of Modern Turkish*. There is no doubt that, as the author states, "the student who has familiarized himself with the material in these lessons can go forth in self-confidence, knowing that he will encounter no unexplored territory." Few grammar textbook writers have made this claim, fewer still have come so close to justifying it.

☉ SIDNEY GLAZER is Consultant on Near East Bibliography for the Library of Congress.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

### General

*Alexander und Asien: Geschichte eines Geistigen Erbes*, by F. Altheim. Tübingen, Germany: Nie-

meyer, 1953. 320 pages, 2 maps. DM 32.00. Divided into four main parts: Zarathustra und Alexander, Alexanders Nachfolger, Ausgang, and Geistiges Erbe.

*Atlas of Islamic History*, compiled by Harry W. Hazard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954. 49 pages. \$6.00. 3rd edition, revised.

*The British in Asia*, by Guy Wint. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. 242 pages, index. \$3.75. A revised and considerably enlarged version of a book published in Great Britain in 1947. Gives a vivid description of the rise and decline of British imperial power in South Asia, contrasts it with Russian expansion into Asia, and examines the far-reaching consequences of the British withdrawal after 1947.

*Communism in Education in Asia, Africa and the Far Pacific*, by Walter Crosby Eells. Washington: American Council on Education, 1954. 231 pages, appendices, index. \$3.00. A report of conditions, events, and opinion in 39 countries of the Near and Far East to give Americans a better perspective on the infiltration of Communist ideology into the schools. Shows the pattern of action and gives interpretation of the causes.

*The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*, by Eugene Staley. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1954. 448 pages. \$5.00. Deals with the history, strategy, and practices of Communism in making converts among people with little experience in self-government. Outlines the alternatives these countries should take and shows importance of Western encouragement of these alternatives.

*Heroes of the Empty View*, by James Aldridge. New York: Knopf, 1954. 428 pages. \$3.95. A novel whose hero, Ned Gordon, is based on T. E. Lawrence in a modern setting. Imaginary Arab tribes of an imaginary country revolt against the corrupt rule of a British-supported government.

*Histoire de la Dynastie des H'amdanides de Jazira et de Syrie*, by M. Canard. Algiers, 1953. 863 pages, 10 maps. £2 17s. 6d. Divided into five parts: Le cadre géographique de l'histoire des H'amdanides; Les debuts des H'amdanides; L'émirat de Mossoul; L'émirat d'Alep; Les H'amdanides et la guerre arabo-byzantine.

*Al-isti'mar wal-mazahib al-isti'mariah [Colonization and its Doctrines]*, by Muhammad Awad. Cairo: Librairie Internationale, 1953. 688 pages. £E.20. Puts into the limelight the "tragedies" of China, India, and Palestine.

*Mémorial: Jean Sauwaget*. Tome I. Damascus, Syria: Institut Français de Damas, 1954. 309 pages. No price listed. Contains a sketch of his life; excerpts from five of his works, including "L'inceinte primitive de la ville d'Alep" and "Comment étudier l'histoire du monde arabe"; and the whole of a posthumous work, "Les merveilles de l'Inde."

*Middle East Economic Papers, 1954*. Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut.

Beirut: Dar el-Kitab, 1954. 153 pages. \$2.50. A collection of essays by economists in the Arab countries. First of an annual series.

*The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics*, by Halford L. Hoskins. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1954. 302 pages, index. \$4.75. An analysis and discussion of the countries of the Middle East and their importance in present world security. Deals with the economic and political issues with which the United States, as leader of the free world since World War II, is concerned.

*The Middle East, 1945-1950*, by George Kirk. New York: Oxford Univ. Press (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954. 319 pages, index. \$7.50. Forms a part of the wartime series of the *Survey of International Affairs (1939-1946)*, and continues through 1947-1950. From 1951 onwards the Middle East will be dealt with in the annual *Survey* volumes.

*Report on Africa*, by Oden Meeker. New York: Scribner's, 1954. 470 pages, illus. \$5.00. Primarily concerns those areas of Africa which have settler minority communities, but touches also on Ethiopia and the Sudan.

*Al-siyasah wal-istratiqiyah fil-shark al-awsat [Politics and Strategy in the Middle East]*, by Husayn Fawzi al-Naggar. Cairo: Librairie Internationale, 1953. 672 pages. £E.75. Deals with geography, economic resources, political significance, and strategic value of the Middle East.

*Summary of Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1952-1953*, Issued by the UN Department of Economic Affairs. UN Publication No. 1954-II.C.2.

### Algeria

*Blue Veils, Red Tents: The Story of a Journey across the Sahara*, by René Gardi. Trans. from the French by Edward Fitz-Gerald. London: Hutchinson (Toronto: McGraw-Hill), 1953. 239 pages, illus. 21s.; \$4.65. Impressions of a journey in Algeria in 1916. The author was principally concerned with the Touaregs and the M'zabites.

*Les débuts de la dynastie Sa'dienne*, by Roger Le Tourneau. Algiers: Institut d'Etudes supérieures Islamiques d'Alger, 1954. 64 pages. No price listed. Vol. IX in the series of the Institute's studies. Professor Le Tourneau brings the story up to the death of Sultan Mohammed ech-Cheikh.

*Mountains in the Desert*, by Louis Carl and Joseph Petit. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954. 318 pages, illus. \$3.95. Account of a search for prehistoric drawings in the Hoggar region of the Sahara.

*Sahara*, by René Leclerc. Garden City, N. Y.: Hanover House, 1954. 280 pages, illus. by Georges Tairraz. \$3.95. A popular history of the Sahara

and the men who lived and died there in attempts to open this desert to the world.

*Le Sahara français*, by Robert Capot-Rey. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1953. 564 pages. 2000 fr. An extensive survey of the physical, human, and economic geography of the Sahara.

### Arabia

*Beiträge zur historischen Geographie des vorislamischen Südarabien*, by H. von Wissmann and M. Höfner. Wiesbaden: Akad. Steiner für Wiss. und der Lit. in Mainz, 1952. 167 pages. DM 21.00. A cartography of Southwestern Arabia. Contains a detailed map of the whole area between a meridian slightly east of San'a' and Shibam in the Hadramaut. Takes the reader on a tour of South Arabia, starting at Najran and ending in the lower part of the Wadi Hadramaut.

*The Road to Mecca*, by Muhammad Asad. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954. 400 pages. \$5.00. Account of the author's journey from the interior of Arabia to the Holy City in 1932. Also concerns his conversion to Islam. The author was born Leopold Weiss, was a correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, and played a part in the setting up of the state of Pakistan.

### Egypt and the Sudan

*Die biographischen Inschriften der ägyptischen Spätzeit*, by Eberhard Otto. Leiden/Köln: E. J. Brill, 1954. vii+199 pages. Gld. 25. Volume II of the series *Probleme der Ägyptologie*.

*Egypt at Mid-Century: An Economic Survey*, by Charles Issawi. New York: Oxford Univ. Press (Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1954. 276 pages, biblio., index. \$3.40. A largely rewritten version of *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, published in 1947. Describes the geographical, historical, political, and cultural background and devotes several chapters to recent social and political trends.

*Egyptian Adventures*, by Olivia E. Coolidge. Illus. by Joseph Low. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1954. 209 pages. \$3.00. For ages 12 to 16.

*Farewell Farouk*, by Austin L. Moore. Chicago: Scholars' Press, 1954. 66 pages. \$2.50. A Fulbright grantee and professor at Cairo University describes the events of the last year of King Faruq's reign and deals with the role of student, politician, and press in fomenting revolution.

*The Fighting Sudanese*, by H. C. Jackson. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954. 85 pages. \$2.00. Primarily an account of the part played by the Sudanese in World War II.

*Growing up in an Egyptian Village*, by Hamed Ammar. New York: Grove Press, 1954. 237 pages, appendices, index, biblio. \$6.00. A study of the social and psychological aspects of education in

a village community in which an interdisciplinary approach had been adopted. Wherever possible, the author has tried to perceive culture at its three levels: the functional, the historical, and the psychological.

*Histoire de l'Égypte*, by M. Brion. Paris: Fayard, 1954. 488 pages. 900 fr. A chronology of the Pharaohs from prehistory through Cleopatra.

*History of Egypt, 1382-1469 A.D.* Trans. from the Arabic Annals of Abu L-Mahasin ibn Taghri Birdi, by William Popper. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1954. Part I (1382-1399), 206 pages, \$2.50; Part II (1399-1411), 220 pages, \$2.50. Volumes 13 and 14 in the University of California Publications in Semitic Philology.

*A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1953*, by John Marlowe. New York: Praeger, 1954. 404 pages, biblio., appendices, index. \$6.00. Starting from 1800, it brings the story through the international conferences of the 19th century to the completion of the Sudan agreement and the inception of negotiations with Nagib over the future of the Suez Canal Zone.

*Kamūs al-Ādat wal-taqalid wal-Ta'abir al-misriyah* [Dictionary of Egyptian Customs, Traditions, and Expressions], by Ahmad Amin. Cairo: Librairie Internationale, 1953. 487 pages. £E.65.

*The Occult Arts of Ancient Egypt*, by Bernard Bromage. London: Aquarian Press, 1953. 204 pages, illus. 15s.6d. One of the first books to deal exclusively with the magical side of the Egyptian religion.

*The Philosophy of the Revolution*, by Gamal Abd el-Nasser. Cairo: Dar al-Maaref, [1954]. 73 pages. No price listed. In his Introduction the author says "these impressions" are not an attempt "to explain the objectives of the Revolution of July 23rd [1952] and its events." His pamphlet is rather "an attempt to explore the conditions surrounding us, past, present and future, and find out the path along which we can proceed."

*Al-qanun al-dawli al-khass fi al-jinsiyah wa markaz al-ajanib* [Private International Law on Nationality and the Status of Foreigners], by Ahmad Musallam. Cairo: Librairie Internationale, 1953. 191 pages. £E 1.50. Presents a wide background of the theories adopted by different countries, with special stress on the status of foreign institutions in Egypt.

*Sharh qanun al-islah al-zira'i* [Explanation of the law of Agrarian Reform], by Muhammad 'Ali Arafa. Cairo: Librairie Internationale, 1953. 201 pages. LE.50. An explanation of the legal problems, with emphasis on understanding and application. The author is Professor of Civil Law, Faculty of Law, Cairo University.

## India and Pakistan

*Economic and Social Status of Women Workers in India*. New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Labour, Publication No. 15, 1953. 97 pages. Rs. 1. Has chapters on legislative measures for the protection of women workers, their employment, wages and earnings, working conditions, etc.

*Education in Pakistan*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954. 92 pages. 35¢. Based on data gathered in Pakistan in May and June 1952. Contains comparatively more information on institutions of higher learning than on other phases of education. Request by Catalog No. FS 5.3:954/2.

*India and Pakistan: A Continent Decides*, by Lord Birdwood. New York: Praeger, 1954. 284 pages, appendices, index. \$4.50. Published in England in 1953 under its present subtitle, *A Continent Decides*. Is divided into three parts: Internal Problems, External Problems, and Kashmir. Appendices include the preamble to the Constitution of Pakistan; chapter headings of the Indian Constitution; data on the armies of the two countries, political parties, the Portuguese and French territories in India, and Kashmir.

*India since Independence*, by Robert Trumbull. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1954. Headline Series, No. 105. 62 pages, 35¢. In summary fashion reviews, among other things, problems of Partition, elections, community projects, change in family life, new role of women, climate and food, and land reform.

*India without Illusions*, by Vivek [pseud. for A. D. Gorwala]. Bombay: New Book Co., 1953. 216 pages. Rs.44. A series of newspaper articles on Indian foreign and domestic problems which first appeared in the *Times of India* between December 1950 and June 1953.

*Indian Cookery for Use in All Countries*, by E. P. Veerasawmy. New York: British Book Centre, 1954. 230 pages. \$2.75.

*Indien und Pakistan*, by Hans Steche. Berlin: Safari Verlag, 1952. 472 pages, illus., map. DM 14.50. From the Safari geographical series.

*Just Half a World Away: My Search for the New India*, by Jean Lyon. New York: Crowell, 1954. 373 pages, illus. \$5.00. Impressions of the New India by a keen reporter who visited untouchables, Ambassador's officers, the Prime Minister, and many points in between.

*Mahatma*, by D. G. Tendulkar. Vol. 8, 1947-1948. Bombay: Published by the author, 1954. 389 pages. Rs.25. Last volume in a comprehensive biography of Gandhi.

*Men Against the Jungle*, by Ritchie Calder. New York: Macmillan, 1954. 231 pages, illus. \$3.50. Record of a trek from Borneo to Afghanistan and the story of UN special agencies which combat hunger, disease, and ignorance in this region.

*My Public Life: Recollections and Reflections*, by Sir Mirza M. Ismail. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1954. 180 pages. 18s. A record of achievement by an elder statesman in Mysore, Jaipur, and Hyderabad, and his later work for the UN in Indonesia and the Middle East.

*Post-War Agricultural Problems and Policies in India*, by S. Thirumalai. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954. 280 pages.

*Primitive India*, by Vitold de Golish. Trans. by Nadine Peppard. London: Harrap, 132 pages, illus. 30s. An account of four of the primitive tribes of India—the Todas, the Gadabas, the Bondos, and the Kanis—as seen by three French architects.

*Sarvodaya*, by M. K. Gandhi. Ed. by Bharatan Kumarappa. Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1954. 200 pages. Rs. 2/8. A collection of Gandhi's writings on *sarvodaya* but does not give a total picture of his political ideas.

*The Shi'a of India*, by John Norman Hollister. London: Luzac, 1953. 440 pages, illus. £3 3s. Divided into two main parts: the Ithna 'Ashariyah and the Isma'iliyah. The latter part is divided into (1) the Mustaliyah and (2) the Nizariyah.

*Tarikh-i-musalmanan-i-pakistan-o-bharat*, by Sayyid Hashimi Faridabadi. Karachi: Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu, 1953. 665 pages. Rs. 8/8. (In Urdu.) This is the second volume of a general history of the subcontinent and covers the years 1707–1952. Based on a large number of English, Persian, and Urdu works. The sections on the evolution of Urdu have been written with remarkable insight and learning.

*The Transfer of Power in India*, by E. W. R. Lumby. New York: Praeger, 1954. 274 pages. \$4.50. A record of the events from June 1945 to the end of 1947 culminating in the transfer of power, together with related developments in the political and constitutional fields.

### Iran

*Les Papis: Tribu persane de nomades montagnards du sud-ouest de l'Iran*, by C. G. Feilberg. Copenhagen: Kommission Hos Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1952. 166 pages. Kr. 27.50. Reviewed in this issue.

### Iraq

*A Beehive of Construction*, by Mohammed Zaki Abdul Kareem. Baghdad: Ministry of Development, Director of Information, 1954. 15 mimeo. pages. No charge. Reviews the projects of the Development Board established by the Iraqi Government in 1950.

### Lebanon

*National Income of Lebanon*, by Albert Y. Badre and Economic Research Institute Staff. Beirut: Economic Research Institute (American Uni-

versity of Beirut), 1953–54. Mimeographed. No charge. A series of monographs as follows: (1) Agricultural Sector; (2) Construction Sector; (3) Industrial Sector; (4) Services Sector; (5) Government Sector; (6) Transportation Sector; (7) Real Estate Sector; (8) Trade Sector; (9) Financial Sector (in preparation); (10) Rest of the World (in preparation). To be published in one volume when completed.

### Israel and Jewish History

*Between Past and Future: Essays and Studies on Aspects of Immigrant Absorption in Israel*, ed. by Carl Frankenstein. Jerusalem: Henrietta Szold Foundation for Child and Youth Welfare, 1953. 335 pages. Contributions by 10 authorities, including the editor.

*Data and Plans Submitted to the Jerusalem Conference, October 1953*. Jerusalem: Government of Israel, Ministry of Finance, 1953. 227 pages. £1 2.500. Deals with economic development over the next five years.

*Ha-hok ha-plili: Halacha l'maaseh [The Criminal Law in Theory and Practice]*, by Uriel Gorney, assisted by Aharon Kedron. Tel Aviv: Dinim Press, 1954. 440 pages. \$8.00. Gives the text of the Criminal Code of 1936 with amendments and nearly 1,000 cases and precedents arranged in classified sections.

*Haligah ha-'arvit [The Arab League], 1945–1954*, by Asher Goren. Tel Aviv: 'Ayanot, 1954. 389 pages, index. £1 3.750.

*Israel*, by Theodor Meyseles and others. New York: Praeger, 1954. 304 pages, maps. \$5.00. Nagel's Travel Guides series.

*Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, by E. R. Goodenough. New York: Pantheon, 1953. 3 vols. 1,000 pages. \$25.00. Aims to discover the religious attitudes of the Jews in the Greco-Roman world through the mass of archaeological remains which have survived. Vol. III is entitled *Illustrations*.

*Kleine Schriften zur Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, Vol. 1, by Albrecht Alt. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1953. xii + 357 pages. DM 26.00.

*Rescue and Liberation: America's Part in the Birth of Israel*, by Isaac Zaar. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., 1954. 306 pages. \$4.50. In his preface the author promises to give a "documented review of the non-sectarian effort to smash the conspiracy of silence around the greatest tragedy of a martyred people in the days of Hitler and to mobilize decent America for aid and comfort to the embattled Jews of Europe and Palestine."

### Morocco

*Anthropologie et groupes sanguins des populations du Maroc*, by N. Kossowitch. Paris: Masson, 1954. 116 pages, illus. 2200 fr.



*Le Maroc à la croisée des chemins*, by Gen. J. Charbonneau. Paris: E.T.L., 1953. 200 pages, illus. 450 fr.

*Vue générale de l'histoire berbère*, by Lhaoussine Mtouggu. Paris: Maison des Livres, 1953. 198 pages. 450 frs. The first nine chapters deal with the history of the Berbers; the last three with their present-day position.

### Palestine

*The Holy City: The Pageant of Jerusalem's Thirty Centuries of History*, by Albert N. Williams. New York: Duell, 1954. 411 pages, illus. \$6.00. Describes the significance of Jerusalem in the development of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and annotates the numerous conquests and political regimes which have controlled Jerusalem's destiny.

*Jerusalem de l'Ancien Testament: Recherches d'archéologie et d'histoire*. Part I, *Archéologie de la ville*, by R. P. Vincent, O.P. Paris: Gabalda, 1954. 372 pages. 10,000 fr. Treats of the extension, ramparts, fortresses, palaces, hydraulic installations, etc., of the town. The 2nd volume will treat of the Temple.

*The Palestine Problem Today: Israel and its Neighbors*, by Carl Hermann Voss. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953. xvi + 64 pages, illus., maps, index. Cloth \$1.50; paper 75¢.

*Le royaume latin de Jérusalem*, by Jean Richard. Preface by René Grausset. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954. 368 pages. 800 fr.

*Ta'rikh al-quds [The History of Jerusalem]*, by 'Arif al-'Arif. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1954.

### Somaliland

*Rapport du Gouvernement Italien à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies sur l'administration de tutelle de la Somalie 1953*. Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato P.V., 1954. 528 pages. No price listed. Available from the Office of the Italian Representative to the United Nations, 270 Park Avenue, New York 17, N. Y.

### Turkestan

*The History of Bukhara*, trans. by Richard N. Frye from a Persian abridgment of the Arabic original by Narshakhi. Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1954. 178 pages. \$5.00 (\$4.00 to members of the Academy). The Arabic original was written about 943 A.D., and was translated into Persian about 1128 by Abu Nasr Ahmad al-Qubavi, who also brought the story down to the year 975. This was abridged in 1178-9 by Muhammad ibn Zufar ibn 'Umar, who also made additions from other works.

### Turkey

*Alacahöyük*, by Hâmit Zübeyr Koşay. Ankara: Turkish Press, Broadcasting and Tourist Department, 1954. 46 pages of text, 37 pages of illus. Available free of charge at the Turkish Information Office, 444 East 52nd St., New York 22, N. Y. This pamphlet in English gives an historical survey and describes the excavations at Pazarlı, Büyük Gölücek and Boğazköy, and the museum at Alacahöyük.

*Economic and Social Aspects of Farm Mechanization in Turkey*. A Study by a Committee of the Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara. Sponsored by the Special Mission to Turkey for Economic Cooperation, Foreign Operations Administration, United States of America. 105 mimeo. pages. No price listed.

*Die Einkommenssteuerreform in der Türkei*, by Nasuhi Bursal. Winterthur, Switzerland: Keller, 1953. 216 pages. Sw. fr. 18.75.

*History of Mehmed the Conqueror*, by Kritovoulos. Trans. from the Greek by Charles T. Riggs. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954. 222 pages. \$5.00. First English translation of a manuscript covering the years 1451 to 1468, written by a Greek who entered the service of the Conqueror.

*Journey to Ankara*, by Marjorie Darling. Illus. by Raymond Greekmore. New York: Macmillan, 1954. 48 pages. \$2.00. A picture story of present-day Turkey for children aged 6-8. Shows the striking contrasts of the old and the new and between the country and the large city.

*Pak-Turkey Alliance Number*. Special edition of *Enterprise* (vol. 3, no. 10). 39 pages. Rs. 1. This special edition dedicated to Turkey contains articles on Turkey's agriculture, economy, education, etc.

*Travel into Yesterday: An Account of Archaeological Journeying through the Plain and the Rough Places of the Roman Province of Cilicia, in Southern Turkey*, by Mary Gough. New York: Doubleday, 1954. 305 pages. \$4.50. Despite the title, primarily an account of roughing it in post-World War II Cilicia.

*Les Turcs à Constantinople du V<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, by Rechid Saffet Atabinen. Istanbul: T.A.C.T. [Türkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu], 1954. 66 pages. 150 fr. A speech by Mr. Atabinen before the Centre des Recherches Historiques (Sorbonne) on May 29, 1953.

### Religion and Philosophy

*Der Gott auf der Blume*, by Siegfried Morenz and Johannes Schubert. Ascona, Switzerland: Artibus Asiae, 1954. 160 pages, illus. Sw. fr. 25. This investigation, written by an Egyptologist and a Buddhologist, inquires into the relationships of the iconographic type of the God on the flower

(lotus blossom) in the Near East and the Far East.

*Islamic Social Framework*, by M. Raihan Sharif. Lahore: Orientalia, 1954. 169 pages. Rs. 6. Endeavors to present the nucleus of an Islamic social framework in an effort to provoke fruitful thinking leading gradually to an ever-improving structure on which the future social framework of an Islamic country can be safely founded.

*The Jewish Sect of Qumran and the Essenes*, by A. Dupont-Sommer. Trans. from the French by R. D. Barnett. London: Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., 1954. 195 pages, illus. 10s.6d. English translation of *Nouveaux aperçus sur des manuscrits de la Mer Morte* (Editions Lasalle, 1953).

*Judaism: An Analysis and an Interpretation*, by Israel Herbert Levinthal. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1954. 285 pages. \$3.50. Historical, philosophical, and ethical approach to the Jewish religion.

*Judaism in Islam: Biblical and Talmudic Backgrounds of the Koran and Its Commentaries*, by Abraham I. Katsh. New York: Bloch, 1954. 244 pages, biblio., indices. \$7.50. Illuminates the general relationship between the cultures of the two great Semitic peoples, and especially the derivativeness of many important elements in the younger of the two religions.

*Mohammed: The Prophet of Islam*, by Abdel Samii Al Misry. Cairo: Librairie Internationale, 1953. 139 pages. £E .20. A glimpse of the life of Muhammad, illustrating some of his human ideals.

*The Principal Upanishads*, ed. with introduction, text, trans., and notes, by S. Radhakrishnan. New York: Harper, 1954. 958 pages. \$10. A new translation of the Hindu scriptures.

*Vom Sufitum: Einführung in die Mystik des Islams*, by T. Burckhardt. Berlin: Barth, 1953. 131 pages. DM 8.80. From the services *Weisheit aus dem Osten*.

### *Bibliography, Linguistics, Literature*

*Bibliography on Southwestern Asia*, by Henry Field. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami

Press, 1953. xi + 106 pages. \$3.00. Contains 3,016 selected titles in Western language in the field of natural history and anthropogeography.

*English-Arabic and Arabic-English Dictionary*, by John Wortabet and Harvey Porter. With Supplement of Modern Words and New Meanings by John L. Mish. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1954. 802 pages. \$8.50. A reissue of a standard work.

*Index general des manuscrits arabes musulmans de la Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris*, by G. Vajda. Paris: CNRS, 1953. 744 pages. 2400 fr.

*Language Reform in Modern Turkey*, by Uriel Heyd. Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society (Oriental Notes and Studies No. 5), 1954. 116 pages. \$1.50. Primarily concerns changes in the vocabulary of written Turkish.

*Scheherezade: Tales from the Thousand and One Nights*, trans. by A. J. Arberry. London: Geo. Allen & Unwin, 1953. 223 pages, illus., 15s. A new translation from the original of "The Brothers Judar," "Aladdin," "Aboukir and Abousir," and "The Amorous Goldsmith."

*A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Economic Literature on the Arabic Speaking Countries of the Middle East*. Economic Research Institute (American University of Beirut). Beirut: Gideon Press, 1954. 199 pages. \$4.50.

*A Selected Bibliography of Articles Dealing with the Middle East, 1939-1950*. Jerusalem, Israel: Economic Research Institute (The Hebrew University), 1954. 95 pages. No price listed. This bibliography, covering 43 periodicals, is arranged according to Middle East (general), Arabian Peninsula, and 8 countries. Under each of these headings are further breakdowns: general, physical geography, modern history (1798-1918), politics and government, society, religion and culture, economics, and finance.

*Studies in North Palestinian Arabic: Linguistic Inquiries among the Druzes of Western Galilee and Mt. Carmel*, by Haim Blanc. Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1953. xi + 139 pages. \$2.00.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress.

With contributions from: Elizabeth Bacon, Ernest Dawn, Richard Ettinghausen, Harvey P. Hall, Sidney Glazer, Louis A. Leopold, Bernard Lewis, M. Perlmann, C. Rabin, Andreas Tietze.

*Note:* It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of the Soviet Union, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Palestine and Zionism*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library, New York.

It would be appreciated if authors of articles appropriate to the Bibliography, in particular those published in journals not appearing among the periodicals listed on pages 370-74, would send reprints or notices of such articles to: Bibliography Editor, The Middle East Journal, 2002 P Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

For list of abbreviations, see page 491. For list of periodicals reviewed, see page 492.

## GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

- 7111 PRINCE PETER OF GREECE AND DENMARK. "The Abul camp in Central Afghanistan." *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 44-53. The Danish Scientific Mission lead by the author came to Afghanistan for ethnographic research. It succeeded in reaching a "mysterious camp" where tribal representatives convened annually to select their rulers, transact civil and commercial business, and engage in sports contests and other forms of diversion.
- 7112 THESIGER, WILFRED. "The Ma'dan or marsh dwellers of southern Iraq." *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 4-25. The Ma'dan inhabit some 6,000 sq. mi. of reed-beds, lagoons, and watercourses — a hot, disease-ridden environment that seems destined to be eliminated by government-initiated drainage projects. The little known people, animals, flora and fauna are described in intimate detail by a trained observer who lived in the area for more than a year.

- 7113 THESIGER, WILFRED. "Buraimi oasis." *Illustr. London News* 225 (Jl 3 '54) 19-21. The noted explorer gives a brief account of the peoples and fauna of this tiny region on the Persian Gulf, which is now an object of contention between Saudi Arabia and Great Britain. *Illustr.*

- 7114 VAN VALKENBURG, S. "The Hashemite kingdom of the Jordan: a study in economic geography." 30 *Econ. Geog.* (Ap '54) 102-16.

## HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 7115 'ALĪ, HĀSHIM AMĪR. "The first decade in Islam." *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 126-38. Advances a new theory regarding the calendar employed by the Muslims during the first ten years of their history.
- 7116 ALOJIAN, H. "Origins of the Armenian colony in Constantinople." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Summer '54) 119-21. The article is an account of the more recent history of the Armenians in Constantinople rather than of their origins. There

- was a large Armenian community in the city as far back as the early 14th century.
- 7117 AYALON, D. "Studies in the structure of the Mamluk army, III." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1, (1954) 57-90.
- 7118 BASETTI-SANI, G. "Conditions de l'apostolat en Egypte au début du XIIIe siècle." *Cahiers d'Hist. Egyptienne* 5 (O '53) 193-216.
- 7119 BERK, NURULLAH. "Fatih Sultan Mehmet ve Venedikli ressam Gentile Bellini." (in Turkish) *Ilahiyat Fak. Dergisi* 2 (no. 2-3) 1953, 143-60. Mehmet the Conqueror as a humanist sovereign—the visit to Istanbul of the famous Italian painter Bellini. Based on Western sources.
- 7120 BIBIKLIOĞLU, TEVFIK. "İstanbul'un iki fatihi II Mehmet ve Atatürk." (in Turkish) *Belleten* 17 (Ja '53) 83-100. Comparisons of the conquests of Istanbul by Mehmet II and by Atatürk.
- 7121 FISCHER-GALATI, STEPHEN. "Ottoman imperialism and the Lutheran struggle for recognition in Germany, 1520-1529." *Church Hist.* (Mr '54).
- 7122 GOITEIN, S. D. "Petitions to Fatimid caliphs from the Cairo geniza." *Jewish Quart. Rev.* 40 (Jl '54) 30-8. Translation and commentary on a letter from a craftsman in Damascus seeking the intervention of the Caliph in a personal matter. The fact that the writer who hoped to attract the attention of the central government to his problem was insignificant apart from his profession shows the high regard in which medieval Islam held artisans.
- 7123 HOPKINS, J. F. P. "The Almohade hierarchy." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 93-112. After studying, on the basis of many sources, the various layers of this highly stratified body politic, the author concludes that most of the classification may have been purely theoretical.
- 7124 KHAN, M. A. MUID. "The Kharijite ideal of Islamic society." *Islamic L.* 6 (F '54) 85-90. These nonconformists advocated close adherence to the Qur'an and traditions which would help to guarantee justice, equality, piety, and fraternity, such as existed in the early days of Islam.
- 7125 KISSLING, HANS JOACHIM. "The sociological and educational role of the dervish orders in the Ottoman empire." *Amer. Anthropologist* 56 (Ap '54).
- 7126 KURDIAN, H. "Armenian-Georgian relations." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Summer '54) 74-84. Discusses, among other things, attribution of the invention of the Georgian alphabet to St. Mesrop Mashtots by the classical Armenian historian Korun.
- 7127 OKIÇ, M. TAYYIB. "Critique of a critique." (in Turkish) *Ilahiyat Fak. Dergisi* 2, no. 2-3 (1953) 219-90. The author replies to a critique of his earlier article on a *fatwa* of Ebussuud concerning Sari Saltik. He deals with the function of the *fatwa* in general, the personalities of both Ebussuud and Sari Saltik, and examines at some length the evidence relating to the first appearance in Southeastern Europe of Islam.
- 7128 O'LEARY, DELACY. "The *ribat*." *Islamic L.* 6 (Ja '54) 17-9. Etymology of this term for "monastery of Muslim dervishes" and a note on its evolution from the concept of a "frontier fortress garrisoned by men who devoted themselves to holy war."
- 7129 SHERWANI, H. K. "Ibn Taimiyah's conception of the state." *Islamic L.* 6 (Ja '54) 5-16. Discusses the noted theologian's views of the imamate, the basis of the imam's power, and his qualifications. To be continued.
- 7130 TRITTON, A. S. "Notes on the Muslim system of pensions." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1, (1954) 170-2. Various references from literature about the system by which members of Arab tribes were paid state allowances under the Umayyads, and the methods by which the tribal registers were compiled.
- 7131 AL-WAZZANI, "Khadijah bint Khuwailid." *Islamic Rev.* 42 (My '54) 5-7. Notes on the wife of the Prophet.
- 7132 YÖRÜKAN, YUSUF ZIYA. "İslam akaid sisteminde gelişmeler ve Ebu Mansur-i Matürîdî." *Ilahiyat Fak. Dergisi* 2, no. 2-3 (1953) 127-42. A modern Turkish theologian examines some problems of authority and reason in the theological literature of the Abbâsîd period.

## HISTORY AND POLITICS

## (Modern)

- 7133 "Cross purposes in Egypt." *Round Table* 175 (Je '54) 223-35. Strong endorsement of the political and economic achievements of the Revolutionary Command Council and a plea for total British withdrawal from the Suez.
- 7134 B., N. "The Spanish zone of Morocco." *World Today* 10 (My '54) 209-18. Franco's active pro-Arab policy coupled with his studied cultivation of good relations with the Arab League states is a major reason why the Spanish Zone has suffered fewer political upsets in recent years than the French. Spain may well imagine the emergence of an independent and united Morocco bound to herself by close cultural and perhaps political ties.
- 7135 L., T. R. "Britain, Egypt, and the Canal Zone since July 1952." *World Today* 10 (My '54) 186-97. The attempt to reach a solution has been hindered less by the differences between the two countries than by the domestic difficulties of each. Since military opinion no longer regards the base as essential, the "position of Britain, or at least of the West, is strong in Egypt. The democratic world can, at a pinch, do without Egypt, but it is extremely doubtful whether Egypt can do without the West." It is apparent that the present Egyptian regime is realistic enough to be aware of this.
- 7136 M., E. M. "The Arab federation plan." *Islamic Rev.* 42 (My '54) 30-2. Analyzes the reasons for the coolness with which this proposal for



unity, advanced by Iraqi Prime Minister Fāḍil al-Jamālī, was greeted by the various Arab countries.

- 7137 AHARONIAN, VARDGES. "The Armenian emancipatory struggle, II, III." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Spring, Summer '54) 55-60, 64-9. Describes the reaction of the Armenians to the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and their role in the Russo-Iranian War of 1826-28. The Russian defeat of the Persians and the resultant Treaty of Turkmenchay of February 1828 led directly to the Russo-Turkish War and the invasion of Turkish Armenia, with fateful consequences for the Armenian people.
- 7138 BARBOUR, NEVILL. "Variations of Arab national feeling in French North Africa." *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 308-20. The patterns of nationalism in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia are each distinctive, thanks to differences of historical background, geography, and French administration.
- 7139 BOUSQUET, G.-H. "Les élites gouvernantes en Afrique du Nord depuis la conquête française." *Welt des Islams* 3, no. 1 (1953) 15-23. As a result of the French invasion some ruling groups disappeared, e.g. the Turkish elements, and were replaced by others; some succeeded in maintaining themselves, e.g. the heads of various brotherhoods.
- 7140 BROADBENT, P. B. "Sudanese self-government." *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Jl '54) 320-30. Analyzes the forces playing on the new government and administrative apparatus and institutions set up to confront them. Brief mention of the development programs being carried out under the second five-year plan.
- 7141 COLOMBE, MARCEL. "Egypt from the fall of King Farouk to the February 1954 crisis." *Middle East Aff.* 5 (Je-Jl '54) 185-92. The significance of these events lies in the fact that for the first time in modern Egyptian history a ruling group (the Army) has maintained its power not by shouting the traditional slogans and denouncing foreign scapegoats, but by mobilizing and exploiting the support of workers and labor unions.
- 7142 DALY, ROBERT W. "First steps into the principles of war." *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 80 (My '54) 538-48. Includes a 7-page analysis of the Russo-Turkish naval battle of Tchesme in the Aegean in 1770.
- 7143 DARBINIAN, REUBEN. "Crucial issues of the day." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Summer '54) 42-57. A truly independent Armenia requires that Armenians in the Near East and elsewhere support in peace and war, if it should come, the Western democracies. The author ably disposes of Turkophobia as well as fear of Armenia's Caucasian neighbors.
- 7144 GLUBB, LT. GEN. J. B. "Violence on the Jordan-Israel border." *For. Aff.* 32 (Jl '54) 552-62. Israeli-organized brutality in dealing with infiltrators, says the commander of the Arab Legion, is a serious mistake in that it neither eliminates incidents nor speeds the arrival of peace. Jordan believes that genuine cooperation between the police of both sides and the holding in check of military forces can solve the border problem.
- 7145 GOBY, J.-E. "Ou vécurent les savants de Bonaparte en Egypte." *Cahiers d'Hist. Egyptienne* 5 (D '53) 290-301.
- 7146 HAHN, LORNA H. "Tunisia: a challenge to American foreign policy." *Middle East Aff.* 5 (My '54) 159-67. The Tunisian crisis arises from the irreconcilability between the claims of the French and those of the Tunisian nationalists. Although the American dilemma is clearly set forth, no indications of a possible solution are given.
- 7147 HAYDEN, SHERMAN S. "The Arab-Asian bloc." *Middle East Aff.* 5 (My '54) 149-53. This coalition within the United Nations has been "in general ineffectual, at times disturbing, but seldom demonstrating constructive or creative power." Unless the Arab-Asian statesmen become more moderate, they are likely to generate "more passion than wisdom, and more aggravations than solutions." The author discusses the merits of the positions taken by the bloc on various issues.
- 7148 IZZEDDIN, NAJLAH. "The development of Kuwait." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 7 (Mr '54) 39-53. A general sketch containing interesting observations on education and the aspiration of some far-sighted Kuwaitis for the development of their economic resources independent of oil royalties.
- 7149 KAPLINSKI, ZVI. "The Sudan on the threshold of a new era." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 88-96. Victorious in the elections, the National Unity Party is already showing hesitancy about union with Egypt. The difficulty of finding a satisfactory formula for union may well destroy it.
- 7150 MCGHEE, GEORGE C. "Turkey joins the West." *For. Aff.* 32 (Jl '54) 617-30. As a result of Turkey's traditional hostility to Russia and unshakeable determination to maintain her independence and territorial integrity, not to mention the added strength from American material support and the country's progress toward democracy, the West has gained a reliable and potent ally.
- 7151 PERLMANN, M. "Upheaval in Syria and Egypt." *Middle East Aff.* 5 (Ap '54) 120-9. An interpretive review of events from February 1-March 31, 1954.
- 7152 PRICE, M. PHILIPS. "Impressions of a recent journey in the Middle East." *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 104-14. This member of the British Parliament found Turkey politically strong but economically weak, the Arab states superficially enthusiastic over the idea of federation and still bitter at Israel, and Persia less hopeless than commonly believed.

- 7153 SARAFIAN, VAHE A. "Soviet colonialism in the Caucasus." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Spring '54) 112-23. Exposes the contradictions between Soviet preaching and practice as it has affected the Armenians.
- 7154 SHWADRAN, BENJAMIN. "The Anglo-Iranian oil dispute 1948-1953." *Middle East. Aff.* 5 (Je-Jl '54) 193-231. A detailed review of the main stages of the controversy, concluded by a discerning analysis of the attitudes, tactics, and policies of Iran, Great Britain, and the United States.
- 7155 SPAIN, JAMES W. "Middle East defense: a new approach." *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 251-66. Strategically, defense of the Middle East based on the "northern tier" countries rather than on Suez makes sense. Turkey and Pakistan are potentially strong partners, but much must be done in order to give substance to the new approach.
- 7156 THOMPSON, W. J. "Iran today." *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 124-33. Scattered observations on the impact of the discovery of oil on the Persians, the replacement of Englishmen by Americans as the main element in the foreign community, communism, and some developments in engineering and transportation.
- 7157 TUNAYA, TARIK Z. "Elections in Turkish history." *Middle East. Aff.* 5 (Ap '54) 116-9. Fifteen general elections have been held between that in 1876 and the most recent in 1954. Electoral machinery is now properly under the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the government. The constant strengthening of safeguards for secrecy together with attempts at softening campaign propaganda bode well for the future.
- 7158 VERNANT, JACQUES. "L'Occident et le Moyen-Orient: un témoignage subjectif." *Polit. Etrangère* 19 (Ap-My '54) 232-7. Comments on the provocative article of Albert Hourani, "The Decline of the West in the Middle East," *Internat. Aff.* (Jan., Ap. '54), concluding with this question: Given the general anti-Western state of mind that Hourani considers now prevalent in the Arab world, is it in the interests of the West, including the United States, to "cement a union which would apparently be directed against them?"
- See also: 7160, 7162, 7165, 7167, 7171, 7174, 7180.

## ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation and communications)

- 7159 "The westward course." *Economist* (London) 171 (My 15 '54) 546 ff. A special supplement surveying Turkey today.
- 7160 BAER, GABRIEL. "Problems of the implementation of land reform in Egypt." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 73-87. Careful analysis of the progress

of land reform, mainly based on the daily *al-Ahrām*. Conclusions: expropriation has made rapid progress, with little resistance; distribution is slowed down by the fear that it may result in diminished crops; the differences between landed peasants and landless laborers will be intensified.

- 7161 C., F. "L'artisanat sur la côte orientale du Cap Bon." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 2 (1953) 203-26. Economic and social problems.
- 7162 CALLENS, P. M. "Réalités économiques et problèmes sociaux en Tunisie." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 2 (1953) 227-46.
- 7163 COOKE, HEDLEY V. "Foreign investment in the Middle Eastern region, 1944-1953." *Middle East. Aff.* 5 (Ap '54) 109-15. Almost \$4 billion (from American and other Western sources, private and governmental) have been poured into the area. While the benefit to the Middle East as a whole seems slight as contrasted with the gains of the individual recipient countries, it is nevertheless true that "the total situation both in the Middle East and in the world as a whole would be considerably worse today" without this large investment.
- 7164 HANCE, WILLIAM A. "The Gezira: an example in development." *Geog. Rev.* 44 (Ap '54) 253-70. This successful attempt in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to develop a backward area is worth careful study by all those interested in promoting the welfare of the ordinary people. The Gezira farmers now enjoy an exceptionally high standard of living. The taint of colonial exploitation is lacking because of "the degree of social awareness that characterizes the scheme."
- 7165 MONROE, ELIZABETH. "The shakhdom of Kuwait." *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Jl '54) 271-84. A well-written account of how the Kuwaitis are using their new wealth from oil to transform the material and moral basis of their society. Considerable progress has been made due to "sturdiness of character" and the social-mindedness of the ruling Subah family. \*
- 7166 POWERS, W. L. "Soil and land-use capabilities in Iraq." *Geog. Rev.* 44 (Jl '54) 373-80. "Iraq has perhaps greater prospects for agricultural expansion than any other country of the Middle East." Before this can take place, however, it will be necessary to institute a far-flung program to control silt, salinization, floods, erosion, stream migration, and one-crop farming. Simple demonstrations at the village level are essential.
- 7167 TAGHER, JEANNETTE. "Le centenaire de la construction des chemins de fer en Egypte." *Cahiers d'Hist. Egyptienne* 5 (O '53) 256-65.
- See also: 7114, 7140, 7148, 7154, 7156, 7180, 7191.

## SOCIAL AFFAIRS

(General, education, population, medicine and public health, religion, law)

- 7168 "The Cultural Department of the League of Arab States: its organization and programme."

- Internat. Social Science B.* 5, no. 4 (1953) 723-8. Detailed account of activities to date. Includes the text of the Cultural Treaty of 1946.
- 7169 ABBASI, A. DE ZAYAS. "Woman in Islam." *Islamic L.* 6 (Ja '54) 55-61. A study of the Qur'anic concept of *hijab* "moral reserve" which governs the conduct of men and women so as to ensure virtuous living. It covers the relationships between the sexes, mothers and children, women's attire, and public decorum.
- 7170 'ALAVI, MOHD. BADRUDDIN. "Fatalism, free will and acquisition, as held by Muslim sects." *Islamic Culture* 28 (Ja '54) 319-29. The theological arguments of the Jabriyyah, the Qadariyyah, and the Ash'ariyyah, are briefly summarized. No historical or comparative treatment.
- 7171 ALI, SYED WARIS AMEER. "Muslim brotherhoods." *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 134-45. Discusses the historical background and influence of these religious organizations, noting how they were used for both constructive and destructive purposes. Their power has persisted until the present day.
- 7172 ANAWATI, G. C. "Deux textes inédites de mystique et de théologie musulmanes." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 3 (1953) 285-96. (1) Al-Firkāwi's commentary on the *Manāzil al-sā'irīn* and (2) al-Ash'ari's *K. al-Luma'*.
- 7173 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "The *shari'a* and civil law." *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 29-46. Detailed examination of *shari'a* elements contained in the law of the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 and the Syrian Code of 1949 derived from it.
- 7174 AWAD, MOHAMED. "The assimilation of nomads in Egypt." *Geog. Rev.* 44 (Ap '54) 240-52. A part historical and part sociological study of the five different stages in the process of absorbing the nomads.
- 7175 AL-'AZMEH, AHMAD MAZHAR. "Public health and hygiene." *Islamic Rev.* 42 (Je '54) 10-2. Quotations from the Qur'an and *hadith*, with commentary.
- 7176 BUTHAUD, E. "Introduction à l'étude des problèmes humains de l'immatriculation foncière en Tunisie." *Cahiers de Tunisie* 1 (no. 3-4) 229-60.
- 7177 CASKELE, WERNER. "The bedouinization of Arabia." *Amer. Anthropologist* 56 (Ap '54).
- 7178 DAJANI, BURHANI. "The American University of Beirut and the Arab world." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 7 (Mr '54) 17-27. The main task of the University is to present the finest traditions and ideals of the West which the Arabs must assimilate if they are to advance their own civilization.
- 7179 DE ZAYAS, FARISHTA GABRIELLA. "The *zakāt* of gold and silver ornaments, pearls, and precious stones." *Islamic L.* 6 (F '54) 65-75. The author cites legal and theological sources to refute the arguments advanced to justify exemption from payment of the tax prescribed for these articles.
- 7180 GULICK, JOHN. "Conservatism and change in a Lebanese village." *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 295-307. The most marked change in recent years has been the breaking down of the economic isolation and self-sufficiency of the village; kinship ties remain strong.
- 7181 LATIF, SYED ABDUL. "Islam and social change." *Internat. Social Science B.* 5, no. 4 (1953) 691-7. An analysis of Islamic social ideology past and present and its relationship to the great issues facing the Islamic world today.
- 7182 LETELLIER, G. "Attraction des villes et sous-prolétariat en Afrique du Nord." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 3 (1953) 259-76. Essentially, a study of the factors that make urban life almost intolerable; some recommendations for alleviation.
- 7183 LOUIS, A. "La jeunesse tunisienne et les études." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 1 (1953) 1-46. A detailed study of the Tunisian school system.
- 7184 MARMORSTEIN, EMILE. "The veil in Judaism and Islam." *J. of Jewish Stud.* (London) 5 (Ap '54) 1-11. The veil was worn by women in remote pre-Islamic times; later practices in Judaism and Islam were quite similar, e.g., neither Jewish nor Muslim peasants ever wore it. This would seem to suggest that the veil was a symbol of privilege restricted to the well-born. The custom was imitated by townswomen everywhere, but rejected by the innately more conservative rural and nomadic women.
- 7185 REED, HOWARD A. "Revival of Islam in secular Turkey." *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 267-82. There is a resurgence of interest in Islam as a personal religion; theological writers may be opening the way toward a rethinking of Islam in terms more adapted to modern times.
- 7186 ROBSON, JAMES. "*Islām* as a term." *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 101-9. Refutes the belief held by certain Muslims that *islām* means "peace" through analysis of occurrences of the word in the Qur'an, the lexicographers, and the interpretation by the famous exegete al-Baidāwī. Basically, *islām* means "resignation to God," whence it became a name to designate the religion.
- 7187 SERRADJ, M. BENHADJI. "Pratiques saisonnières du Maghreb." *I.B.L.A.* 16 no. 3 (1953) 297-316. Fall and winter among the Azaïli (near Tlemcen) fellahs; proverbs, idioms.
- 7188 TIBAWI, A. L. "Arab education under the caliphate." *Islamic Rev.* 42 (Je '54) 13-8. The first schools in Islam were not established until the 10th cent. A.D. The state-supported system of education consisted wholly of colleges. There were no public elementary or secondary schools to provide large numbers of students qualified for advanced study.
- See also: 7112, 7124, 7125, 7127, 7148, 7156, 7161, 7162.

## SCIENCE

- 7189 AHMED, S. MAQBUL. "Al-Mas'udi's contribution to medieval Arab geography." *Islamic*



*Culture* 28 (Ja '54) 275-86. Investigates his indebtedness to the Greeks and various Muslim scholars, to popular lore, and to *ḥadīth* and ancient tales. Interesting is the suggestion that al-Mas'udi was a Mu'tazilite, which is based on his methods of argumentation and the way in which he refers to the Mu'tazilah.

## ART

(*Archaeology, epigraphy, manuscripts and papyri, minor arts, numismatics, and painting and music*)

- 7190 BONESCHI, P. "Inscriptions humiliantes de monnaies sabéennes." *Riv. degli Stud. O.* 29, no. 1-2 (1954) 17-27. These coins were struck with figures of conquered enemies and engraved with contemptuous references. Antiquity knows several other instances of similar practices.
- 7191 DAVIDOVICH, E. A. "The silver covered copper dirhems of 617/1220 found at Termez." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 43-55. A collection of 78 coins with a list of the titles of the Khwarezm shah; interesting remarks on currency circulation of the 12-13th cent.
- 7192 DOBRYNIN, M. A. "Poetic legends on Saffavid coins." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 63-76. Text, translation, parallels. Illust.
- 7193 ERDMANN, KURT. "Noch einmal zur datierung der Berlin Pegasus-schule." *Archaeol. Anzeiger D. Archaeol. Inst.* (1953) cols. 135-142. Corrects the findings of an earlier article in the same journal (1950-51, pp. 115 ff.) and now dates a well-known glass bowl with applied medallions showing a Pegasus back to the early Islamic period of Iran. Kufic inscriptions are cited as proof.
- 7194 EYICE, SEMAVI. "Une dalle armoriée inédite de l'époque génoise à Amasra." (in Turkish, French summary) *Belleten* 17 (Ja '53) 27-40. Photograph and description of a plaque with a Genoese coat of arms, which the writer dates in 1424 A.D.
- 7195 FOSTER, J. "Crosses from the walls of Zaitun." *J.R.A. Soc.*, no. 1-2 (1954) 1-25. Tomb inscriptions in Arabic (Muslim, dated from 609-789 A.H., and perhaps Christian), and in an unknown language written in Syriac character, from Ch'üan-Chou, Fukien province — Marco Polo's *Zaitun*.
- 7196 KRACHKOVSKAYA, V. A. "V. V. Bartold as a student of numismatics and epigraphy." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 10-23.
- 7197 MASSON, M. E. "Medieval tombricks of the Merv oasis." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 24-35. Dated 12th cent. relics from the region of Merv.
- 7198 MEGRELIDZE, I. V. "An Arabic alphabet in old-Georgian transliteration." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 36-42. Found in an 11th cent. ms. on Mt. Sinai.
- 7199 MELIKSET-BEKOV, L. M. "Four-language inscription of the Jaresjis mountain range, of the Mongol period (1352)." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 56-62. Georgian-Armenian-Persian-Uigur; 5-6 lines in each language concerning the visit of Armenian grandees to the shrine of a Georgian saint.
- 7200 MUSTAFA, MUHAMMAD. "The museum of Islamic art at Cairo, Egypt." *Islamic Rev.* 42 (Ap '54) 19-22. The director of this institution, which was founded in 1903 with 7,000 objects and now numbers some 50,000, describes the outstanding collections. Illust.
- 7201 NYKL, A. R. "Libro conplido en los juizios de la estrellas." *Speculum* 29 (Ja '54) 85-99. Data on the author, translator, and Arabic mss. of *al-Bārī fi aḥkām al-nujūm*, written by the noted astrologist Ibn abi al-Rijāl.
- 7202 ORAL, M. ZEKL. "Kubād Âbâd çinileri." *Belleten* 17 (Ap '51) 209-22. Deals with the tiles of the 13th and 14th cent. A.D. found in this town on Lake Beyşehir in Central Anatolia. They follow the well-known pattern of contemporary Ragga and Rusafa pottery. Illust.
- 7203 ORAL, M. ZEKL. "Kubād-Âbâd nasıl bulundu?" *İlahiyat Fak. Dergisi* 2 (no. 2-3). The director of the Konya Museum gives an account of the discovery and contents of an important Seljuk site, with plan and illustrations.
- 7204 REY, EKREM RESID. "Visages de mosquées." *Türkiye* (Ankara) no. 2 (1954) 17-24.
- 7205 RYGDYLOV, E. R. "On the old-Turkic runic inscriptions of the Baikal region." (in Russian) *Epigr. Vostoka* 8 (1953) 86-90.
- 7206 TOGAN, Z. V. "Topkapı sarayındaki dört cönk." (English summary) *İslam Tetkikleri Enst. Dergisi* (Istanbul) 1 (1953) 73-87. Discusses four celebrated albums in the Topkapı Museum, their history and the painters represented therein.
- 7207 ÜLKÜTAŞER, M. ŞAKIR. "The artistic monuments of Konya and the turbah of Mevlana." *Türkiye* (Ankara) no. 2 (1954) 1-6. Illustrated account of the tomb of the famous mystic poet.
- 7208 ÜNVER, SÜHAYL. "Les arts décoratifs turcs sous la règne de Fatih." *Türkiye* (Ankara) no. 2 (1954) 28-33.
- See also: 7122, 7126.

## LANGUAGE

- 7209 AHMEROV, K. Z. "Linguistics in Bashkiria." (in Russian) *Voprosy Yazykoznaniya* (Moscow) 3 (My-Je '53) 156-8.
- 7210 GERMANUS, AK. J. "Studies in Arabic lexicography." *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 12-28. A chatty miscellany on the Arabic language, style, and the work of philologists, with a brief account of the plans of the Arab Academy.
- 7211 MASSERIAN, F. "The philology of Hrachya Ajarian." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Summer '54) 114-8. Appreciative review of the major published works of this distinguished lexicographer and grammarian of the Armenian language.



- 7212 MIHAYLOV, G. I. "A linguistic conference in the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous S.S.R." (in Russian) *Voprosy Yazykoznaniya* 3 (My-Je '53) 162-7.
- 7213 MOSCATI, SABATINO. "Il plurale esterne maschile nelle lingue semitiche." *Riv. degli Stud. O.* 29, no. 1-2 (1954) 28-52. Seeks to modify the general conception of the formation of the plural as framed by C. Brockelmann almost half a century ago.
- 7214 MUHAMMEDOVA, Z. B. "Notes on the language of the translations of Russian belles-lettres into Turkmen." (in Russian) *Voprosy Yazykoznaniya* (Moscow) 3 (My-Je '53) 81-92.
- 7215 ZHIRKOV, L. I. "On the basic lexical resources of the language of the Dagestan mountaineers." (in Russian) *Voprosy Yazykoznaniya* 3 (My-Je '53) 69-80.
- See also: 7128, 7187.

## LITERATURE

- 7216 'ABBĀS, IHSĀN. "The renaissance of poetry in the Sudan." (in Arabic) *al-Adib* (Beirut) 25 (Ja '54) 40-44. An account of the eternal struggle between the innovators and conservatives.
- 7217 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Soixante ans de pensée Tunisienne, à travers les revues de langue arabe." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 2 (1953) 113-201. A systematic analysis of the ideas expressed in the major Arabic language magazines on language, literature, culture, Islam, the humanities, natural sciences, art, Tunisian and international problems.
- 7218 GRAF, G. "Maymar of Jacob of Sarūg." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 48 (J-F '54). A passage from an Arabic translation of a work ascribed to the 6th cent. Syriac author.
- 7219 GUILLAUME, A. "The biography of the Prophet in recent research." *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 5-11. Report on various theses and editions in progress at the London School of Oriental and African Studies, followed by a discussion of the spurious verses in the *Sirah* of Ibn Hishām, which the author believes were intended as propaganda for "the claims of the Anṣār to pre-eminence in Islam."
- 7220 HUSAINI, QARI SAYYID KALIMULLAH. "Life and works of Zahiruddin al-Bayhaqi, the author of the *Tārīkh-i-Bayhaq*." *Islamic Culture* 28 (Ja '54) 297-318. The history of Bayhaq in Khurasan was used by Qazvini for his *Tārīkh-i-guzida*. Bayhaqi, author of some 80 works, is here established to have lived 493-565/1099-1169. The account of his early education is noteworthy.
- 7221 IBN ABĪ SHANAB, SA'D AL-DĪN. "Arabic language and literature in Algiers." (in Arabic) *al-Adib* 25 (Ja '54) 71-3. Names prominent poets and prose writers; discusses the severe problems of publication which have been responsible for the very meager output of books to date.
- 7222 JABBUR, JIBRAIL. "Al Amir Shakeeb Arslan." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* 7 (Mr '54) 33-8.
- A sketch of the library activity and extensive correspondence of this famous Arab publicist.
- 7223 KHALFALLĀH, MUHAMMAD. "Literary life in modern Egypt." *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54). Essentially, an outline of Egyptian literature from the early 19th century, followed by a discussion of the language problem.
- 7224 KHALŪSHĪ, ŠAFĀ'. "The short story in Iraq." (in Arabic) *al-Adib* 25 (Ja '54). Enumerates the reasons for the failure of this branch of literature to emerge until the 1920's as well as the major difficulties in publication. Lists the principal authors and their best known works.
- 7225 LAMBTON, A. K. S. "The theory of kingship in the *Nasihat ul-mulūk of Ghazālī*." *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 47-55. Comes to the conclusion that the work contains more elements derived from Sassanian statecraft than from Islam.
- 7226 AL-MALĀ'IKAH, NĀZIK. "The free verse movement in Iraq." (in Arabic) *al-Adib* 25 (Ja '54) 21-4. This form of poetry, comparatively new in Arabic literature, is interestingly discussed by a pioneer in the field.
- 7227 MINAS, LOOTFI. "Bedros Tourian." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Spring '54) 109-11. Tourian (1851) is known as the "Armenian Keats."
- 7228 MINORSKY, V. "Vis-u-Rāmīn, III." *B.S.O. Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 91-2. A photograph of the rock of Gūrāb, which plays an important role in the poem by Gurgānī, and a short note on the relation of its theme to the Tristan and Isolde motif.
- 7229 MORTAZAVI, M. M. "*Jām-e-jam*." (in Persian) *Rev. de la Fac. des Lettres de Tabriz* 5 (O-D '53) 86-99. Traces the use of the term in the writings of such mystics as Jalāleddīn Rūmī, 'Attār, Sanā'ī, and others. According to the author, *jām-e-jam* signifies "the illumined soul of the mystic as the medium of revelation of eternal truths and the all-embracing mirror of the ambiguous and inexplicable secrets of creation."
- 7230 PERLMANN, MOSHE. "Another Ka'b al-Ahbār story." *Jewish Quart. Rev.* 40 (Jl '54). Text and summary translation of the account of a meeting between the famous caliph 'Umar and Ka'b, a Jewish convert to Islam, as found in a Cairo ms.
- 7231 RAJJĪ, M. "Al-Duwayhi's chronicle." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 48 (Ja-F '54) 77-81. Stephen Duwayhi (1670-1704), Maronite patriarch, wrote a chronicle on the events of 1095-1699. This chronicle was printed in *al-Mashriq* in 1950. A list of corrections is here included.
- 7232 ROSSI, E. "Due canti di marinai turchi del secolo XVI." *Riv. degli Stud. O.* 29, no. 1-2 (1954) 71-8. Found in a Vatican ms., these two Turkish popular poems are here transliterated and translated. They are interesting both from the historical and from the linguistic points of view.
- 7233 SHIBLĪ, A. "Relations between Nāsif al-Yāziji and Naṣrallāh Ṭarābulusī of Aleppo."

- (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 48 (Ja-F '54) 31-45. 19th century poetic exchanges.
- 7234 TOLEGIAN, ARAM. "Original translations from Daniel Varoujean." *Armenian Rev.* 7 (Spring '54) 37-54. Varoujean was the foremost Armenian poet at the beginning of the 20th century. Each of the quoted poems is preceded by a valuable introduction.
- 7235 WIDMER, GOTTFRIED. "Der spiegel der welt [of Ibrāhīm al-Muwayliḥi]." *Welt des Islams* 3, no. 2 (1953) 57-126. Biographical sketch and translation of this major work of an Egyptian writer (1846-1906) who made a significant contribution to modern Arabic literature.

See also: 7214

## BIOGRAPHY

- 7236 LOUCA, A. "Ellious Bocthor." *Cahiers d'Hist. Egyptienne* 5 (D '53) 309-20. Bocthor was a young Egyptian (1784-1821) who went to France with the retreating army of Napoleon and ended up as a student of French and teacher of Arabic.

See also: 7196

## MISCELLANEOUS

- 7237 "UNESCO's activities in the Middle East countries." *Internat. Social Science B.* 5, no. 4 (1953) 786-805.
- 7238 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Une étape importante de la culture islamique: une parente pauvre de l'imprimerie arabe et tunisienne, la lithographie." *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 4 (1953) 347-85. A stimulating discussion of the reasons—technical, artistic, social, and economic—why the apparently inferior technique of lithography gained a foothold in the Muslim world and maintained itself so long as a transitional stage between the age of manuscripts and printing by type; the specific contribution of Tunisia to its development.
- 7239 MATTHEWS, CHARLES D. "Research in Saudi Arabia." *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 110-25. An account of the wide range of activities, both practical and scholarly, conducted by the research section of the Arabian American Oil Company, e.g., the determination of place names, preparation of a history of Eastern Arabia, tape recording of Arabian dialects, and rendition of technical advice in the production of a motion picture history of the Arabs.
- 7240 VON GRUNEBaum, G. E. "Islamic studies and cultural research." *Amer. Anthropologist* 56 (Ap '54) 1-22.
- 7241 ZAYAT, H. "Paper writing material and manufacture in Islam." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* 48 (Ja-F '54) 1-30.

## BOOK REVIEWS

- 7242 ABBAS, MEKKI. *The Sudan question.* Hamizrah Heḥdash 5. (Winter '54) 138-9. (Z.

Kaplinski). The first book in English by a Sudanese. The author thinks that there is no chance of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Sudan. In spite of its having been belied by events, the book is useful because of its factual and objective approach.

- 7243 ABŪ SHAQRĀ, H. G. H. *Al-ḥarakat fi Lubnān ilā 'ahd al-Mutaṣarrifiyyah.* J.R.A.Soc. no. 1-2 (1954) 78-9. (H. A. R. Gibb). The book is an eye-witness account of the 19th century troubles in Lebanon, taken down from the lips of a Druze.
- 7244 'ALĪ, JAWĀD. *Tārīkh al-'Arab qabl al-Islām*, II. Political section. *Islamic Culture* 28, (Ja '54) 331-2. (M. A. M. Khan).
- 7245 ALLEN, H. B. *Rural reconstruction in action.* R.C.A.J. 41 (Ap '54) 156-7. (Humphrey Bowman). "This is a book which cannot fail to be of interest to anyone who cares for the welfare of the people . . . of the Near and Middle East."
- 7246 ALLEN, W. E. D. and MURATOFF, PAUL. *Caucasian battlefields.* R.C.A.J. 41 (Ja '54) 70-1. (Olaf Caroe). A history of the wars on the Russo-Turkish border during the last century, which includes some consideration of the campaigns in relation to the problems of Middle East strategy in general.
- 7247 ARBERRY, A. J., tr. *An anthology of Moorish poetry [of Ibn Sa'id].* B.S.O. Afr. Stud. 16, no. 1 (1954) 191. (R. B. Serjeant); J.R.A.Soc., no. 1-2 (1954) 75-6. (H. A. R. Gibb).
- 7248 ARBERRY, A. J., ed. *The legacy of Persia.* B.S.O.Afr. Stud. 16, no. 1 (1954) 193-4 (A. K. S. Lambton); *Middle East. Aff.* 5 (Je-Jl '54) 231-2. (Herbert H. Paper). "Interesting and valuable materials are to be found between its covers . . . [although] it falls somewhat short of the standard set by the other *Legacy* volumes."
- 7249 ARBERRY, A. J. tr. *The ring of the dove [of Ibn Ḥazm].* B.S.O.Afr. Stud. 16, no. 1 (1954) 191. (R. B. Serjeant); J.R.A.Soc., no. 1-2 (1954) 75-6. (H. A. R. Gibb); R.C.A.J. 41 (Ap '54) 167-8. (M. H.) "The book is well worth reading for the vivid picture that emerges of its author, for his shrewd observation of men and women, for the sidelights on the brilliant and turbulent life of the last distressful years of the Spanish caliphate, for the queries it must raise . . . on the place of the culture of al-Andalus in European history."
- 7250 ARBERRY, A. J., tr. *Scheherazade.* R.C.A.J. 41 (Ap '54) 172. (G. M. Routh). Four tales from the Arabian Nights presented in a less stilted form than the versions of Lane, Burton, and Payne.
- 7251 ASAD, MUHAMMAD. *The road to Mecca.* Saturday Rev. (Ag 14 '54) 9-10. (Paul L. Hanna). Combines a tale of travel and adventure with "revelation of a man's search for religious certainty." The author is an Austrian Jew converted to Islam.
- 7252 ATIYAH, EDWARD. *Lebanon paradise.* R.C.A.J. 41 (Ja '54) 84. (Mary Rowlett). "This

- novel traces the life of a modern rich Lebanese family. . . . A Palestine refugee camp produces the central problem."
- 7253 AL-BARĀWĪ, RĀSHID. *Ḥaqīqat al-inqilāb al-akhir fī Miṣr*. *Ḥamizrah Ḥeḥadash* 5 (Winter '54) 141-2. (G. Baer). An analysis of Egyptian history and society, most of which was written prior to the revolution by a lecturer on economic history at Cairo University.
- 7254 BARRAT, ROBERT. *Justice pour le Maroc*. *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Jl '54) 382. (Dorothy M. Pickles). "An eye-witness account of the events following the Casablanca riots of December 1952 and leading up to the deposition of the Sultan in August 1953."
- 7255 BERCHER, L., tr. *Etudes sur la tradition islamique* [of I. Goldziher]. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 190-1. (A. Guillaume).
- 7256 BIROT, PIERRE and DRESCH, JEAN. *La Méditerranée et le Moyen-Orient*, I. *Geog. Rev.* 44 (Jl '54) 458-9. (W. Gordon East). "It is not with geopolitics . . . but with basic geography that this . . . work is concerned . . . [it is written] not for the beginner or general reader, but for the more mature and serious student of geography."
- 7257 BLACHÈRE, R. *Le problème de Mahomet*. *Cahiers de Tunisie* 1, no. 3-4 (1953) 341-3. (F. Vire).
- 7258 BOUSQUET, G. H. and BERCHER, L. *Le statut personnel en droit musulman hanéfite*. *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 1 (1953) 85-7. (Ch. Samaran). Text and annotated translation of the *Mukhtaṣar* of al-Qudūrī, a celebrated jurist who was head of the Hanafite school in Iraq. The Hanafite rite is practiced only in Tunisia; elsewhere in North Africa the Malikite holds sway.
- 7259 BUTT, AUDREY. *The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda*. *Ḥamizrah Ḥeḥadash* 5 (Winter '54) 144-5. (Y. Talmon-Gerber).
- 7260 BYNG, EDWARD J. *Die welt der Araber*. *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 345-6. (Eric Fischer). Revision of a book first published in English in 1944. Tends to discuss only the admirable aspects of Arab history and to exaggerate Arab contributions to other cultures.
- 7261 CANARD, MARIUS, tr. *Akhbār ar-rādi billāh wa'l-muttaqī billāh* [of al-Sūli]. *Bibliotheca O.* 11 (Ja '54) 35-6. (Akbert Dietrich). Deals with 'Abbāsīd history from 934-944.
- 7262 CAROE, OLAF. *Soviet Empire*. *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 65-7. (C. P. Skrine). "Valuable and thought-provoking book"; *U. S. Naval Inst. Proceed.* 80 (Jl '54) 816-7. (L. C. Stevens).
- 7263 COOKE, HEDLEY V. *Challenge and response in the Middle East*. *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Ap '54) 253. (S. H. Longrigg). "Many readers . . . will learn much from his pages. The more critical . . . will perhaps feel a certain aridity, or lack of conviction, in Mr. Cooke's work."
- 7264 CORBIN, H. and MOIN, M. *Kitāb jāmi' al-hikmatain* [of Nāṣir-i-Khusraw]. *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 146-8. (Fazlu-r-Rahman). "A very valuable and informative introduction to Ismā'īlī philosophy, containing results of original research in a difficult and obscure field of study."
- 7265 CORBIN, H., ed. *Oeuvres philosophiques et mystiques* [of Suhrawardī]. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 194-5. (A. J. Arberry).
- 7266 CRESSWELL, K. A. C. *The Muslim architecture of Egypt*. *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 67. (John H. Harvey). "The value of the work (which covers the 10-12th centuries A.D.) will be immediately appreciated by Islamic archeologists, but it is only too likely that workers in other fields may overlook his far from negligible contribution to Byzantine, Romanesque, and Gothic knowledge."
- 7267 CURIEL, RAOUL and SCHLUMBERGER, DANIEL. *Trésors monétaires d'Afghanistan*. *J.R.A.Soc.*, no. 1-2 (1954) 100-1. (A. D. H. Bivar).
- 7268 DAGHER, JOSEPH A. *Répertoire des bibliothèques de proche et du Moyen Orient* (UNESCO). *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 190. (J. D. Pearson).
- 7269 DEPARTMENT OF STATE. *Documents on German foreign policy, 1918-1945*. *Middle East. Aff.* 5 (My '54) 167-70. (Lionel Gelber). "The importance of this series is clear. The Middle Eastern trends which it documents may be familiar ones, but now we can see how they appeared to German officials and Nazi agents, what they thought they could do about them and what they could not. Fresh light may not only be shed on dark corners as later volumes are issued. A more authentic picture of recent diplomacy in the Middle East should also gradually emerge."
- 7270 DESPOIS, J. (1) *Le Hodna*. (2) *L'Afrique blanche française*. *Cahiers de Tunisie* 1, no. 3-4 (1953) 332-5. (P. Marthelot).
- 7271 DIB, MOHAMED. *Algérie, I. La grande maison*. *I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 2 (1953) 256-8. (J. Ballet).
- 7272 DONALDSON, DWIGHT M. *Studies in Muslim ethics*. *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 64-5. (D. Cowan). "The most important parts of the book are the chapters on the ethical teaching of al-Ghazālī and the great Persian Ṣūfī poets."
- 7273 ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY. *A selected bibliography of articles dealing with the Middle East, 1939-50*. *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Jl '54) 384. (B. K.). Drawn from over 40 different periodicals, the articles are classified by country or region and then by subject.
- 7274 ELGOOD, CYRIL. *A medical history of Persia and the eastern caliphate*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 194. (A. K. S. Lambton).
- 7275 EPTON, NINA. *Oasis kingdom*. *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54). (Anonymous). "Miss Epton has given us a summary rewrite of official and semi-official documentation interlarded with a number of anecdotes apparently chosen to establish her obviously friendly feeling toward North Africa."



- 7276 FARIS, NABIH AMIN and HUSAYN, MUHAMMAD TAWFIK. *Hada al-'alam al-'arabi*. *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 344-5. (John S. Badeau). Lists the factors drawing the Arab world together and those tending to divide it; concludes that the basic requirement for unity is "an educated populace aware of its own problems and able to direct its own destinies." No practical steps are suggested.
- 7277 FARIS, NABIH AMIN. *The book of idols [of Hishām al-Kalbī]*. *Islamic Culture* 28 (Ja '54) 330-1. (Mohd. Abdul Muid Khan).
- 7278 FAYDĪ (FYZEE) A. A. A., ed. *Da'd'im al-Islām*, I. J.R.A.Soc., no. 1-2 (1954) 99-100. (H. A. R. Gibb). An important source for the study of the history of Islamic law in general and of Ismā'īlī tenets in particular.
- 7279 FIGUERAS, TOMAS GARCIA and JIMINEZ, RAFAEL DE RODA. *Economía social de Marruecos*. *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 349-50. (David M. Hart). "This replete and well-written study of socio-economic problems in Spanish Morocco is one of the best works . . . to appear in recent years."
- 7280 FRAYHA, ANIS. *Essentials of Arabic*. *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 141-3. (R. Bayly Winder). "Offers a new and interesting arrangement of the material of classical Arabic, but is also marred by some deficiencies."
- 7281 FRYE, RICHARD N. *Iran*. *J. Mod. Hist.* 26 (Mr '54) 117-8. (Peter G. Franck).
- 7282 GHALI, MIRRIOT BOUTROS. *The policy of tomorrow*. *Middle East Aff.* 5 (Je-Jl '54) 232-3. (Daniel Garnick). "Mr. Ghali is . . . one of the precursors of the reform and development which are in the offing in Egypt today."
- 7283 GRÄF, ERWIN. *Das rechtswesen der heutigen Beduinen*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 191. (J. Schacht).
- 7284 HAÏRABEDIAN, MÉGUERDITCH. *Les films égyptiens et ceux de Hollywood*. *Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 145-6. (J. M. Landau). The author regards Egyptian productions as moral, American as immoral.
- 7285 HOENERBACH, WILHELM. *Cervantes und der orient: Algier zur Türkenzeit*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 193. (J. F. P. Hopkins).
- 7286 HUREWITZ, J. C. *Middle East dilemmas*. *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Ap '54) 252. (R. W. Bullard). "Gives much information about Middle East problems, but its value is diminished by mistakes and, what is more serious, lapses from the academic standard" (i.e., in judging British policy).
- 7287 HURST, H. E. *The Nile*. *Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 143-4. (D. Amiran).
- 7288 IZ, F. and HONY, H. C. *An English-Turkish dictionary*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 195. (S. Wurm).
- 7289 KEMP, NORMAN. *Abadan*. *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Ap '54) 253. (S. H. Longrigg). A first-hand account of the Iranian oil crisis by a New Zealand journalist.
- 7290 KÜHNEL, ERNST and BELLINGER, LOUISA. *The Textile Museum catalogue of dated tiraz fabrics*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 193. (R. B. Serjeant).
- 7291 LAMBTON, ANN K. S. *Persian grammar*. *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 143-5. (T. Cuyler Young). "For reference, it is excellent; as a teaching tool, a disappointment;" *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 351-2 (Sidney Glazer). "Meritorious in fringe qualities (i.e., clarity of type, error-free printing, simplicity of explanation), but defective in the basic components of textbook construction (i.e., lessons overpacked with rules, over-long vocabularies containing many low frequency items, artificial exercises)."
- 7292 LAMBTON, ANN K. S. *Landlord and peasant in Persia*. *Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 146-7. (U. Heyd and G. Baer); *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 65-6. (A. H. Hourani). "Extraordinarily full and precise collection of all the evidence bearing on the subject," *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 154-6. (C. P. Skrine). "A masterly and admirably documented survey of the past history and present condition of Persia's agricultural economy."
- 7293 LAMBERT, JACQUES. *Manuel de législation algérienne*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 191-2. (A. N. Allott).
- 7294 LANDAU, JACOB M. *Parliaments and parties in Egypt*. *Mid. East. Aff.* 5 (My '54) 171-2. (Marcel Colombe). Based on numerous published works in Egypt as well as primary sources and British and French archival material, this work is a valuable study of Egyptian parliamentary practice since 1866.
- 7295 LÉVI-PROVENÇAL, E. *Histoire de l'Espagne musulmane, III. Le siècle du califat de Cordoue*. *Riv. degli Stud. O.* 29, no. 1-2 (1954) 135-7. (F. Gabrieli).
- 7296 LEVY, R., ed. *A mirror for princes [of Kai Kā'ūs]*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 195. (A. K. S. Lambton).
- 7297 LEVY, R. *The Persian language*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 175-6. (V. Minorsky).
- 7298 LEWIS, BERNARD. *Notes and documents from the Turkish archives: a contribution to the history of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 196. (P. Wittek).
- 7299 LONGRIGG, STEPHEN HEMSLEY. *Iraq, 1900-1950*. *Internat. Aff.* 30 (Ap '54) 251-2. (C. J. Edmonds); *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 341-2. (Albert Hourani). Written with authority, but suffers somewhat from its chronological arrangement and the author's faith in British imperialism; *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 153-4. (H. C. S.). "The fifty years under review have been compressed very skilfully within 400 pages, and no event of any real consequence appears to have been overlooked."
- 7300 LUKE, HARRY. *Cities and men*, II. *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 75-6. (J. E. F. Gueritz). This section of the British diplomat's autobiography relates



- his experiences in Turkey and Palestine from 1915 to 1924.
- 7301 MACMICHAEL, SIR HAROLD. *The Sudan. Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 140. (G. Baer). The book does not pretend to be objective. Its value lies in the description of the evolution of Sudan administration; its main weakness is the failure to consider the role of the religious movements.
- 7302 MAKAL, MAHMUT. *A village in Anatolia. Internat. Aff.* 30 (Jl '54) 383. (C. G. Simpson). "Politically explosive descriptions of Turkish village life . . . This is a book to be read by all who are interested in Turkey"; *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 350-1. (Richard D. Robinson).
- 7303 MARIN, ELMA, tr. *The reign of al-Mu'tasim [of al-Tabarī]. Bibliotheca O.* 11 (Ja '54) 34-5. (Albert Dietrich). The reviewer suggests better renditions for a number of passages.
- 7304 MINORSKY, V. *Studies in Caucasian history. Islamic Culture* 28 (Ja '54) 330. (Hadi Hasan); *J.R.A.Soc.*, no. 1-2 (1954) 76-7. (D. M. Lang).
- 7305 MONTAGNE, ROBERT. *Révolution au Maroc. Internat. Aff.* 30 (Jl '54) 381-2. (R. W. Bullard). "Full of valuable information and interesting comment."
- 7306 NEISSERT, FR. *Studien zur Georgischen wortbildung. Riv. degli Stud. O.* 29, no. 1-2 (1943) 132-4. (G. Castellino).
- 7307 PAOLILLO, M. *Contes et légendes de Tunisie. I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 4 (1953) 421-5. (A. Louis).
- 7308 PAYNE, ROBERT. *Journey to Persia. Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 147. (Gad Fraenkel). The author is convinced that the Persian *Weltanschauung*, with its concentration on splendor, can show humanity the way to redemption. The book does not give a true picture of contemporary Persia.
- 7309 PELLEGRIN, A. *Le vieux Tunis — les noms de rues de la ville arabe. I.B.L.A.* 16, no. 2 (1953) 255-6. (A. Louis). "Une richesse de matériel qu'historien, linguiste, sociologue ou folkloriste pourront . . . facilement exploiter."
- 7310 PHILBY, H. ST. JOHN B. *Arabian jubilee. Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 139-40. (C. D. Matthews); *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 71-4. (E. D.).
- 7311 PURYEAR, VERNON J. *Napoleon and the Dardanelles. J. Mod. Hist.* 26 (Mr '54) 84-5. (E. J. Knapton).
- 7312 RABIN, CHAIM. *Ancient West Arabian. Bibliotheca O.* 11 (Ja '54) 30-4. (A. Spitaler); *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 60-2. (J. W. Fueck).
- 7313 RINGBOM, LARS-IVAR. *Graltempel und paradies: beziehung zwischen Iran und Europa im mittelalter. B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 174-5. (R. N. Frye).
- 7314 ROBSON, J., ed. *An introduction to the science of tradition. R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 76. (A. S. Tritton).
- 7315 ROSENTHAL, FRANZ. *History of Muslim historiography. Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeigen* 207, no. 2-3 (1953) 185-90 (Carl Brockelmann).
- 7316 ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. *Great Britain and Egypt 1914-1951. Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 141. (H. P.). The book is an "instructive example of the British characteristic of equating British interests with absolute justice." Nevertheless, it is a valuable source of information.
- 7317 SADIQ, ISSA. *Sair-i farhang, the March of education. R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 164. (R. Levy). "It deals with every rung of the educational ladder from elementary school to university, with a portion describing how the Ministry of Education is organized."
- 7318 SCHACHT, J. *Esquisse d'une histoire du droit musulman. al-Mashriq* 48 (J-F '54) 119-20. (E. Tyan).
- 7319 SCHACHT, J. *The origins of Muhammadan jurisprudence. B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 176-7. (A. Guillaume). The reviewer objects to Schacht's assumption that historical traditions were invented to prove legal opinions and thus the existing biographies are rendered valueless.
- 7320 SCHULZE-HOLTHUS. *Frührot in Iran. Mid. East. Aff.* 5 (My '54) 170-1. (Richard N. Frye). The exciting adventures of a German intelligence officer in Iran during World War II. "The book conveys the impression, perhaps intended, that many Germans in the underground in Iran did not have their hearts in their work."
- 7321 SCHUON, FRITHJOF. *The transcendent unity of religions. Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 56-8. (A. Siraj Ed Din). The reviewer points out the arguments advanced in the book to confirm the truth of Mohammed's mission.
- 7322 SHIBEIKA, MEKKI. *British policy in the Sudan 1882-1902. Hamizrah Hehadash* 5 (Winter '54) 139. (Gabriel Baer). The author is lecturer on Sudanese history at Khartum University. His book is based entirely on the official correspondence of the period.
- 7323 SPULER, BERTOLD. *Iran in früh-islamischer zeit. Göttinger Gelehrte Anzeiger* 207, no. 3-4 (1953) 190-203. (V. Minorsky). Highly critical analysis and evaluation.
- 7324 STARK, FREYA. *The coast of incense. R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ja '54) 80-1.
- 7325 STARK, FREYA. *The Freya Stark story. Georg. Rev.* 44 (Jl '54) 445-7. (G. M. W.).
- 7326 TAESCHNER, F. *Gihannūma, eine altomanische chronik, I. [of Neshri]. B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 195-6. (P. Wittek).
- 7327 TOGAN, A. ZEKI VELIDI. *Tarihde usul. B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 195. (B. Lewis).
- 7328 ULLENDORFF, E. *Catalogue of the Ethiopic manuscripts in the Bodleian library. B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 173. (J. Leveen).
- 7329 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS. *Review of economic conditions in the Middle East, 1951-2. Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 67-8. (A. H. Hourani).
- 7330 VAN DER MEULEN, D. *Öntwakend Arabië. Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 342-3. (Charles D. Matthews). Vivid picture of King Ibn Sa'ud; interesting strictures on Saudi-Aramco relations.

- 7331 WATT, W. MONTGOMERY. *The faith and practice of al-Ghazālī*. *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 62-4. (M. Hamidullah). The reviewer accuses the author of Christian prejudice and objects to translating *ṣalāt* as "prayer" and *zakāt* as "alms."
- 7332 WICKENS, G. M., ed. *Avicenna, scientist and philosopher*. *J.R.S.Soc.*, no. 1-2 (1954) 100. (H. A. R. Gibb).
- 7333 WEBSTER, CHARLES. *The foreign policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841*. *J. Mod. Hist.* 62 (Mr '54) 86-7. (Frank J. Klingberg).
- 7334 WEILL, J. DAVID. *Le Djāmi' d 'Ibn Wahb*. *Islamic Quart.* 1 (Spring '54) 58-60. (A. Grohmann). Confirms, from owners' marks, Weill's dating of the ms. in the 3rd century and announces the discovery in Qairawan of another complete ms. of the work of the same time.
- 7335 YOUNG, EDWARD J. *Arabic for beginners*. *Muslim World* 44 (Ap '54) 140-1. (Farhat Ziadeh). "Represents one of the very few attempts to present a very difficult subject [classical Arabic grammar] in a gradual manner."
- 7336 YOUNG, T. CUYLER, ed. *Near Eastern*

*culture and society*. *B.S.O.Afr. Stud.* 16, no. 1 (1954) 192-3. (B. Lewis).

- 7337 ZIADEH, NICOLA A. *Urban life in Syria under the early Mamluks*. *Middle East J.* 8 (Summer '54) 346-7. (Ernest Dawn); *R.C.A.J.* 41 (Ap '54) 166-7. (Herbert L. Bodman, Jr.) "Based on a profound study of the original sources for the period, the book would be of great value to students of Arabic history . . . were it not for the broken style, over-segmented organization, inconsistencies in transliteration and capitalization, and grammatical as well as typographical errors."

## NEW PERIODICALS

Kush. *Journal of the Sudan Antiquities Service*. Annual. Single issue, 10s. 3d. Number I, 1953; Number II, 1954 (both issued in 1954; special price, £1). Commissioner for Archaeology, P. O. Box 178, Khartoum, Sudan. Agent: J. Thornton & Son, 11 Broad St., Oxford, England. Publishes articles and notes on all aspects of archeological and historical research prior to 1821, laid down by Sudan law as the limiting date for antiquities.

## ABBREVIATIONS

A., Asian, Asiatic, asiatique  
Acad., Academy  
Aff., Affairs, affaires  
Afr., African, Afrique, etc.  
Amer., American  
Archeol., Archeological, archéologique  
B., Bulletin  
C., Central  
Cent., Century  
Contemp., Contemporary, etc.  
D., Deutsch  
Dept., Department  
East., Eastern  
Econ., Economic, économique  
For., Foreign  
G., Gesellschaft  
Geog., Geographical, géographique, etc.  
Gt. Brit., Great Britain  
Hist., Historical, historique, etc.  
Illust., Illustrated  
Inst., Institute  
Internat., International  
J., Journal  
L., Literature, etc.  
M., Morgenländisch, etc.  
Mag., Magazine

Mod., Modern, moderno, etc.  
Mus., Museum, musée  
Natl., National  
Nr., Near  
Numis., Numismatic, numismatique  
O., Oriental, etc.  
Pal., Palestine  
Phil., Philosophical  
Philol., Philological, philologique  
Polit., Political, politique  
Proceed., Proceedings  
Quart., Quarterly  
R., Royal  
Res., Research  
Rev., Review, revue  
Riv., Rivista  
S., School  
Soc., Society, société  
Stud., Studies  
Trans., Transactions  
U.S., United States  
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
Univ., University, université  
Z., Zeitschrift, Zeitung

### Arabic

K., Kitab, etc.  
Maj., Majallah, etc.

### Russian, Polish, etc.

Akad., Akademii  
Fil., Filosofi  
Inst., Institut  
Ist., Istorii  
Izvest., Izvestia  
Lit., Literaturi  
Orient., Orientalni  
Ser., Seriya  
Sov., Sovetskoye  
Uchon., Uchoniye  
Vostok., Vostokovedenia  
Yaz., Yazika  
Zap., Zapiski

### Turkish

Coğ., Coğrafya  
Fak., Fakülte  
Univ., Üniversite

# LIST OF PERIODICALS REVIEWED

- al-Abhath. Lebanon and Syria, LL9; foreign, £1; single issue LL2.50, 6s. *q* American Univ. of Beirut; agent: Dar al-Kitab, POB 1284, Beirut, Lebanon.
- al-Adib. Single issue LL1. *m* al-Adib, B.P. 878, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Acta Orientalia. 60 forint. *irreg* Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Orientalisztikai Közlönyei, 2 V. Alkotmány-utca 21, Budapest, Hungary.
- Acta Orientalia. Kr. 30; single issue kr. 10. *irreg*. Associates Orientales Batava Danica Norvegica, c/o Ejnar Munksgaard, Ltd., Nørregade 6, Copenhagen K, Denmark.
- Africa. UK, £1 15s; foreign, \$5.25, fr. 1720. *q* International African Institute, St. Dunstan's Chambers, 10/11 Fetter Lane, London, E.C.4.
- African Affairs. £1 4s; single issue 5s. *q* Royal African Society, 18 Northumberland Ave., London, W.C.2.
- African Studies. £1; single issue 5s. *q* Dept. of Bantu Studies, Univ. of the Witwatersrand, Milner Park, Johannesburg, S. Africa; agent: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., 43 Gr. Russell St., London, W.C. 1.
- L'Afrique et l'Asie. 800 fr. *q* I.A.C. 8, rue de Furstenberg, Paris 6e.
- American Anthropologist. Institutions, \$9.00; individuals, \$8.50; single issue \$2.25. *bi-m* Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Chicago, Chicago 37, Ill.
- American Historical Review. \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Historical Association, Study Room 274, Library of Congress Annex, Washington 25, D. C.; single issues available from The Macmillan Co., 60 Fifth Ave., New York 11, N. Y.
- American Journal of Archaeology. \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* Archaeological Institute of America, Andover Hall, Cambridge 38, Mass.
- Anadolu. E. de Boccard, 1, rue de Medici, Paris.
- Anatolian Studies. UK, £1 10s; foreign, \$4.50; single issue £1 12s 6d. *ann* British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, 56 Queen Anne St., London, W.1.
- al-Andalus. 60 pes.; single issue 30 pes. *semi-ann* Secretaria, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Cambio Internacional Serrano 117, Madrid, Spain.
- Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesinin Dergisi. 4 parts per ann Univ. of Ankara, Turkey.
- Annales Archéologiques de Syrie. Syria, LS 20; foreign, £2 10s or equiv.; single issue LS 10, £1 5s. *semi-ann* Direction Générale des Antiquités de Syrie, Damascus, Syria.
- Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales. Algiers, Algeria.
- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Membership, U.S., \$5; Can., \$4.50; elsewhere, \$4; subscription, libraries and other institutions, \$6; single issue, mbrs. \$1.25, non-mbrs. \$2. *bi-m* American Academy of Political and Social Science, 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia 4, Pa.
- Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan. Jordan, JD 1; foreign, £1 plus postage. *ann* Dept. of Antiquities, POB 88, Amman, Jordan.
- Anthropos. Sw. fr. 60. 3 issues per ann P. Fritz Bornemann SVD, Posieux, Freiburg, Switzerland; agent: Stechert-Hafner, 31 E. 10th St., New York 3, N. Y.
- Arabica. Fl. 26; fr. 2400. 3 issues per ann E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; Librairie Orientale et Americaine G.P. Maisonneuve, 198, Blvd. St-Germain, Paris 7e.
- Archiv Orientální. Kčs.100; single issue Kčs.25. *q* Československá akademie věd Orientální ústav, Lázeňská 4, Praha III, Czechoslovakia.
- Armenian Review. \$6; single issue \$1.75. *q* Hairenik Association, Inc., 212 Stuart St., Boston 16, Mass.
- Ars Orientalis (formerly Ars Islamica). *irreg* Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington 25, D. C.
- Art Institute of Chicago Quarterly. \$1. *q* The Art Institute, Adams St. at Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Artibus Asiae. Sw.fr.50, \$12; single issue \$3.50. *q* Prof. Alfred Salmony, Institute of Fine Arts, New York Univ., 17 E. 80th St., New York, N. Y.
- Asian Review. £1; single issue 5s. *q* East & West Ltd., 3 Victoria St., London, S.W.1.
- Asiatische Studien. Sw.fr. 18. *q* A. Francke, A. G. Verlag, Bern, Switzerland.
- Belleten. *q* Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, Turkey.
- Biblioteca Orientalis. \$9.50; single issue \$2. *bi-m* Dr. A. A. Kampman, ed., Noordeindeplein 4a, Leiden, The Netherlands.
- British Museum Quarterly. £1; single issue 5s 3d. *q* Trustees of the British Museum, Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
- Bulletin of the City Art Museum of St. Louis. \$2, \$3 for two years; single issue 40¢, foreign, 75¢. *q* City Art Museum of St. Louis, Forest Park, St. Louis 5, Mo.
- Bulletin of the Cleveland Museum of Art. \$3; single issue 35¢ *m* (10 issues per ann) Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland 6, Ohio.

- Bulletin of the Detroit Institute of Arts.** 80¢; single issue 25¢. *q* Detroit Institute of Arts, 5200 Woodward Ave., Detroit, Mich.
- Bulletin des Études Arabes.** *bi-m* 175 Chemin du Telemly, Algiers, Algeria.
- Bulletin of Faculty of Arts.** Univ. of Cairo, Egypt.
- Bulletin de l'Institut du Desert Égyptien.** By exchange or request. *semi-ann* M. Mitwally, Sec. Gen. de l'Institut du Desert Égyptien, Blvd. Sultan Hussein, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Bulletin of the John Rylands Library.** £1 11s; single issue 15s 6d. *semi-ann* University Press, 316-324 Oxford Road, Manchester 13, England.
- Bulletin of the Museum of Fine Arts.** \$1; single issue 25¢. *q* Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 15, Mass.
- Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.** £1 10s. 3 issues per year School of Oriental & African Studies, Univ. of London, London, W.C.1; agent: Luzac & Co., 46 Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
- Bulletin of the Walters Art Gallery.** \$1; single issue at Museum 10¢. *m* (Oct-May) Walters Art Gallery, Charles & Centre Sts., Baltimore 1, Md.
- Burlington Magazine.** UK, £3; foreign, \$10; single issue 5s, \$1. *m* Burlington Magazine, Ltd., 12 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.
- Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne.** Egypt, £E 1; U.S., \$3.50; elsewhere, \$3.50 plus postage. *q* Mme. Jacques Tagher, Sec. Gen., 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale.** \$6. *q* Lucien LeFebvre, ed., A.218, UNESCO, 19 Ave. Kléber, Paris 16e; agent: Librairie des Meridiens, 119 Blvd. Saint-Germain, Paris 6e.
- Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain.** France, 1500 fr; foreign, 1800 fr; single issue 800 fr, 1000 fr. *semi-ann* Institut d'Études Islamiques, Univ. de Paris; Librairie G.P. Maisonneuve, 198 Blvd. St-Germain, Paris 7e.
- Cahiers de Tunisie** (formerly *Revue Tunisienne*). 1000 fr; foreign, 1200 fr; single issue 400 fr. *q* L'Institut des Hautes Études de Tunisie, 2 rue de Souk-Ahras, Tunis, Tunisia.
- Commentary.** U.S., \$5; foreign, \$6; single issue 50¢. *m* American Jewish Committee, 34 W. 33rd St., New York 1, N. Y.
- Contemporary Review.** £2 5s; single issue 3s 6d. *m* British Periodicals, Ltd., 46-7 Chancery Lane, London, W.C.2.
- Current History.** U.S., \$6; Can., \$6.25; elsewhere, \$6.50; single issue 50¢. *m* Events Publ. Co., 108-10 Walnut St., Philadelphia 6, Pa.
- L'Égypte Contemporaine.** Egypt, £E1.50; foreign, £1 14s; single issue £E.40, 9s. *q* Boite Postale 732, Cairo.
- L'Égypte Industrielle.** Egypt, £E 1; foreign, £1 10s; single issue £E.15, 15s. *m* La Fédération Égyptienne de l'Industrie, Mahmoud Bayram, ed., 26a rue Cherif Pacha, Cairo.
- Ethnos.** Swed. cr. 15; single issue Swed. cr. 4. *q* Statens Etnografiska Museum, Stockholm Ö, Sweden.
- Faenza.** Italy, lire 1000; foreign, lire 1500; single issue lire 200, lire 300. *semi-ann* Direzione del Museo Internazionale delle Ceramiche, Faenza, Italy.
- Foreign Affairs.** \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Council on Foreign Relations, 58 E. 68th St., New York 21, N. Y.
- Fortnightly.** £2 2s; single issue 3s 6d. *m* Fortnightly Review, Ltd., 570 Harrow Road, London, W.9; agent: Horace Marshall & Sons, Ltd., Temple House, Tallis St., London, E.C.4.
- Fortune.** \$12.50; single issue \$1.50. *m* Time-Life-Fortune, Inc., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20, N. Y.
- Geographical Journal.** £1 16s; single issue 8s 6d. *q* Royal Geographical Society, 1 Kensington Gore, London, S.W.7; agent: John Murray (Publ.), Ltd., 50 Albemarle St., London, W.1.
- Geographical Review.** \$7.50; single issue \$2. *q* American Geographical Society, Broadway at 156th St., New York 32, N. Y.
- Hamizrah Hehadash.** Israel, £I 4; foreign, \$6; single issue £I 1, \$1.25. *q* Israel Oriental Society, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel.
- Héspéris.** 2600 fr; single issue 1300 fr. *semi-ann* Secrétariat des Publications, Institut des Hautes-Études Marocaines, Rabat, Morocco; agent: Librairie Larose, 11 rue Victor-Cousin, Paris 5e.
- IBLA.** Tunisia and France, 850 fr; foreign, 1000 fr; single issue 215 fr, 250 fr. *q* Institut des Belles-Lettres, 12 rue Jamaa el Haoua, Tunis, Tunisia.
- Ilahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi.** Faculty of Divinity, Ankara Univ., Cebeci, Ankara, Turkey.
- Illustrated London News.** UK, £5 18s 6d; U.S., (British Edition) \$18, (American Edition) \$16.50; single issue 3s, 35¢. *w* 1 New Oxford St., London, W.C.1; agent: International News Company, 131 Varick St., New York 13, N. Y.
- International Affairs.** UK, £1 5s; U.S., \$5; single issue 6s 6d, \$1.25. *q* Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, St. James's Square, London, S.W.1; 345 East 46th St., New York 17, N. Y.
- International Social Science Bulletin.** \$3.50; single issue, \$1. *q* UNESCO, 19 avenue Kleber, Paris 16e; U.S. agent: Columbia Univ. Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27.
- Iraq.** £1 11s; single issue 18s. *semi-ann* British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 20 Wilton St., London, S.W.1.



- Isis.** \$7.50; single issue \$1.90. *q* History of Science Society, I. Bernard Cohen, ed., Widener Library 189, Cambridge 38, Mass.
- Der Islam.** DM (West) 28; single issue DM (West) 10. *3 issues per year* Schriftleitung des Islams, Prof. Dr. R. Strothmann & Prof. Dr. B. Spuler, ed., Bornplatz 2, Hamburg 13, Germany; agent: Walter de Gruyter & Co., Genthiner Str. 13, Berlin W5 (U.S. Sector).
- Islamic Culture.** Sterling area, £1 10s; elsewhere, \$6; single issue 7s 6d, \$1.50. *q* Islamic Culture Board, POB 171, Hyderabad, India.
- Islamic Literature.** Pakistan, P.Rs. 10/-; foreign, \$3.50; single issue Pakistan, P.R. 1/-; foreign 30¢. *m* Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore, Pakistan; agent: Orientalia, Inc., 11 E. 12th St., New York 3, N. Y.
- Islamic Quarterly.** 30s; single issue, 7s 6d. *q* The Islamic Cultural Centre, Regent's Lodge, 146 Park Rd., London, NW 8.
- Islamic Review.** UK, £1 5s; U.S., \$3.75; single issue 2s 6d, 37¢. *m* Woking Muslim Mission & Literary Trust, Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking, Surrey, England; Moslem Society of USA, 870 Castro St., San Francisco, Calif.; The International Muslim Society, Inc., POB 37, Manhattanville, Station J, New York 27, N. Y.
- Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Otdeleniye Literatury i Yazyka.\*** \$4.50 or £1 10s; single issue 90¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
- Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Seriya Geofizicheskaya.\*** \$4.50 or £1 10s; single issue 90¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
- Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Seriya Geograficheskaya.\*** \$4.50 or £1 10s; single issue 90¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
- Izvestiya Vsesoiuznogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva.\*** \$5 or £1 15s; single issue 85¢, 6s plus postage. *bi-m* Moscow, USSR.
- Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen.** DM 24. *ann* Publ.: Dr. Ernst Hauswedell & Co. Verlag, Fontenay 4, Hamburg 36, Germany.
- Jewish Quarterly Review.** \$6. *q* The Dropsie College, Broad & York Sts., Philadelphia 32, Pa.
- Journal of the American Oriental Society.** \$8; libraries, \$7; single issue \$2. *q* American Oriental Society, 329 Sterling Memorial Library, New Haven, Conn.
- Journal Asiatique.** *q* Société Asiatique, 1, rue de Seine, Paris 6e.
- Journal of Modern History.** \$7.50; single issue \$2.25. *q* Univ. of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
- Journal of Near Eastern Studies.** \$6 in U.S. and Pan American Postal Union; postage added outside PanAm Postal Union; single issue \$1.75.
- q* Dept. of Oriental Languages and Literatures, Univ. of Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, Ill.
- Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.** £2 8s; single issue £1 10s. *semi-ann* Royal Asiatic Society, 56 Queen Anne St., London, W.1.
- \* Agents in the U.S. for Russian publications: Four Continent Book Corporation, 38 W. 58th St., New York 19, N. Y.; Universal Distributors, 52-54 W. 13th St., New York 11, N. Y.
- Journal of World History.** See Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale.
- Kirjath Sepher.** \$5; single issue \$1.25. *q* Jewish National and Univ. Library, POB 503, Jerusalem, Israel.
- al-Kulliya.** £E.20; single issue £E.10. *semi-ann* Khartoum Univ. College, Khartoum, Sudan.
- Levante.** Italy, lire 1800; foreign, \$3.50; single issue lire 500, \$1. *q* Società Editrice "Levante," 6 Via di Villa Ruffo, Rome.
- Libia.** Libya, £L 1; foreign, £1 4s; single issue, £L .250. *q* Via Michelangelo 41, Tripoli, Libya.
- al-Machriq.** Lebanon and Syria, LL25; foreign, \$9; single issue LL4.50, \$2. *bi-m* Fr.I.-Abdo Khalife, S.J., Univ. Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Majallat al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi.** LS10. *q* Damascus, Syria.
- Man.** £1 10s; single issue 2s 6d. *m* Royal Anthropological Institute, 21 Bedford Square, London, W.C.1.
- Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph.** *irreg* Univ. Saint Joseph, Beirut, Lebanon; agent: Librairie Orientale, Place de l'Étoile, Beirut, Lebanon.
- Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin.** Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$5; single issue 50¢. *m* (Oct-June) *q* (July-Sept) Metropolitan Museum of Art, 5th Ave. at 82nd St., New York 28, N. Y.
- Middle East Journal.** Free to mbrs.; subscr. \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Middle East Institute, 2002 P St. N.W., Washington 6, D.C.
- Middle Eastern Affairs.** \$2; foreign, \$2.50; single issue 20¢, 25¢. *m* (10 issues per ann) Council for Middle Eastern Affairs, 11 W. 42nd St., New York 36, N. Y.
- Miscelanea de Estudios Arabes y Hebraicos.** No price listed. *ann* Escuela de Estudios Arabes (Universidad de Granada), Casa del Chapiz, Granada, Spain.
- Le Muséon.** 300 Belg. fr. *2 double vols. per year* Le Muséon, 9 Ave. des Hêtres, Héverlé-Louvain, Belgium.
- Muslim World.** \$3; single issue 75¢. *q* Dr. Kenneth Cragg, ed., Hartford Seminary Foundation, Hartford 5, Conn.

- National Geographic Magazine.** \$6.50; foreign, \$7.75; single issue 65¢, 75¢. *m* National Geographic Society, 16th & M Sts. N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
- New Times.\*** \$3.50 or 14s; single issue 10¢, 4d plus postage. *w* Moscow, USSR.
- Numismatic Chronicle & Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society.** £2 2s. *q* B. Quaritch, Ltd., 11 Grafton St., London, W.1.
- Oriens.** TL15; \$5. *semi-ann* Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research, c/o E. J. Brill, Oude Rijn 33a, Leiden, The Netherlands; agent for U.S. & Can.: Prof. Dr. Eberhard, 604 Panoramic Way, Berkeley, Calif.
- Oriens Christianus.** \$4.26. *ann* Harrossowitz, Wiesbaden, Germany.
- Orientalia.** Italy, lire 7300; foreign, \$13.50; single issue lire 2400, \$4. *q* Pontificum Istituto Biblico, Amministr. Pubblicazione, Piazza Pilotta 35, Rome 204.
- Orientalia Christiana Periodica.** Italy, lire 3500; foreign, \$3; single issue lire 1750, \$3. *semi-ann* Pontificum Istituto Orientale; Piazza Santa Maria Maggiore 7, Rome.
- Orientalische Literatur Zeitung.** *q* J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, Scherlstr. 2, (10B) Leipzig, Cr, Germany.
- Oriente Moderno.** \$8. *m* Istituto per l'Oriente, Viale Davide Lubin 2, Rome.
- Palestine Exploration Quarterly.** £1 1s. *semi-ann* Palestine Exploration Fund, 2 Hinde St., Manchester Square, London, W.1.
- Politica Estera.** Italy, lire 1000; foreign, lire 3000; single issue lire 25. *w* Giuseppe d'Amico, Dir., Via Lucrezio Caro 67, Rome.
- Politique Étrangère.** 1800 fr; foreign, 2250 fr; single issue 330 fr. *bi-m* Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère, 54 rue de Varenne, Paris 7e.
- Political Quarterly.** £1 10s; single issue 7s 6d. *q* Turnstile Press, 10 Great Turnstile, London, W.C.1.
- Political Science Quarterly.** Membership \$6; single issue \$1.50. *q* Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.
- Proceedings Royal Society of Historical Studies.** *irreg* 18 Ave. du Baron Empain, Héliopolis, Egypt.
- Quarterly Review.** £1 15s 6d; single issue 8s 6d. *q* John Murray (Publ.), Ltd., 50 Albemarle St., London, W.1.; International News Co., 131 Varick St., New York 13, N. Y.
- Relazioni Internazionali.** Italy, lire 4000; foreign, lire 6000; single issue lire 100. *w* Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionali, Via Clerici 5, Milan, Italy.
- Revue du Caire.** Egypt, £E 2.25; foreign, 2000 fr; single issue £E.20, 200 fr. *m* 3 rue Dr. Ahmed Hamid Said, Cairo; Les Éditions des Cahiers du Sud, 28 rue du Four, Paris 6e.
- Revue Égyptienne de Droit International.** Egypt, £E 1; foreign, £E 1.25. *ann* Société Égyptienne de Droit International, 16 Ave. el-Malika, Cairo.
- Revue des Études Islamiques.** 12 rue Vavin, Paris 6e.
- Revue de Géographie Marocaine.** Free to members, 500 fr to non-mbrs. *ann* Société de Géographie du Maroc, 18 Ave. Poymiran, Casablanca, Morocco.
- Revue Historique.** France, 1500 fr; foreign, 1750 fr; single issue 450 fr. *q* Prof. Pierre Renouvin, ed., 7 Place de la Sorbonne, Paris 5e; Presses Universitaires de France, 108 Blvd. Saint-Germain, Paris 6e.
- Revue de la Méditerranée.** France, 700 fr; foreign, 1000 fr; single issue 130 fr, 175 fr. *bi-m* Univ. d'Alger, 9 rue Trollier, Algiers, Algeria; agent: Presses Univ. de France, 108 Blvd. Saint-Germain, Paris 6e.
- Revue Numismatique.** *q* 95 Blvd. Raspail, Paris 6e.
- Rivista Storica Italiana.** Italy, lire 2000; foreign, lire 3500; single issue, lire 800, lire 1500. *q* Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Galleria Umberto I, 83, Naples, Italy.
- Rivista degli Studi Orientali.** Lire 3000. *q* Istituto di Studi Orientali, Univ. di Roma, Roma.
- Rocznik Orientalni.** Warsaw, Poland.
- Round Table.** UK, £1 10s; foreign, \$5; single issue 7s 6d, \$1.25. *q* 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York St., London, S.W.1.
- Royal Central Asian Journal.** £1 5s; single issue 7s 6d, July/Oct double number 9s 6d, plus postage. *q* Royal Central Asian Society, 2 Hinde St., Manchester Square, London, W.1.
- Saeculum (Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte).** DM 24; single issue DM 7. *q* Verlag Karl Alber, Johanniterstr. 4, Freiburg/Breisgau; V. Karl Alber, Freiburg-München, Germany.
- Sovetskaja Etnografia.\*** \$7.50 or £1 10s; single issue \$2.10, 8s 6d plus postage. *q* Moscow, USSR.
- Speculum.** Free to mbrs.; subscr \$7. *q* Mediaeval Academy of America, 1430 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge 38, Mass.
- Studia Islamica.** Single issue, 650 fr. *semi-ann* Editions Larose, 11, rue Victor-Cousin, Paris 5e.
- Sudan Notes & Records (incorporating Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of the Sudan).** Sudan and Egypt, £E.75; foreign, 18s; single issue £E.40, 9s. *semi-ann* G. N. Sanderson, ed., POB 555, Khartoum, Sudan; agent: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 46 Gt. Russell St., London, W.C.1.
- Sumer (Journal of Archaeology in Iraq).** Iraq, £I 1; foreign, £1 10s; single issue 10s, 15s. *semi-*

- ann* Directorate General of Antiquities, Baghdad, Iraq.
- Swiss Review of World Affairs.* Switzerland, Sw.fr. 20; U.S., \$7; elsewhere, Sw. fr. 30. *m* Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Falkenstrasse 11, Zurich, Switzerland; Univ. of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- Tamuda.* Spain & Span. Morocco, 100 ptas.; foreign, \$4; single issue 60 ptas., \$2.50. *semi-ann* Delegacion de Educacion y Cultura, Tetuan, Spanish Morocco.
- Tarbiz.* \$5. *q* Magnes Press, Hebrew Univ., Jerusalem, Israel.
- Tarih Dergisi.* 4 parts per year Univ. of Ankara, Turkey.
- Türk Dil ve Coğrafya Dergisi.* 4 parts per year Univ. of Istanbul, Turkey.
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## Reader's Commentary

*The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages.*

### A Critique of "The Middle East Defense: A New Approach"

James W. Spain's informative article in *The Middle East Journal*, Volume 8, Number 3 [Summer 1954] gives only one-half of the picture of the implications of the new Middle East defense system based on what he calls the "Northern Tier." Consequently it can give his readers, unfamiliar with military matters, a false sense of security which could be beguiling alike to the Turks and the Pakistani as well as to Americans.

An analysis of the value of a defense system for a specific area such as the Middle East requires an understanding of the defensive and offensive potentialities of the enemy. An advanced defensive area such as the Northern Tier gives advantages to the enemy which may outweigh those which are acquired by the defenders of the Middle East. Mr. Spain's article gives the impression that the whole defense is based on the assumption that the Soviet Union might launch an aggressive military attack upon Turkey and/or Pakistan. Such an assumption needs close examination.

It raises the question as to whether the Muscovites, except in the case of a general war, would attack Turkey or Pakistan. Although Communist armies might rapidly sweep across the Thracian plain and capture Istanbul, they would find it a long and arduous task to invade Anatolia from the west with Istanbul as a base. The eastern approaches to Sivas and Ankara, although not impregnable, are so formidable that, against adequate defense, an invasion from Transcaucasia would require a major military effort over a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the Russians must know that a military attack upon Turkey would bring both Great Britain and the United States into a Turkish Russian War which would then become a global war. Such a conflict would confront the Soviet Union with battle fronts in Europe, in the Middle East and the Far East. It seems highly unlikely that the Russians would risk an attack upon the Turkish Republic except in the case of the outbreak of a third world war.

It is therefore logical to think the "Northern Defense Tier" has as its main purpose the preparation of an offensive as well as a defensive aim in the event of a global conflict. The question then arises as to whether the Northern Tier in Turkey and Pakistan can be adequately defended against

aerial attack and destruction without invasion by Russian land forces.

Mr. Spain points out in his article and shows graphically by his accompanying chart the Russian territory and targets which lie within a 1,000 mile radius from air bases in Turkey and Pakistan. The area, which can be reached from Anatolia, is of vital industrial and military importance and includes Sofia, Bucharest, Budapest, all of the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The area, which can be reached from Peshawar in Pakistan, does not contain any areas of vital importance to the industrial and military resources of the Soviet Union. Mr. Spain's article and chart give no consideration to the striking power of the Russians.

A compass applied to Mr. Spain's chart would clearly reveal the vulnerability of the Northern Tier. A circle with a radius of 1,000 miles with its center at, or near, Dnepropetrovsk would contain within its circumference all of Turkey, Athens, Piraeus and Salonika, also Belgrade, the Island of Cyprus, the principal cities of Syria and Lebanon. A circle with a radius of 1,000 miles with its center on the Amu Darya River south of Bokhara would contain within its circumference all of Pakistan. The implication of these facts needs to be closely studied in relationship to the value of the "Northern Tier" defense plan.

It must be assumed that Moscow is well informed with regard to the threat to vital areas in southern Russia from the air bases in Anatolia and to the less vital areas in Russian Turkestan from Peshawar. It is more than likely that the Muscovites are far better equipped to defend these areas from destructive aerial bombing than the Turks and the Pakistani are their air bases and cities. It does not seem probable that the United States can afford to provide fully adequate protection to the Northern Tier comparable to that of the Russians.

If these assumptions be correct, the military and industrial potentialities of Greece, Turkey and Pakistan might be destroyed within a few days or weeks after the outbreak of a global war. Should this prove to be the case, the whole "Northern Tier" defense might be wiped out. The valiant Turkish and Pakistani armies would count for little after the destruction of the Turkish and Pakistani cities. The Middle East to the Suez Canal, the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea might then be open to invasion by Russian armies advancing in western Asia and Chinese armies in Pakistan.



The real validity of the "Northern Tier" defense lies largely in the psychological rather than the military sphere. The Russians undoubtedly realize that an attack upon Turkey and/or Pakistan would precipitate a global war. Unless it be the intention of the Russians to launch such a momentous conflict, there is little likelihood of an attack on either of these countries. If, however, there is a global conflict, it is questionable whether the "Northern Tier" defense has any significant military value. Of course, and this it is impossible to ascertain, if the United States and Great Britain can bring

sufficient striking force to bear in Turkey and Pakistan to destroy vital segments of the Russian industrial and military potential from Anatolian and Pakistani bases, the Northern Tier is vital to the defensive and offensive power of the West. Mr. Spain's article gives the impression that such is the case, but it lacks any substantiation due to the fact that Mr. Spain does not adequately analyze the situation.

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
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